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ABSTRACT 
Food Insecurity: The prospects for Food Sovereignty in contemporary East Africa. 
This thesis examines the enduring problem of food insecurity in Africa, with a 
particular focus on Ethiopia and Kenya. It considers food insecurity both in acute 
terms - the occurrence of famine and chronic terms - famine vulnerability. More 
specifically it provides a new interpretation of the causes of food insecurity in East 
Africa, with respect to some of the causal factors and viable solutions. It does so by 
locating the occurrence of famine, and countries vulnerability to it, in the context of 
the global food system. The global food system is, as yet, an under-examined factor in 
contemporary famine analysis, particularly in East Africa and this thesis aims to 
explore it more comprehensively than hitherto. This thesis also makes a substantive 
contribution to understanding the concept of Food Sovereignty in an African context. 
Food Sovereignty deserves to be a more significant part of contemporary narratives 
that at present dominate the political and social dilemmas about food insecurity. 
However there are serious obstacles such as political relationships, land tenure and the 
industrial system of agriculture that hinder the development of Food Sovereignty as a 
viable option. Natural disasters, demographic pressures and ill conceived economic 
policies are an ongoing part of the story but in essence food insecurity is ultimately 
political. This thesis concludes that Food Sovereignty should be explored as a political 
solution to a political problem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the enduring problem of food insecurity in parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, particularly in the East African countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. It considers 
food insecurity both in acute terms i.e. the occurrence of famine and chronic terms i.e. 
famine vulnerability. More specifically it provides a new interpretation of food 
insecurity in East Africa with respect to causal factors and viable solutions. It does so 
by locating the occurrence of, and vulnerability to, famine in the context of the global 
food system (GFS). This thesis examines why the GFS has been overlooked as a 
causal factor in the past and is likely to become a greater factor of food insecurity in 
the future. This thesis also makes a substantive contribution to understanding the 
concept of Food Sovereignty in an African context. Food Sovereignty has not been 
applied seriously to Africa in the past so the time is right to explore the viability of 
Food Sovereignty as a permanent solution to both acute and chronic food insecurity in 
the future. 
Context of thesis 
In terms of regional analysis this thesis concentrates on Africa, not because it is the 
only continent where food insecurity persists, it clearly is not, but because it is 
arguably where the persistence of famine and famine vulnerability is most overtly 
political. In other words political factors are more relevant than economic, geographic, 
climatic or demographic ones.1 According to the Global Hunger Index, developed by 
the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), eight of the twelve countries 
with the highest levels of hunger were in Sub-Saharan Africa (IFPRI 2011). Recent 
IMF data (2011) shows that nine of the ten poorest countries in the world, measured 
by GDP, are in Africa.  All have weak or failed governments, most have a colonial 
history and most have experienced conflict.2 Very little, however, is said about the 
global food system and Africa’s position within it. For this reason, this thesis explores 
the negative impact of the global food system and the possibilities of Food 
Sovereignty in an East African context. The global food system refers to the 
                                                          
1
 Food insecurity in terms of chronic hunger in South Asia, for example, is attributed to chronic poverty 
but the region is considered to be largely famine free due to political safeguards. There are countries in 
Africa, however, where political marginalisation, conflict and ill conceived agricultural policies have 
resulted in periods of acute hunger i.e. famine. 
2
 In descending order the nine countries are: Zimbabwe; Democratic republic of the Congo; Liberia; 
Burundi; Somalia; Niger; Eritrea; Sierra Leone; Central African Republic.  
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increasing integration of the world economy with regard to agricultural production and 
the decreasing capacity of people and governments to have control over it; Food 
Sovereignty is understood as a collective right to control the food supply.3 
The apparent ineradicability of famine in parts of East Africa raises many important 
questions. Africa is a continent endowed with plentiful natural resources and yet parts 
of this continent continue to suffer adversely and disproportionately from vulnerability 
to famine. Africa is also situated within a global context of unprecedented plenty, 
technical know-how and a discourse of fundamental human rights in international law 
and yet famine, and the threat of it, persist. Furthermore, Africa, in general, and East 
Africa in particular has been the focus of development projects for decades and 
attracted billions of dollars in aid. In a UK context the focus on Africa accelerated 
during the Blair era culminating in a ‘Year for Africa’ in 2005 during which Tony 
Blair’s commission for Africa was launched (Gallagher 2011, Porteous 2008). Despite 
this focus, however, political actors and policy makers have failed to eradicate famine 
vulnerability in any permanent sense. It is in this context that the concept of Food 
Sovereignty becomes relevant, not least because it has had little influence on African 
politics and it is important to understand why this should be. 
This thesis starts from the premise that famine and famine vulnerability in Africa are 
complex issues with both national and international causes. This complexity, 
however, is understood in terms of the political economy of the region. This means 
that African food insecurity is conceptualised, primarily, with regard to power 
relationships. This approach is distinct from previous approaches, which have 
theorised famine at the individual level through notions of ‘entitlements’ (Sen 1981), 
or in terms of unsustainable population growth (Brown 1995; Hardin 1977, 1993), or 
have situated famine solely within the context of conflict (de Waal 1989, 1990, 2006). 
These relationships are considered at a local and national level in the context of 
government responsibility to their own people and at an international level in terms of 
the inequity of power relationships between economically dominant and economically 
dependant countries. Specifically, this thesis examines the power relationships that 
dominate the global food system (GFS) and offers a challenge to the political basis 
and social implications of the modern production and distribution of food. Such a 
                                                          
3
 See section below on defining the terms for an elaboration.  
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challenge demands a serious exploration of alternatives to the free market, and its 
inherent inequities, as the primary basis of the modern food system. This challenge is 
made, explicitly, within the context of examining Food Sovereignty as a coordinated 
reorientation of the global food system. 
It is difficult, if not meaningless, to talk about African food insecurity as a whole. The 
diversity of the food situation across the continent precludes this. However, official 
organisations, such as the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 
state that Sub-Saharan Africa has, in general, become less food secure in recent 
decades (IFPRI 2006; Oxfam 2005; SOFI 2011).4 The countries of East Africa 
examined in this thesis are selected on the basis that there is a demonstrable causal 
relationship between the development of the GFS and a worsening of their food 
security over recent decades. In addition the rising incidence of large-scale land 
acquisition or ‘land-grabbing’ by foreign governments or agencies is an issue of 
growing concern with regards to food insecurity in this region. 
The importance of political factors in explaining vulnerability to famine has long been 
recognised. As noted by David Arnold, 
Food was one of the principle sinews of power. Its importance was felt at all 
levels of society, both by those who suffered directly for want of basic 
sustenance and those whose authority, security and profit were threatened by 
the indirect consequence of dearth and mass starvation (Arnold 1988: 3). 
That food has always been used locally or regionally for political ends is not in 
question, but it is fair to say that two things are different in the approach of this work. 
First, while it recognises that the degree of inequality between those who do not have 
enough to eat and those who do has never been so great (Collier 2007; Pogge 2003), 
this has yet to be linked more directly to the global food system.5 This is the primary 
aim of this work. Second, while there is agreement from across the political spectrum 
that such gross inequalities could disappear, or at the very least diminish considerably 
in scope, Food Sovereignty has not been seriously explored as a solution. This thesis 
                                                          
4
 The IFPRI 2011 Global Hunger Index does show an improvement in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, 
but, importantly, the data does not take into account the recent food crises in the horn of Africa during 
2011.  
5
 It should be qualified, of course, that food inequality is partly a function of the over-consumption of 
the ‘food rich’ so inequality, per se, may not be reduced simply by increasing food production. 
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is concerned, therefore, with how to ensure a basic level of nutrition beneath which no 
one should have to live and this issue will be considered explicitly through the 
concepts of the global food system (GFS) and Food Sovereignty. 
Defining the terms. 
To minimise confusion and ambiguity it would be helpful at this stage to define the 
key terms in this thesis such as food insecurity, famine, famine vulnerability, the GFS 
and Food Sovereignty,.6 
Food insecurity 
Food insecurity is defined by the FAO as ‘people who live with hunger and fear of 
starvation’ (SOFI 2003). Food insecurity therefore refers to more than just officially 
recognised or quantified famine but also to conditions that increase vulnerability to 
famine. Food insecurity can be thought of as the opposite of food security. Food 
security is a technical term that has increased in use over recent decades primarily as a 
result of the growth in international agricultural trade. The concept of food security 
has changed significantly over time and these changes have been reflected in national 
and international trade and agricultural policies.7 In the post-war era so-called 
‘developed’ nations pursued what have been referred to as ‘agricultural productivist 
frameworks’, which prioritised national self-sufficiency, against a background of 
wartime supply disruption (Lee 2007). But this perception (and pursuit) of food 
security as food self-sufficiency has been eclipsed with the development of more 
highly integrated and international food supply chains.8 In nation states that are home 
to high levels of under-nutrition and hunger, food security strategies are also being 
shaped by trade considerations. Food security has been defined in at least 200 ways 
(Smith, Pointing & Maxwell 1992), which in terms of trying to establish clarity of 
meaning renders it rather unhelpful. 
The term is also frequently differentiated by reference to scale, from the food security 
of households to regional, national and global food security. Likewise, food insecurity 
can be differentiated in the same way. The scope of food security is also differentiated. 
It may involve a pre-occupation with aggregate imports and exports or be implicated 
                                                          
6
 For example terms such as ‘famine’, ‘hunger’, ‘starvation’, ‘malnutrition’ and ‘under-nutrition’ are 
often used interchangeably when they are, in fact, conceptually and analytically different.  
7
 See Chapter 4. 
8
 See Chapter 2 
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in the maintenance of rural livelihoods. Food security, considered at the level of the 
household, necessarily incorporates a wide-range of factors including demographics, 
land, production, consumption, reproduction, entitlements, kinship and customs. Thus 
the household as a unit of analysis and intervention connects food security to a 
complex network of social activity. 
Famine 
Famine is a troublesome word and has often been defined in a fairly narrow sense, 
typically, for example, as ‘severe shortage of food, as through crop failure or 
overpopulation; acute shortage of anything; violent hunger’ (Collins 2004) or ‘virulent 
manifestations of intense starvation causing substantial loss of life’ (Kumar 1990: 
173). It has been shown, however, that famines have occurred in the absence of food 
shortages (Sen 1981) and indeed loss of life may not be directly attributed to 
starvation (de Waal 1989). Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) offer a more statistically 
precise definition of famine, by stating that it occurs in a situation where more than 5 
people in 10,000 are dying every day because of lack of food (Whiting 2005). 
However this perception of famine as a discrete event triggered by food shortages and 
resulting in mass starvation has been increasingly challenged over the last two 
decades. Works by Devereux (1993, 2000, 2007); de Waal (1989, 2006); and Sen 
(1981, 2001), for example, have clearly shown that mass starvation is only one, albeit 
the most horrendous, outcome of the famine process. Other consequences of famine 
include economic destitution, fertility decline, distress or involuntary migration, 
breakdown of communities and exposure to new diseases. In other words, it may not 
be starvation per se that kills during famines but other associated consequences. In 
this thesis the presence of any or all of these factors increase, what will be referred to 
as, vulnerability to famine. This thesis rejects the general depiction of famine, in 
modern Western discourse, as a short-term disaster or ‘something simple, huge and 
apocalyptic’ (de Waal 1989: 3). Rather, famine is understood as a process which 
allows for a distinction between famine and famine mortality. From this perspective 
famine is understood as a disruption to a way of life, including hunger, destitution and 
loss of assets. It sometimes, but not always, involves death and this is of major 
importance in any attempts at preventing its occurrence. In de Waal’s analytical 
framework there are famines and famines that kill (de Waal 1989). This broader 
interpretation of famine is most appropriate in this thesis because of the centrality of 
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the GFS and the way it will be linked, causally, to both acute famine and increased 
vulnerability to famine in East Africa. At a general level the terms chronic food 
insecurity and famine vulnerability will be used interchangeably in this thesis although 
it is important to note the subtle differences between them. For example, chronic food 
insecurity may be a result of absolute poverty and no other factors, whereas famine 
vulnerability may result from specific agricultural policies or malevolent government 
practices. In other words certain groups may be intentionally targeted to create 
conditions of famine vulnerability, which may lead to acute famine.9 Equally, it is now 
well understood that the occurrence of famine, particularly those that adversely affect 
livestock, can increase vulnerability to famine in following years. This may occur 
even though rain or crop production has returned to normal, or better than normal, 
levels.10 
It is agreed that as long as we continue to view famine as synonymous with starving to 
death we are unlikely to eradicate it. However, if we conceive famine as ‘an extended 
economic and political process’ (Keen 1994b: 7) we can at least begin to develop 
effective preventative measures. Though accepting that there are environmental 
factors such as drought, land degradation and areas of unsustainable population 
density, these are not absolute requirements for famine to occur.11 
Henceforth, the term famine will be used to refer to a social phenomenon in which 
access to food in a given population falls below a minimum level necessary to provide 
members of that society with sufficient nutrition for a prolonged period of time. Its 
occurrence leads to a significant increase in the likelihood of death from starvation or 
hunger related diseases or other diseases relating directly to the famine process. Thus 
it is not only those famine events that result directly or immediately in the deaths of 
thousands or millions that are of concern in this thesis.12 The relentless, ongoing 
suffering and disruption to livelihoods and entire communities, caused by chronic 
food insecurity is of equal concern. This is more than just semantic wrangling because 
it has been shown that the lack of an agreed definition of ‘famine’ has had serious 
                                                          
9
 There is an abundance of literature on this theme, see for example, Duffield 1991; Keen 1994, 2000; 
de Waal 1989; 2006.  
10
 See Jamal Osman. ‘Famine in Somalia.’ Guardian Focus podcast, guardian.co.uk, 18 August 2011. 
11
 Somalia and the Sudan, for example, show that fertile regions that are not densely populated may be 
particularly vulnerable to famine because of the political inequalities between certain groups. 
12
 Twentieth century famines in China and the Soviet Union for example, involved mortality rates in the 
millions whereas most recent famines affect numbers in the thousands. See Chapter 1. 
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implications for national and international responses in the past. As noted by Howe 
and Devereux (Devereux (ed) 2007: 28), ‘Operationally, lack of consensus on a 
definition has contributed to late intervention and inequitable distribution of resources 
among areas of need’.13 
In other words defining famine has political significance. This thesis seeks to fill in 
some of the gaps in famine literature and will argue that the notion of famine is more 
encompassing than often recognised. The process of famine includes situations when 
people are unable to take measures that would prevent a famine, defined throughout 
this thesis as famine vulnerability. For those who are dying from acute or chronic 
malnutrition, and related diseases, the debate about whether or not there have been 
sufficient deaths to justify the label of famine is, of course, deeply ambiguous and 
unhelpful. 
The Global Food System 
For the purposes of this thesis, the GFS is critically understood in keeping with the 
International Food Regime Theories (Albritton 2009; Friedmann & McMichael 1989; 
George 1991, 1996; Gibbon 2007, Patel 2007).14 The work of Karl Marx has provided 
the theoretical base for much of the literature on the GFS and inspired many of the key 
critical writers on this subject. It can be noted, however, that one need not be a 
Marxist to agree with the key normative assumptions of his political and economic 
theory and the way it relates to contemporary food insecurity.15 The GFS refers to the 
increasing integration of the world economy with regard to agricultural production and 
the decreasing capacity of national governments, or their people, to pursue policies 
that do not best serve the interests of international capital. For example, in East 
Africa, there has been considerable transfer of land ownership and growth of corporate 
and foreign direct investment in agriculture for export.16 Most countries around the 
globe are closely linked through economic, political, technological and cultural 
relationships, and increasingly, the environment. Actions taken in one country have 
measurable repercussions for others. In terms of avoidable morbidity and mortality 
this interconnection is perhaps nowhere more fundamentally relevant than in the 
                                                          
13
 The authors cite the disproportionate amount of aid to Bosnia 1992-1995 and Kosovo 1998 as an 
illustration of this claim (2007: 29).  
14
 See Chapter 2 on the GFS. 
15
 See Burns (1981) for an accessible reading of Marx’s analysis of capitalism. 
16
 See Chapter 7. 
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provision of food. Interactions between national food supplies, in different parts of the 
world, are taking place with increasing frequency but with more intense and often 
unintended consequences. Policies aimed at boosting economies through increased 
market integration in Africa, particularly in agriculture, have left many countries such 
as Kenya more vulnerable to food insecurity than ever before. Land deal proposals in 
Ethiopia, where millions of people remain dependent on food aid offer another 
tangible example (Horne 2011).17 
From a radical perspective the significance of the global food system lies in its 
contribution to the extension of capitalist relations within the world economy.18 It does 
this by moving more and more of the world’s population further away from direct 
production of, and access to, food thus creating ever more inequitable food markets. 
The commodification of food is crucial to those who view the global food system as 
further extending the ‘capitalist industrialisation project’ (Friedmann 1982; George 
1991,1996). When something is ‘commodified’ it becomes the property of only those 
who can afford to buy it. Whilst this may be acceptable for many goods and services it 
is extremely problematic in terms of adequate food. This thesis will consider this 
development specifically with regard to a measurable increase in famine vulnerability 
in Ethiopia and Kenya. The notion of the global food system is central to the overall 
argument of this thesis in that the persistence of famine needs to be situated in the 
international context, since it is, to a very large degree, an outcome of international 
structures and relationships. There is a fairly new development within the GFS, which 
has seen some national governments leasing vast tracts of land to foreign governments 
for the production of food for their respective countries (FIAN 2010). The prospect of 
increasing foreign investment in agricultural land in East Africa, so called ‘land 
grabbing’19, and the effect this will have on some of the world’s most food insecure 
people forms an important part of the debate on the GFS and the concept of Food 
Sovereignty in this thesis. 
Food Sovereignty 
Food Sovereignty is understood in this thesis as a radical political concept offering a 
                                                          
17
 See Chapters 6 and 7 for a detailed discussion on these two countries. 
18
 See Chapter 2 
19
 The most common definition of ‘land grabbing’ refers to large-scale land acquisition, be it purchase 
or lease, for agricultural production by foreign investors. This phenomenon will be explored in greater 
depth in Chapter 7. 
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political solution to a political problem. It is an extension of the right to food in that it 
demands democratic autonomy for people with respect to food, in a way that the right 
to food does not. Third parties could guarantee the right to food, for example, without 
any input or control by those whose food needs are not being met. This can, and 
indeed has, resulted in total dependency on food aid for some food vulnerable 
communities.20 Food Sovereignty, by contrast, involves the right to consume and 
produce food and a range of other sub-rights, including land rights, so it is a much 
more complex and ambitious idea than the simple right to food. It can be conceived of 
as a ‘collective’ right to Food Sovereignty as opposed to an ‘individual’ right to food.21 
La Via Campesina (translated literally as ‘the peasant way’) is an international alliance 
of peasant organisations, family farmers and workers, indigenous people, landless 
peasants and rural women and youth. This movement has developed an alternative 
proposal for restructuring food production and consumption at the local, national and 
global level, and has become the main global organisation promoting the framework 
of Food Sovereignty.22 Unlike the top down approach, associated with the failed 
attempts of international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, 
the concept of Food Sovereignty proposes that every country and people have the right 
to establish their own policies with regard to their food and agriculture system, 
providing these policies do not harm developing countries.23 Food Sovereignty is 
understood throughout this thesis, in accordance with the seven principles developed 
by La Via Campesina.24 By rejecting the unsuccessful strategy of a generalised, 
internationalised response to food insecurity, this thesis argues in favour of local 
political accountability and the pursuit of Food Sovereignty. Food Sovereignty is a 
more demanding, and more political concept than the traditional concepts of the right 
to food or food security, which have often reduced the issue of famine to a social 
welfare problem. It is more powerful because it includes rights relating to both the 
production and consumption of food, gender equality, and crucially, the emphasis on 
                                                          
20
 Ethiopia, for example, is the largest recipient of the World Banks’ global food crises response 
programme (GFRP). Last year 12 million Ethiopians out of a population just under 90 million are 
estimated to have received food aid (Oakland Institute 2010). 
21
 Arguably the ‘collective’ nature of Food Sovereignty makes it more problematic, to define and 




 See Chapter 3 
24
 See Appendix 3 for a summary of the seven key principles of Food Sovereignty. 
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land-rights. Land tenure has often been overlooked in past approaches to food 
security, particularly food aid, and is a relevant factor in both episodes of acute famine 
and chronic hunger. International organisations and agencies clearly have a role to 
play in the democratisation of local food systems, but it should be one of supporting 
the right of all to have greater control over access to food and protection of their 
fundamental right to do so. At present, Food Sovereignty can be understood as a 
political construct which demands a transition from ‘what is’ to ‘what ought to be’ in 
the global food system. In considering Food Sovereignty as a political project, and its 
relevance to East Africa, this thesis explores the sort of politics, and kinds of agencies 
and alliances that are required to bring about the necessary changes to achieve this 
transition. 
Key Questions and Methods. 
Two key questions are central to this thesis. First, in what ways does the global food 
system, as it is currently constituted, increase food insecurity in parts of Africa? 
Second, in what ways might reorganising aspects of the global food system reduce 
vulnerability to famine in East Africa, with Food Sovereignty as a guiding principle? 
These questions generate a number of lines of enquiry and possible arguments, three 
of which will preoccupy this thesis: 
A1. The failure to think about vulnerability to famine in Africa as a consequence of 
the GFS handicaps attempts to reduce that vulnerability. 
A2. Food Sovereignty is an appropriate solution to famine and vulnerability to famine 
where famine is caused by systemic features of the GFS. 
A3. There are clear obstacles to the adaptation and development of Food Sovereignty 
in an East African context taking account of differences in economic structure, 
political culture, land tenure and institutions of government. 
In order to answer the central questions asked in this thesis, two things need to be 
understood and acknowledged in the approach it adopts. First, contemporary famines 
in East Africa are too complex to be explained by a single factor. Their occurrence in 
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, do not share one single root cause. 
It will be shown that the underlying causes are essentially political rather than simply 
market failures or environmental factors. Second, there is a clear need to establish a 
separation between trigger factors, such as drought, over-grazing or over-population, 
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and vulnerability factors linked to structures and processes such as the GFS, weak or 
corrupt government, civil conflict and neo-liberal economic policies. It is these 
vulnerability factors that are of central importance in this discussion both in how they 
relate to causation but more importantly how they can be reduced by the adoption of 
Food Sovereignty as a guiding and enshrined principle. Vulnerability can be 
understood at many different levels with regard to famine; it maybe political, 
economic, governmental, geographical, social, gendered and so forth, further 
emphasising the complexity of the topic and the need for clarity in approach. In more 
simplistic terms the debate is still often polarised between viewing famine as an ‘Act 
of God’, i.e. triggered by a natural event or alternatively an ‘Act of Man’, i.e. the 
tragic consequences of human activities. For example, virtually all media coverage of 
the current (2011) East African food crises emphasises drought over and above any 
other causal factor. This thesis, however, is more interested in ‘Acts of Man’ and 
places famine on a continuum along with poverty and other political and social 
deprivations. The importance of this distinction, of course, is that from this 
perspective famine is perceived as preventable through political and economic 
intervention. A common thread throughout all the chapters in this thesis is that that the 
main causes of food insecurity fall into two groups: those that are more related to 
national policymaking and those more related to rules and policymaking at the 
international level. This distinction is not always easy to make since, as will be 
demonstrated, so much of national policy making is now heavily influenced by 
international framework conditions. However the differentiation is a useful 
methodological tool to facilitate a more precise understanding of the issues 
particularly in terms of establishing the relevant responsibility of different actors. 
Sources 
This thesis relies primarily on secondary sources and work published over several 
decades by many academics in the field.25 Particular analysts from competing and 
contrasting positions have informed and helped develop the perspective presented in 
this work. Works by Friedmann & McMichael (1989), Gibbon (2007), McMichael 
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(2008, 2009) and Patel (2009) have helped develop the framework of analysis of the 
global food system. The understanding of the framework and development of the 
Food Sovereignty model, expressed here, owes much to the work of Windfuhr and 
Jonsén (2005), Rosset (2006, 2009, et al 2011) and FIAN-International. An abundance 
of research conducted by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) over the last two 
decades, has also greatly informed this thesis. This includes research on early famine 
theories and work on the ‘new variant famines’. The evolution of social ‘safety nets’ 
to one of ‘social protection’ by Steven Devereux and colleagues has been especially 
informative (Devereux 1993, 2000, 2007); Devereux (ed) 2007; Devereux et al 2006; 
Devereux & White 2010). Although none of these authors engage explicitly with the 
concept of Food Sovereignty their work has been instrumental in the way the 
importance and potential of this concept has been developed and advocated by the 
author of this thesis. 
Much of the current data are drawn from research published by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), which is the principal 
organisation responsible for calculating figures on global nutrition and hunger. It is, in 
theory, a neutral forum where all nations meet as equals to negotiate agreements and 
debate policy. There has been public criticism of the FAO for at least thirty years 
especially from those opposed to its perceived ‘neo-liberal’ agenda of promoting 
Western style intensive farming and the export of cash crops. Indeed many NGOs 
have urged the FAO to do more to protect the ‘right to food’ of the poor rather than 
protecting the profits and intellectual property rights of companies involved in 
agribusiness.26 Its statistical division (FAOSTAT) produces an online, multilingual 
database with records from more than 210 countries, covering statistics on areas 
including agriculture, nutrition, food aid, land use and populations. In addition, The 
State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) published annually by the FAO is a 
report on the progress and setbacks in efforts to reach the goals, set by the World Food 
Summit (WFS) in 1996, to halve the number of chronically hungry people in the 
world by the year 2015. The most current version available at the time of writing is 
SOFI 2011, which in addition to the earlier SOFI reports, is quoted throughout this 
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work. 
The World Food Programme (WFP), the world’s largest humanitarian agency, is 
another important source of data on famine and food insecurity. The official position 
of the WFP is to strive to eradicate hunger and malnutrition, but its ultimate goal is to 
eliminate the need for food aid itself. The role of food aid both within the current GFS 
and within the concept of Food Sovereignty is highly controversial and will be 
explored in due course.27 Data from official governmental agencies such as the 
Department for International Development (DFID) in the UK and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in the US are also widely referred to. 
A considerable amount of research undertaken by the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) has been used in this thesis. The IFPRI is one of fifteen 
food and environmental organisations supported by the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). There are two aspects of the IFPRI 
emphasis that are particularly pertinent to this thesis. First, the focus is on identifying 
and analysing alternative international, national and local policies for improving food 
security in low-income countries and contributing to the strengthening of people and 
institutions within these countries. Second, it is committed to providing international 
food policy as a global public good thus providing knowledge relevant to decision 
makers both inside and outside the countries where research is undertaken. Both these 
aspects fit very well within a framework of Food Sovereignty. 
Other useful sources of data are the many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
active in the field, such as the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED); UK Food Group which includes Action Aid, Oxfam and Save 
the Children Fund (STC); Action against Hunger (AAH); War on Want; and 
Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). Whilst the UN and its various agencies provide 
reliable figures for multi- and bi-lateral donations, and programmes spending on food 
issues, NGOs tend to provide more localised and specific data and knowledge. FIAN 
(FoodFirst Information and Action Network), for example, has provided much of the 
country specific data used in this work. FIAN is an international human rights 
organisation that has advocated for the realisation of the right to food for more than 20 
years. FIAN follows a case based human rights approach by documenting and 
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analysing concrete violations of the right to food. Since its foundation, FIAN has 
documented more than 400 individual cases of violations.28 Therefore, in terms of the 
global picture of food, the international agencies are often the most revealing, but for 
individual famines and famine vulnerabilities it is very often the NGOs and their field 
workers on the ground that are able to provide the most accurate and unbiased 
accounts. In terms of recent publications on Food Sovereignty and the growing 
phenomenon of ‘land-grabs’ this thesis has greatly benefited from the research and 
analysis generated by the Oakland Institute (OI). The Oakland Institute is a research 
and educational institute whose mission is to bring dynamic new voices into policy 
debates to promote public participation and fair debate on critical economic and social 
policy issues.29 
For the purpose of measuring the level of democracy experienced in the famine prone 
countries discussed, this thesis has used the ‘Freedom in the World Survey’ 2006, 
2009 and 2011 published by Freedom House30 and data from the Polity IV research 
project.31 The ‘Freedom in the World Survey’ is an annual evaluation of the freedom 
of individuals around the world; the 2011 version consists of numerical ratings for 
194 states and 14 select territories. The survey measures individual freedoms 
according to two key categories, political rights and civil liberties which between 
them encapsulate what are considered the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down 
by the 1948 UDHR. The survey does not rate government performance as such, but 
rather the demonstrable rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Importantly, the 
survey recognises that freedoms can be affected by more than just state action, and so 
includes the effects of insurgents or other armed groups, which is very often an 
important factor in terms of food security.32 Thus the survey ratings are able to reflect, 
to a high degree, the interplay of a variety of actors including both governmental and 
non-governmental. This depth of analysis is especially important with regard to the 
close relationship between famine and government accountability at both a national 
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and an international level. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly in terms of originality, this work has been 
informed by many personal testaments from rural farmers and food activists living in 
the Third World.33 Throughout 2010/2011 numerous workshops, seminars and 
meetings have been held in the UK to promote and develop the Food Sovereignty 
framework. These have provided opportunities to share with, and build on, the 
experiences and experiments of those most adversely affected by the current global 
food system. The author of this thesis has endeavoured to include some research that 
demonstrates the complementarity and uniqueness of the different evaluation criteria 
and indicators used by both farmers in the field and scientists in the laboratory. 
Structure of thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven substantive chapters, which address the central 
research questions. These include identifying the problem and understanding the 
causes of recent African famine; establishing responsibility for the occurrence of and 
failure to prevent famine; and investigating the possibilities of Food Sovereignty as a 
long-term political solution to food insecurity. The logic of the argument developed in 
this work is that Food Sovereignty would, to a great extent, eliminate many of the 
causal factors that increase vulnerability to famine and reduce the failures to prevent 
famine, which have existed in the past. 
Chapter 1 outlines the ongoing problem of famine and famine vulnerability in general. 
It explains the significance of famine definitions, and how these relate to appropriate 
responses. This chapter also addresses some methodological issues such as the 
problematic use of many of the terms to describe regional inequalities. These range 
from ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ worlds to ‘developed’ ‘developing’ and 
‘underdeveloped’ countries. These terms are deeply contested and many writers in the 
field now refer to the global ‘North’ and ‘South’ to illustrate global disparities. This 
chapter also aims to clarify the differences between episodes of acute famine and life-
long food insecurity. Although both concepts represent aspects of food insecurity 
there are different conceptual frameworks of analyses and different indicators. This 
chapter ends with a brief section on the countries of Ethiopia and Kenya and explains 
why they were chosen as suitable countries of comparison. 
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The following two chapters introduce the two key components that are central to the 
originality of the argument developed throughout this thesis, the global food system 
and the concept of Food Sovereignty. Chapter 2 explains the global food system and 
how and why it evolved. It demonstrates that the global food system has increased 
vulnerability to both acute famine and vulnerability to famine in parts of Africa, but 
has been neglected in theorising famine in the past. The countries of Ethiopia and 
Kenya provide evidence to substantiate this claim. Chapter 3 introduces Food 
Sovereignty as a political project and examines its origins as a ‘new social 
movement’. It is an evolving concept and one that calls for placing greater emphasis 
on local initiatives that empower those vulnerable to famine. It is illustrative of a civil 
society response to food insecurity and though its origins are in Latin America its 
potential is gaining global recognition. Food Sovereignty as a political concept and the 
potential for its application in an East African context will be revisited in Chapter 7 of 
the thesis. 
Chapters 4 and 5 focus, specifically, on causal aspects of food insecurity in an East 
African context. Demographic theory, in terms of ‘overpopulation’ or ‘too many 
mouths to feed’, was routinely offered as an explanation for both acute famine and 
chronic food insecurity in the past but it is not considered in depth in this thesis.34 Few, 
if any, academics seriously consider over-population as the major cause of famine in a 
current context. Though there may be rural areas that have become unable to sustain 
local populations the root causes are inevitability due to political and/or economic 
policies. The theories of causation that are discussed in this thesis are selected because 
they fit more closely with an analysis of the political determinants of famine. 
Chapter 4 examines liberal economic approaches to famine analysis. This is an 
interesting and challenging perspective inasmuch as free market economics have been 
perceived as both the cause of and the solution to, both chronic food insecurity and 
acute famine. The first section of the chapter looks at micro economic famine 
analysis, with particular attention paid to the contribution of Amartya Sen. This first 
section also acknowledges and brings up to date the literature on the economic 
benefits of famine (Keen 1994a, Devereux 2007). Successful famine prevention 
policies need to consider that the occurrence of famine creates winners as well as 
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losers. Part 2 of this chapter moves on to a discussion on macro-economic theory and 
how this relates to issues of famine vulnerability as understood within an economic 
development framework. The last section of the chapter examines the negative impact 
of structural adjustment programmes (SA) and the role of International Financial 
Institutions in their implementation in Kenya and Ethiopia. This section considers 
how the economic principles of neo-liberalism can not only reduce democracy, 
especially the criteria of accountability (Pogge 2003; Wallerstein 1993), but also 
undermine it (Chandler 2005; Easterly 2006). 
Chapter 5 is a critical assessment of the role played by aid and the politics of food aid 
as a response to food insecurity. This chapter continues the political debate on food 
insecurity in an external context. It does so by considering how the 
‘internationalisation of welfare’, particularly in terms of food provision, has further 
reduced national governments’ responsibility and accountability to their people. It 
makes explicit the link between the evolution of food aid as a form of compensation 
for liberal-economic reforms and the inequalities that arise from conditionalities 
attached to the adoption of free market principles. This chapter clarifies the distinction 
between the disadvantages of current aid policies and the possibilities for a reformed 
and more effective food aid regime. An over-reliance on aid in the past may well help 
explain why the GFS has been overlooked as a causal factor of famine vulnerability. It 
will be shown that the problem of permanent food deficits resulting in the permanence 
of food aid to famine prone countries is a by-product of the current global food 
system. The current food crisis in East Africa (2011) demonstrates only too clearly the 
inherent weaknesses and inequities of such a system. 
Chapter 6 examines the more radical political perspective, which emphasises the 
relationship between famine and power in both a national and international context. 
The central theme of this chapter is that African states that are not responsive to their 
peoples bear some of the responsibility for food insecurity. The role of the State is 
considered in a past and present context, with particular attention paid to the role of 
the Kenyan and Ethiopian governments. The role of the Kenyan government is 
considered, primarily, in a post-structural adjustment context and the reduction of 
democratic control over food policy. Conversely, the Ethiopian government is 
examined through its use of food as a political weapon. This chapter includes the 
more recent approaches to famines, often referred to as ‘complex emergencies’, which 
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link war and famine as a result of purposeful starvation (de Waal 2006; Duffield 2001; 
Keen 1994a). So although famine, as a result of conflict, will obviously have 
demographic, economic and political components, it is essentially perceived as having 
a function in war rather than simply being a result of other, more obvious factors. 
Although this framework of analysis is particularly useful in understanding certain 
famines,35 its weakness lies in the fact that it cannot explain recent African famines 
that have occurred in peacetime, such as in Malawi for example (Devereux (ed) 2007). 
It does however offer an opportunity to examine the mismanagement, and therefore 
accountability, of particular African governments to their populations. The Ethiopian 
famines during the 1980’s provide a relevant example for this angle of enquiry. 
What these chapters on causation make clear is that famines are usually the result of 
very concrete social, political and economic factors with a national and an 
international dimension. The most obvious implication, therefore, is that these are all 
factors that can be identified and minimised and a framework of Food Sovereignty 
could act as a guiding principle.  
Chapter 7 focuses on Food Sovereignty as a political project of growing importance 
and relevance through the issue of land. Agrarian reform, which is the second of the 
seven principles of Food Sovereignty, is a key factor. Although the hypothesis is that 
Food Sovereignty would have a beneficial effect across the whole continent of Africa, 
the focus is on how Food Sovereignty would reduce both famine and vulnerability to 
famine in parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. The phenomenon of ‘land grabbing’, in both 
its past and present forms, is highly relevant to the analysis in this chapter. The 
concept of Food Sovereignty demands the development of mechanisms for holding to 
account those institutions or individuals who are responsible for the continuation of 
food insecurity and famine vulnerability. This includes national governments, 
international finance institutions, powerful corporations and private foreign investors. 
This chapter explores the ways that those actors can be considered responsible by 
concentrating on the issues of land tenure, land grabs and land use. 
Findings of thesis 
It is often assumed, if only implicitly, that little can be done to eradicate periodic 
episodes of famine and famine vulnerability. Indeed it is also presumed that the 
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problem of vulnerability to famine may get worse in the long run, especially as 
populations in parts of the Third World continue to increase (Kaplan 2003).36 It is also 
clear that the development of bio-fuels is likely to put further pressure on the amount 
of land available for human food production (Eide 2008; SOFI 2011).37 Thus tacit 
pessimism often dominates international responses to the latest hunger crises. Indeed 
it has been argued, that this perceived inability to remedy chronic food insecurity can 
itself lead to a fatalistic attitude and this discourages any serious attempt to rectify the 
miseries that afflict so many lives (Pogge 2003; Sen 2001). 
What is evident from current research is that there is still disagreement about what 
causes vulnerability to famine, and intense disagreement about what needs to be done 
to correct it. This thesis explains the role and inter-relationships of certain political, 
economic and environmental factors, but demonstrates that the global food system, as 
it is currently constituted, is often the principle factor in famine vulnerable countries. 
Food Sovereignty could offer an effective and long-term solution to those who 
continue to live with famine and fear of it. Famine is a subject that transcends 
established units of analysis, and this thesis will demonstrate that analysis from an 
international level is as important as the national, societal or individual level analyses 
of the past. 
This thesis makes the case for the development of an alternative model of agriculture, 
both in general and in an African-specific context. Famine is rarely just a result of lack 
of economic development, lack of democracy, human-rights abuses, ill-conceived 
economic policies, corrupt African governments or over-reliance on international aid. 
It is usually a combination of some or all of these things in a modern context. 
Contemporary famines and famine vulnerability are a complex result of historical 
legacy, geographical location, distribution of power and political ideology. The 
complexity of modern food insecurity suggests that it is time to reframe models of 
famine analysis as a global issue requiring a variety of global solutions. This thesis 
concludes that, despite some very real obstacles, a serious and concerted effort to 
reshape the global food system, with Food Sovereignty as a guiding principle will go a 
long way towards reducing the occurrence of famine, specifically in an East African 
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context. The following chapters are an exploration of some of the past, present and 
future attempts to address this problem. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 1 
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CHAPTER 1 – IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: 
DEFINITIONS, DATA AND PREVALENCE. 
‘Starvation is no more ‘natural’ than suffocation; the former is no more a 
shortage of food than the latter is a shortage of air’ (Edkins 2007: 52). 
This opening chapter introduces the problem of contemporary famine and food 
insecurity and makes clear from the outset that the ways in which these concepts are 
defined has political significance. Part 1 begins with emphasising the importance of 
definitions and conceptual differences in this discussion. What is food insecurity? 
How is it different to famine? How have famines been conceptualised? How many are 
affected? Part 2 then considers the consequences of food insecurity, how people are 
affected and how these effects can be quantified and measured, highlighting the 
inconsistencies that exist in the way the hungry are counted. The understanding that 
famines mean more than death through starvation is crucial to the argument developed 
throughout this thesis. Part 3 considers the prevalence of food insecurity in general, 
where it occurs most and how those regions are understood and represented in the 
literature. Part 4 then explains in more detail why the countries of Kenya and Ethiopia 
have been selected in this thesis as food insecure countries. The four key points of 
comparison are their populations and ethnic mix, their political context, their food 
insecurity context and their patterns of landownership. 
1. The problem 
Many of the terms used in this debate are ambiguous and the way that food insecurity 
is defined, conceptualised and quantified is often a reflection of the prevailing policy 
environment. This is particularly relevant in an East African context because, as 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the food situation has changed significantly 
over recent decades. The relevance lies in the way that conceptualisation helps direct 
the most suitable responses to particular famines and highlights mistakes that can be 
made when famine is not fully understood. The importance, for example, of how 
famine is first defined, either as an event or a process, has been critical to the 
subsequent analysis and generation of theories (Devereux 1993). 
This point is well illustrated in the work of Amrita Rangasami (1985) where it is 
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demonstrated that famine and starvation are not results of sudden and drastic collapses 
of purchasing power or food supply. There is a process, which starts some time before 
a famine that has already rendered some groups more vulnerable than others. This 
recognition of famine as a process resonates with the way famine is understood in this 
thesis and affords the political context of food insecurity a greater potency. From this 
perspective famine is interpreted as a dynamic process that ends in starvation. It is a 
biological process with a socio-economic dimension and one with three clearly 
marked phases. The phases correspond with the biological changes and worsening 
health of the affected community, and socio-economically, by transfer of assets from 
victim to beneficiary.38 The socio-economic process is completed with the loss of all 
the victims’ assets including his ability to labour: in other words, all their entitlements 
(Sen 1981). 
By analysing famine as a process, we can identify two related problems in terms of 
typical responses. Firstly, the state does not often intervene until the third and 
irreversible phase is reached (i.e. starvation) and secondly, popular perceptions of 
famine only relate to the terminal phase and not the whole process. As a result, donors 
continue to fail to intervene until the crisis reaches catastrophic proportions.39 
Consequently theories of famine as a rapid onset have a limited validity, and work by 
Sen (1981) which is based on the elevation of mortality, has been viewed by many 
analysts as inadequate (Fine 2010). As stated, this thesis advocates a broader 
understanding of famine, more generally referred to throughout this work as food 
insecurity. It is argued that famines, certainly in the past, have been defined too 
partially and that starvation can and does occur, even during ‘normal times’ 
(Rangasami 1985). This broader understanding will be justified by demonstrating the 
central role of the global food system in contemporary food insecurity40 and by 
exploring the potential for an alternative agricultural framework of Food 
Sovereignty.41 
Famine typology. 
Generally speaking, literature in the field differentiates between four basic types of 
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famine. These famines typologies have different key causal elements essentially 
affecting different groups of people. Borrowing from de Waal (2000) famines have 
tended to be categorised as 1. Pastoral; 2. Agrarian / Smallholder; 3. Class based / 
Occupational; 4. Wartime. 
The first type, pastoral, mainly affects herders, can be relatively short term and caused 
by drought that depletes pasture and availability of water. The longer-term cause is 
permanent disintegration of land and severe restriction on nomadic lifestyles as has 
occurred in Northern Kenya, Somalia and Southern Ethiopia in recent decades. In this 
situation coping strategies are as important as the distribution of aid; for example, 
state assistance in guaranteeing price of livestock and supply of credit or a 
neighbouring country’s willingness to allow pastoralists to graze animals within their 
borders. 
Type two, agrarian, has frequently been described as the ‘paradigmatic African 
famine’ (de Waal 2000: 8). These are often drought related but equally the result of 
land expulsion and exploitation. Though initially localised, they can result in distress 
migration (or forced migration, as opposed to voluntary economic migration), which 
renders newly inhabited areas unable to cope through a kind of domino effect that may 
have a slow onset. Again, as will be discussed in later chapters, food aid is not the 
only suitable response; labour-based projects are also important and land preservation 
policies and political reforms even more so. The countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and 
Sudan offer recent examples of this type of famine 
The third type, class or occupational based famines may be considered the 
paradigmatic Asian famine. These rapid onset famines often affect whole classes of 
people; farm labourers, fishermen or artisans, for example, are rendered destitute due 
to a collapse in demand for their labour. In these situations local coping strategies are 
less suitable and state intervention is needed such as grain price controls and 
employment guarantee schemes. The Irish famines of the 1840’s fit within this famine 
framework, as they affected those dependent on a single crop, i.e. the potato (O’Grada 
1999) and so would the 1943 Bengal famine, which mainly affected labourers in rural 
districts (Sen 1981). It is worth noting that State intervention, in terms of employment 
guarantee systems, is an ongoing feature of India’s anti-famine policies. The 
Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS), for example, has been 
operational since the 1960s and it institutionalises the right to food by guaranteeing 
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employment to whoever needs it, when they need it (Dreze & Sen 1990). 
The fourth and last category of famine, according to this typology, is that caused by 
war, which can result in rapid catastrophic collapse as happened in Rwanda in the 
1990s or may take years to develop such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea or Southern Sudan. 
Belligerents may prevent all relief strategies and victims may be highly visible or 
purposely kept hidden. The Ethiopian famines in the 1980’s are considered a classic 
example of this type of famine. 
According to de Waal (2006), and substantiated by the FAO findings for SOFI 2004, 
virtually all modern day famines, are caused, at least in part, by conflict. Indeed in 
2004 the top six ‘hunger hotspots’ in Africa were identified as ‘war-torn’ (SOFI 2004) 
and Devereux placed conflict as a causal factor in 21 out of 32 of the major famines 
during the twentieth century (Devereux 2000: 6). However, more recent research 
which has identified ‘new variant famines’, challenges this assertion (Devereux (ed) 
2007). The food crises in Malawi in 2001, for example, and the current situation in 
parts of Kenya (2011) have arisen in the absence of conflict but the increased 
vulnerability can be located within a political and economic context in peacetime. 
Thus although the causal role of conflict is acknowledged,42 the departure for this 
thesis is the focus on the functioning of the global food system as a causal factor in 
contemporary famine and food insecurity. It is interesting to note that the global food 
system does not feature at all in the standard famine typology mentioned above. In fact 
the international context of famine is completely overlooked, except with regards to 
the role of conflict. The global food system is, as yet, an under examined factor in 
contemporary famine analysis, particularly in East Africa and this thesis aims to fill in 
some of the gaps. 
How many are food insecure? 
In order to understand the depth of the problem and measure the success of policies 
aimed at relieving it, we can look at numerous data sets collected over recent 
decades.43 It was estimated that there were 852 million undernourished people in the 
period 2000-2002 (SOFI 2004).  Of these, 815 million were in developing countries, 
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28 million in so-called ‘countries in transition’44 and 9 million in the industrialised 
countries.45 The number of undernourished people in developing countries decreased 
by only 9 million in the 10 years that followed the World Food Summit baseline 
period of 1990-1992. Indeed, during the second half of the decade the number of 
chronically hungry in these countries actually increased by 4 million per year, in effect 
cancelling out two thirds of the reduction of 27 million that had been achieved during 
the previous 5 years.46 Regular reviews of the status of hunger and malnutrition are 
provided in United Nations reports presented by the Millennium Project. To 
recommend how to implement the first MDG on poverty and hunger and, specifically, 
to halve the number of hungry and malnourished people by 2015, a group of experts 
was set up by the UN Secretary General.47 This ‘Hunger Task Force’ developed a 
typology of the hungry worldwide to help differentiate between types of households 
and the most vulnerable groups (see Appendix 1). Current estimates are that more 
than 75% of the world’s poorest people live in rural areas and depend mainly or partly 
on agriculture for their livelihoods. Half the world’s hungry people are smallholder 
farmers who live off a limited area of land, without adequate access to productive 
resources. 
According to the latest SOFI statistics available at the time of writing (SOFI 2011) the 
number of undernourished people in the world remains unacceptably high at close to 
one billion in 2010 despite an expected decline, which is the first in 15 years. This 
decline is largely attributable to a more favourable economic environment in 2010, 
particularly in some developing countries, and the fall in both international and 
domestic food prices since the peak in 2008. The FAO estimates that a total of 925 
million people are undernourished in 2010 compared with 1.023 billion in 2009.48 
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 This includes countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Baltic States and other 
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 Defined by the FAO as the status of persons, whose food intake regularly provides less than their 
minimum energy requirements. The average minimum energy requirement per person is about 1800 
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Most of the decrease was in Asia, with 80 million fewer hungry, but progress was also 
made in Sub-Saharan Africa, where it is estimated that 12 million fewer people are 
going hungry. However, the number of hungry people is higher in 2010 than before 
the food and economic crises of 2008–09.49 The FAO figure of 925 million means one 
in seven people do not get enough food to be healthy and lead an active life. Hunger 
and malnutrition are the number one risk to health worldwide — greater than AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis combined.50 
Research for the Word Development Report (WDR 2008) shows that calories 
available for consumption in the developing economies have increased, in general, 
with consumers having greater quantities of food and greater diversity of products due 
to both trade and domestic food production. What is obvious, however, is that these 
gains are largely due to improvements in Asia, especially China and India, and to a 
lesser degree Latin America; Sub-Saharan Africa has largely deteriorated over the 
same period (WDR 2008). In view of the fact that the above gains have been 
attributed to trade and domestic production, arguably the same factors can explain 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s decline.51 That is to say that the decline in food security in 
Africa is because of trade (trade within an inequitable GFS that is of greater benefit to 
the developed nations) and domestic production (the failure or reduction of 
agricultural development for local consumption). The food situation in Africa, in 
general, has deteriorated rapidly since the early 1970s and this observation is highly 
relevant to the central role afforded to the global food system in this thesis. According 
to the FAO, only the Côte d’Ivoire and Tanzania experienced a higher per capita food 
production (PCFP) in 1989-91 than in 1961-1965. Countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria and the Sudan all experienced significant 
declines.52 It will be demonstrated that there is a causal link between the global food 
system and the economic liberal policies that support it and the increase in food 
insecurity, particularly in East Africa. 
To provide an historical perspective we could take for example the following figures 
from Dando (1980: xii). The worldwide deaths from famine were 2 million in the 17th 
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century, 10 million in the 18th century and 25 million in the nineteenth century 
compared with more than 70 million in the 20th century. Current estimates for the first 
decade of the 21st century are as many as 8 million deaths from hunger per year (SOFI 
2007).53 This number, however, also refers to ‘hunger related’ deaths, which includes 
associated disease rather than starvation alone thus emphasising the need to be clear 
about definitions in discussions of famine. Data concerning famine are no different to 
any other kind of data and estimates of the level and incidence of famine and food 
insecurity vary considerably, as does the methodology employed in the collection and 
analysis of such data. 
2. The effects 
Poor people in general, the world over, have limited diets often lacking access to high 
quality proteins (eggs, dairy produce, fish) and vitamins essential to human 
development. Chronically hungry people are physically less developed and mentally 
less alert than people who have enough to eat. Famine vulnerable populations are 
often chronically hungry, even in the absence of acute famine, which is the current 
situation in both Kenya and Ethiopia.54 Severe chronic malnutrition leads to two 
common problems associated with impaired growth caused by a lack of both proteins 
and calories: Marasmus, particularly related to brain development and Kwashiorkor, 
caused by a deficiency in certain amino acids found in protein.55 Along with lack of 
proteins and calories, lack of certain vitamins leads to other health and development 
complications.56 The effects of chronic malnutrition, in any community, are myriad 
particularly with regard to children. Decades ago, research by Field and Levinson 
demonstrated that early malnutrition not only leads to physical limitations but also 
affects learning and behaviour. Inadequate nutrition during the period of rapid brain 
growth in children may be manifested in neurological damage. Perhaps more 
importantly, malnutrition and its accompanying apathy and listlessness may limit the 
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global population and more accurate data collection and analysis over the last four centuries. Issues 
such as these are addressed in this chapter in a discussion on the difficulties and challenges of 
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 The Ethiopian famines in recent decades will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
55
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child’s social and emotional interaction with his family and environment (Field & 
Levinson 1974). 
Nutritionists have demonstrated that damage caused through malnutrition in the early 
stages of life is irreversible and have identified the self-perpetuating nature of 
underdevelopment due to infantile malnutrition. The problem was emphasised in 
SOFI 2004: 
From the moment of birth the scales are tipped against them. Low birth 
weight (LBW) babies face increased risk of dying in infancy, of stunted 
physical and cognitive growth during childhood, of reduced working capacity 
and earnings as adults and, if female of giving birth to LBW babies 
themselves (SOFI 2004: 8). 
According to this report almost one third of all children in the developing world are 
stunted with heights that fall sufficiently below the normal range for their age to 
indicate chronic under-nutrition. Stunting, like LBW is linked to an increased 
susceptibility to illness and premature death. It also leads to a reduction in cognitive 
ability and educational achievement hence lower productivity and earning potential in 
adulthood. When stunting occurs within the first five years of life the damage to both 
physical and cognitive capacity is generally irreversible. The intergenerational impact 
of LBW and stunting is all too clear as malnourished mothers give birth to LBW 
babies, repeating the cycle of impoverished health and opportunities. This cycle of 
wasted human potential is not just a moral issue. The impact on a country’s chances of 
developing and democratising cannot be underestimated. According to many 
development economists, these are considered key requirements, which increase the 
possibilities of escaping the traps that keep many countries so poor and so vulnerable 
to famine (Collier 2007; Easterly 2006; Pogge 2003; Sachs 2005).57 
Famine analysts have established the close and even synergistic link between 
malnutrition and infectious diseases. In addition, malnourished people are far more 
susceptible to invasion by the parasites that proliferate in poorer countries (de Waal 
2006). However, whilst governments are often willing to invest heavily in curbing 
disease with vaccination programmes and so forth, there is less willingness to fund a 
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major preventative programme in the reduction of malnutrition. There are structural 
reasons for this, both national and international, which will be explored in relation to 
the global food system in Chapter 2, failed economic policies in Chapter 4 and 
government failure in Chapter 6. 
The key point of emphasising the devastating, multi-faceted effects of undernutrition 
here provides an opportunity to show in the following chapters how a model of Food 
Sovereignty would overcome these adverse effects. The Food Sovereignty model 
stands in marked contrast to the current global food system, which is failing in 
meeting the food needs of the global population.58 
How the famine vulnerable are counted 
It is has been noted that estimates of famine deaths are usually approximate and often 
politicised by governments wishing to exaggerate, or more usually, to conceal figures 
(Devereux 2000:4).59 Conversely NGOs and aid agencies have been criticised for 
painting worst-case scenarios in order to mobilise humanitarian efforts (Chandler 
2005). Similarly those quantifying the extent of famine often report crude mortality 
rates, for example 20/1000 among certain populations or sub groups, whereas the 
media typically report in more sensationalist terms giving aggregate totals, e.g., 1.5 
million, which may be headline-grabbing but not necessarily revealing or reliable. 
Problems in estimating famine mortality arise for a number of bona fide reasons. 
Firstly in many poor countries comprehensive data on numbers of births and deaths or 
even national populations may be unreliable or wholly absent. Yet the methodology 
involved in famine mortality rates necessarily involves ‘scaling up’ mortality rates of 
monitored populations (say children in refugee camps) to national populations then 
comparing these against ‘normal mortality rates’ (Devereux 2000: 5). Also mortality 
risk varies a great deal between different age and sex cohorts with children and the 
elderly typically being at greater risk than other ages, yet the elderly population are 
often left out of nutritional monitoring systems. 
Migration of large numbers of people in relation to food shortages is in itself 
associated with heightened mortality risk, not only because of loss of access to normal 
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food supplies but, more importantly, increased exposure to disease and unsafe water.60 
Perversely then, the highest death rates are often in the very places set up to try to 
relieve suffering, the refugee camps. Overcrowded and unsanitary environments 
provide a perfect breeding ground for deadly diseases, such as cholera or dysentery. 
The fact that famine mortality rates are often collated in somewhat artificial conditions 
gives rise to the view, in some circles, that these figures are inevitably inflated. This of 
course does not deny the scale and tragedy of the deaths that do occur, but 
methodologically it is problematic in terms of extrapolating these figures to a 
population at large. Just one example may be useful in illustrating these problems of 
measurement in recent times. During the Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985 the United 
Nations put the death toll at one million. Kumar however claimed that the 
‘estimate of one million deaths would constitute an absolute minimum for the 
entire famine period and the actual figure could turn out to be more than 1 ½ 
million’ (Kumar 1990: 203). 
Conversely Africa Watch dismissed the widely quoted figure of one million as no 
more than a guess and calculated a significantly lower figure of 590,000 (Africa 
Watch 1991a: 173). 
What this example demonstrates is all the usual pitfalls of using statistical data both in 
terms of measurement and the methodological biases of those involved in their 
calculation. In addition, many recent African famines have been integrally associated 
with civil wars and it is therefore often impossible to separate mortality due to famine 
from mortality due to conflict. Examples such as Angola 1974-1976, Liberia 1989-
1996 and 1997-2003, Tigray 1984-1985, and Sierra Leone 1995-1998 illustrate this 
point only too well, but perhaps none so much as the ongoing conflict and associated 
hunger in the Darfur region in Sudan. Given these problems of both overestimation 
and under-reporting61 it is prudent to do as Devereux suggests and take published 
figures as indicative of the magnitude of famine mortality rather than precise statistics 
(Devereux 2000:7). For this reason the use of statistical data in this thesis are kept to a 
minimum. The focus, throughout, is on providing a greater understanding of how the 
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GFS contributes to famine vulnerability rather than an empirical analysis of the 
number it affects. 
With regard to the famine data analysis provided by Devereux there is, however, one 
further point worth mentioning. Of the 70 million plus deaths attributed to famine in 
the twentieth century Devereuex made two striking observations, which resonate with 
the central themes of this thesis. Firstly, with the odd exception, in terms of mortality 
rates, famine has moved from the Northern hemisphere and Asia to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Secondly, there has been a dramatic decline in the actual numbers of deaths, in 
that famine mortality now involves numbers in the thousands rather than millions.62 
Whether this pattern reflects significant progress in famine prevention policies or 
simply reflects the absence of any major malevolent government policy as previously 
witnessed in China and the Soviet Union is a matter of contention. Equally, it can be 
taken to reflect the differences that arise when only official famine statistics are 
recorded as opposed to death from chronic hunger. The former will obviously be less 
than the latter. This was famously articulated by Amartya Sen who stated that there 
are more hunger-related deaths of children under 5 in India every year than total 
deaths in the Bengal famine of 1943 (Sen 2010). The importance of recognising the 
complexity of famine causes and effects is not to be underestimated. Since famine is 
by definition a ‘food crisis’ the perceived wisdom has been that those who die during 
famines die of starvation. Latterly, however, it has been appreciated that there are 
complex relationships between under-nutrition and infectious diseases. Thus, rather 
than starvation being given as the cause of death in famines, deaths are often 
attributed to hunger related diseases such as diarrhoea, dysentery or gastro-enteritis. 
Conversely, it is the case that famines are often accompanied by epidemics that are not 
necessarily hunger related such as malaria, cholera, typhus or measles. Famine related 
deaths, therefore, demonstrate not only an increased susceptibility to disease but also 
an increased exposure to it. An early study of the Irish famine where 193,000 from 
‘fever’, 125,000 from dysentery and 22,000 from dropsy outnumbered the 20,000 
deaths directly attributed to starvation illustrates this point very well (Arnold 1988: 
22). Similarly, Alex de Waal’s (1989) research in the Sudan resulted in his ‘health 
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crisis’ model of famine mortality in contrast to the commonly accepted ‘food crisis’ 
model thus adding another layer to famine analysis. 
As already stated this thesis adopts an holistic understanding of famine, as a process 
with associated ills, that goes beyond starvation and denies people more than just the 
right to food. This conceptualisation is important because the central argument of this 
thesis is predicated on the idea of a holistic political solution to food insecurity, that of 
Food Sovereignty.63 
Thus, this thesis rejects the commonly held assumption that there is a direct route 
from crop failure to income collapse, to decline in food intake, to starvation and death. 
It accepts that the pathway is just as likely to be vulnerability as a result of crop 
failure, or conflict, leading to displacement of people and increased exposure to new 
diseases, thus resulting in epidemics and death. The fact that there was no correlation 
between individual wealth and probability of death in the Sudanese refugee camps in 
1985 lends weight to this argument. Wealthier people who had enough money to buy 
food but were displaced into refugee camps were just as susceptible as the destitute to 
catching a communicable disease and dying (de Waal 1989). 
It must be said, at this stage, that although de Waal’s findings are accepted at a certain 
level in this thesis, they are contested on the grounds that they are applicable to certain 
famines but cannot be generalised. One of the key aims of this thesis is to understand, 
in what ways, the global food system (GFS) increases vulnerability to famine and thus 
demonstrates that it cannot be attributed to conflict alone. The centrality of the GFS, 
as understood here, also suggests that de Waal underestimates the importance of 
under-nutrition and the symbiotic relationship between malnutrition and morbidity 
(Young & Jaspers 1995). The most important aspect of adopting a broader 
understanding of the famine process is the policy implications for governments and 
development agencies with respect to the most suitable responses. It is clear that a 
famine triggered by food shortages is just as likely to develop into a health and water 
crisis as well. 
Furthermore the political landscape is of central importance; appropriate action, 
therefore, may not reside in simply increasing food availability. Availability does not 
guarantee access and sufficient calories do not assure a healthy and nutritious diet. 
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The distribution of available food is also critical and an issue of central importance to 
this argument. It will be shown in the following chapter that these complex synergies 
are in fact related to the position of vulnerable populations in the global food system. 
This increased vulnerability to famine is structural and, as such, could be reduced or 
prevented through structural changes. 
As mentioned, a vital feature in the underestimation of famine is an over-reliance on 
starvation as the cause of death. In World Poverty and Human Rights Thomas Pogge 
has a great deal to say about poverty related deaths which he claims amount to a ‘full 
sized crime against humanity’ (Pogge 2003: 25). Whilst Pogges arguments are general 
and based on the negative rights of the global poor not to be subjected to an economic 
order which harms them, they are applicable with specific regard to issues of food 
insecurity. The extent of human suffering and premature deaths on a daily basis due to 
poverty and hunger related causes are not necessarily well known but only surface 
when they reach ‘famine’ proportions. The critical point here is that avoidable 
starvation (and this thesis will argue that almost all starvation is avoidable) whether it 
is defined as famine or not deserves greater attention and understanding. Much media 
attention is given to natural disasters such as floods or earthquakes, so-called ‘acts of 
God’, but the ordinary deaths from hunger and preventable diseases seldom make the 
headlines. The Asian Tsunami in December 2004 or the Tokyo Earthquake in 2011 
and the world media attention it attracted illustrate this point quite clearly. 
Mal-nutrition/undernutrition 
As with determining the mortality rates due to famine, there are as many variations in 
techniques for determining the existence of malnutrition and classifying it. The 
standards vary depending on whether the data are of interest to public health officials, 
other government officials, NGOs or aid agencies. Different again are techniques 
employed by the medical profession dealing with individual cases of malnutrition. 
Methods most commonly used are anthropometric measurements, which compare 
various body measurements and weight ratios, for example, height for age (stunting) 
weight for age or weight for height measurements (wasting). However other 
nutritional investigations have also used household consumption surveys, clinical 
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assessments, socio-economic and environmental status, and epidemiological surveys.64 
With regard to establishing who is malnourished, much of the academic and official 
literature concentrates on per capita consumption of calories and proteins. In general 
these studies compare national averages, country by country. As with all aggregate 
figures though, the status of particular classes of people in any given society is often 
ignored. This is important for this discussion in view of the fact that a sectoral 
analysis of the food system is applied at a local, national and an international level. 
The methodology employed in such surveys is crucial both in terms of its reliability 
(can the survey be successfully replicated elsewhere?) and its validity (is it measuring 
the phenomenon it claims to?). As with much of political or social scientific research, 
many findings in this area are hotly disputed and invariably reflect the bias of the 
researcher. Thus, in this thesis, every attempt has been made to present a balanced 
interpretation of research concerning food insecurity and analyses have been 
considered from writers across the political spectrum and from opposing interested 
parties. 
From 2004 onwards the authors of the SOFI reports have made a concerted effort to 
utilise different methods of measuring food deprivation and undernutrition in order to 
minimise this effect. Indeed the FAO hosted an International scientific symposium in 
2002 aimed at ways of improving and refining data collection and analysis, looking to 
improve its own methodology and validate alternative approaches.65. The estimates of 
food insecurity in their recent reports are based on calculations of three key 
parameters for each country: the average amount of food available per person, the 
level of inequality in access to that food and the minimum number of calories required 
for an average person.66 Food security, as defined by the FAO can provide a useful 
benchmark towards which policy makers should strive. However, it is a valuable 
concept only if there is a clear understanding of what it means and an appreciation of 
its limitations and the impact on individuals of other non-food factors such as poor 
sanitation and contaminated water. Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 3 on Food 
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Sovereignty, food security is a technical concept and is understood in terms of the 
global food trade. It thus lacks the political perspective and nuances that are central to 
the way food insecurity needs to be understood. 
3. Where does food insecurity occur most? 
Ever since Malthus wrote his seminal ‘Essay on Population’ in 1789 there have been 
ongoing predictions that the world simply could not feed itself indefinitely. To date 
this has not occurred, but nonetheless many influential writers from the ecological 
movement, often referred to as neo-Malthusians, have perpetuated the belief that it is 
only a matter of time until Malthus is ultimately proved right (Brown 1991; Kaplan 
1994). Although this thesis is concerned with the political causes of famine, theories 
of famine that remain preoccupied with demographic issues are important because 
they continue to inform (or misinform) the debate. Evidence to support the neo-
Malthusian view is not always obvious but the two key factors, on which the 
hypothesis is based, are worthy of attention. These factors are population growth and 
sustainable food production. The global population is undeniably rising, particularly in 
those parts of the world that are considered the least ‘developed’.67 For many years 
ecologists have argued that the environment cannot tolerate the current level of 
intensive farming and that land degradation will only increase.68 Two decades ago it 
was argued that: 
As we enter the nineties, the world has little to celebrate on the food front. 
Between 1950 and 1984, the world’s farmers raised grain output 2.6 fold … 
since then, unfortunately, little progress has been made … Drought damaged 
harvests in key producing countries in 1987 and 1988 brought world grain 
stocks to their lowest levels in decades. The 1989 world grain harvest 
depleted stocks even further. If stocks cannot be replenished in years of near 
normal weather, when can they be? (Brown 1991: 59) 
On the other hand, analysts of global food issues writing at the same time provided 
contradictory evidence that was equally compelling. Relatively speaking, towards the 
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end of the 1990s prices of agricultural commodities were at their lowest levels ever 
recorded. Crop yields continued to grow faster than populations and the food situation 
had improved dramatically for much of the world’s populations (Mitchell, Ingco & 
Duncan 1997). This is clearly not to say that the problem of famine did not exist at the 
time, there is ample global data to show that it did. But from a liberal economic and 
optimistic vision of the world food situation, the reasons for, and the solution to the 
problems of food insecurity, were to be found in the functioning of the market.69 
This trend in falling food prices, however, went into reverse after the turn of the 
century, with prices peaking in 2008 (SOFI 2010). The impact of fluctuating food 
prices on the world’s poorest populations is of great importance to this discussion 
both in relation to the functioning of the global food system70 and the protections built 
in to an agricultural model based on the concept of Food Sovereignty.71 
Population growth has usually been taken as the most important determinant of the 
growth of food demand in most economies. The world population in 2011 stands at 
just under 7 billion and the World Bank and United Nations estimate that world 
population growth rates are expected to fall to less than 1% per annum by 2020.72 This, 
in real terms, would mean a world population of approximately 7.5 billion with an 
average yearly increase of 73 million. The fact that it is also predicted that 97.5% of 
this increase will be in the developing world is obviously not without significance. 
Figures published by the World Development Forum predict the global population to 
be 9.3 billion by 2050 with Africa and Asia accounting for 90% of this projected 
world population growth.73 The question of how enough food will be produced to meet 
future demands, and by whom, is a question central to the contemporary debates on 
global food issues. 
However, the current food sustainability debates clearly depend on whose 
consumption levels we are predicting and measuring, as globally there are enormous 
disparities both between and within the developed and underdeveloped worlds.74 
Even the most pessimistic of ecologists couldn’t ignore this issue of disparities 
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entirely: 
‘a world grain harvest of 2.1 billion tons in 2030 would satisfy populations of 
different sizes depending on levels of consumption. At the U.S level of 
800kgs per person per year (PPPY), it would be enough to sustain 
approximately 2.5 billion people. At the Italian level of 400kgs PPPY it 
could support just over 5 billion and at the Indian level of 200kgs PPPY it 
could sustain just over 10 billion people’ (Brown & Kane 1995: 202). 
Though it is unlikely anyone would seriously advocate a global shift to Indian levels 
of consumption, what is clear from these projections is that the current level of 
consumption in the U.S could not be achieved worldwide with current levels of 
production. The growing global trend in meat consumption and the demands this 
imposes on crops for animal feed coupled with the growth in crops as agrofuel have 
exacerbated both environmental and political concerns.75 These concerns, however, do 
not negate the fact that the world produces enough food to feed everyone. World 
agriculture produces 17 percent more calories per person today than it did 30 years 
ago, despite a 70 percent population increase. This is enough to provide everyone in 
the world with at least 2,720 kilocalories (kcal) per person per day (FAO 2002, p.9). 
The main problem is that many people in the world do not have sufficient land to 
grow, or income to purchase, enough food. These themes will be revisited in Chapter 
2, which explores the fundamental inequalities inherent in the global food system and 
the reasons why such a system evolved and is maintained. 
Categories of inequality 
Just as defining famine and food insecurity requires a certain level of explanation, so 
too does the use of the terms used to describe particular global differences of food 
insecurity. One of the key characteristics of the world today is the uneven level of so 
called ‘development’ between continents, regions and nation states. There are various 
categories of classifications to conceptualise these developmental differences. In 
recent history the least developed countries, often former colonies, were grouped 
together under the umbrella term of the ‘Third World’. The term ‘Third World’ arose 
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during the Cold War to define countries that remained non-aligned with either 
capitalism and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (which along with its 
allies represented the First World), or communism and the Soviet Union (which along 
with its allies represented the Second World). This definition provided a way of 
broadly categorising the nations of the Earth into three groups based on social, 
political, and economic divisions.76 The term was used in a pejorative way in the past 
and for a period fell out of common usage giving way to the ‘developmental 
categories’. International agencies tend to talk in terms of developed, developing and 
least developed countries as a way of minimising the pejorative connotations 
associated with the three-world model. More controversially, the term ‘under-
developed’ is often used which does not indicate lack of development, nor does it 
necessarily denote abject poverty. It is a comparative phenomenon, like poverty in 
general, in that it exists only in relation to more advanced development. 
Indeed the term ‘development’ is itself deeply controversial. Broadly speaking, 
economists equate it with economic growth usually quantified by per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) or gross national income (GNI). The position taken in this 
thesis, however, is that development means more than just economic growth. For 
development to occur there must be an expansion in access to other goods required for 
survival and well-being, such as food, shelter, healthcare, education and so on. Indeed 
this broader understanding of development has recently been given greater recognition 
with calls on the international community to use new ways to measure economic 
prosperity by giving more weight to the environment and a nation’s social well-
being.77 From this moral perspective, and the one adopted in this thesis, development 
includes concepts such as equality, dignity and the full range of twentieth century 
political rights. The exclusion of many of these concepts from measurements of so-
called development is problematic, but they are all vital components in the concept of 
Food Sovereignty.78 
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More recently many writers refer to the global North and South to describe rich versus 
poor nations but these terms, for the purpose of this work, are overly simplistic 
politically, economically and geographically. They do feature in this discussion, 
however, particularly with regard to trade because it is in the literature on this 
particular area that theses terms are most commonly applied. 
In addition, there is another model of global differentiation based on the dynamics of 
changing agricultural around the world, known as the ‘Three Rural Worlds’ model 
(Vorley 2003:14). In many ways this model lends itself particularly well to this thesis 
because of its applicability to the framework of Food Sovereignty and its bias towards 
rural food producers. It consists of Rural 1, Rural 2 and Rural 3 and has been adopted 
to explain the differentiation among those involved in agriculture in both the 
developed or industrialised and the developing world. Rural 1, includes large farmers 
and entrepreneurs, which are numerically a minority. They are, however, connected 
into the global food economy through contracts with a rapidly consolidating 
agricultural handling and processing industry, and even directly with food retailers. 
Consequently these farmers have become a vital part of agribusiness, and the lines 
between Rural 1 and agribusiness are becoming increasingly blurred. Only the most 
capitalised and tightly managed enterprises can meet the strict standards imposed by 
importing nations or processing and retail sectors.79 
Rural 2 comprises the family farmers and landed peasantry who have traditionally 
constituted the bedrock of the rural economy, from India to the American prairies. It is 
characterised by low levels of capitalisation, poor integration with downstream food 
businesses80 and other factors, such as lack of information and assets. These factors 
leave this sector exposed when government withdraws from agriculture and when 
agricultural trade is liberalised, or when agribusiness concentrates market power (and 
hence profits) off the farm. Undermined by a cost-price squeeze, Rural 2 faces 
declining returns and increased risks from agricultural commodity production. 
Juggling a number of agricultural and non-agricultural income-earning activities has 
become the norm as households attempt to compensate for the high risks associated 
with agricultural price decline, output fluctuations and lack of access to land or credit 
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(Bryceson, Kay & Mooli 2000, Raikes & Gibbon 2000). Niche marketing such as 
agritourism, organics and local markets has provided viable alternatives to a minority 
of Rural 2, but these are mainly in industrialised countries and thus of no real benefit 
to most farmers in the developing world. 
Rural 3 denotes the struggling underclass that includes almost four-fifths of the 
world’s most food insecure. The households of Rural 3 focus mainly on survival, with 
livelihoods fractured into mixtures of off-farm work, farm labour (often for Rural 1), 
temporary migration and subsistence agriculture. This group may be prevented from 
joining the formal urban economy by lack of education, training and access to regular 
employment opportunities. They are generally excluded from the key arenas of power 
and policy-making, despite the rhetoric in the World Bank and government agencies 
of ‘pro-poor’ development (Vorley 2003:14). 
This ‘Three Rural Worlds’ framework is an interesting one for this thesis on several 
levels and as the Food Sovereignty model develops it may well become more 
prevalent in the literature. Firstly, it links in very well with Chapter 2, which explores 
global commodity food chains and this framework can be used to explain how 
different regions are situated within the GFS. In addition it provides a social and 
political backdrop for the conceptualisation of Food Sovereignty as a movement for 
change. The Three Rural Worlds model makes very clear the social and economic 
beneficiaries of the current GFS and equally those who would benefit from a reformed 
agricultural model, which favours rural populations rather than agri-businesses. Its 
drawbacks are that it has yet to have any real influence on mainstream literature on 
food and agricultural issues, particularly in an institutional and policy-making context, 
thus much of the discussion in this thesis refers to the more traditional categories. 
Therefore the ‘First, Second and Third World’ categorisation and the developmental 
categories will both be used where appropriate in this thesis, not in any pejorative 
sense but in the political sense. 
4 Kenya and Ethiopia as examples of food insecure countries. 
As stated in the introduction, the focus of this thesis is on Kenya and Ethiopia. There 
are good reasons to have chosen these countries as suitable cases through which to 
explore the shortcomings of the global food system and the potential for the 
development of Food Sovereignty as an alternative paradigm. Both countries are 
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located in East Africa, which has been plagued by issues of food insecurity in a past 
and present context. They share a border, both with each other, and Somalia, and have 
tense, but different, border demarcation issues. Indeed the land issue is a central 
feature of the argument developed in this thesis and both countries provide interesting 
and contrasting land ownership histories.81 Despite their geographical proximity they 
have also experienced very different political, economic and security challenges over 
recent decades. They are both drought prone countries but whereas Ethiopia has 
experienced several famines over recent decades, Kenya has never officially declared 
a famine. Both countries have moved towards flori-culture as a major export industry82 
and as such, both have attracted foreign direct investment (FDI). The growth in FDI in 
agricultural systems is central to both the understanding of the GFS and to the role 
that national governments may or may not play in reducing their food insecurity. Thus 
Kenya and Ethiopia offer differences and similarities on a number of levels but four 
specific areas will be introduced here because of their particular relevance to the 
political focus of this thesis. These are firstly population size and ethnic mix; 
secondly, the political context; thirdly, the food aid/food security context; and lastly, 
the issue of land ownership. In different ways these four areas demonstrate the 
potential and possibilities for the adoption of a Food Sovereignty model in East 
Africa. Equally, they demonstrate why it will be difficult to overcome entrenched 
political interests and logics to actually enable Food Sovereignty and land 
redistribution to become a reality. 
Population and ethnic mix. 
Kenya’s population is currently just over 41 million and it is the country with the 
fastest population growth in East Africa with about 2.9% per annum (FIAN 2010:17). 
Poverty is now endemic in Kenya, with approximately 56% of the population living in 
absolute poverty,83 among whom 53% live in rural areas and 47% in urban areas. The 
Human Development Index (HDI) ranked the country at 128th position in its 2010 
edition out of 169 countries with comparable data. There are over 70 distinct ethnic 
groups in Kenya, ranging in size from about seven million Kikuyu to about 500 El 
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Molo who live on the shore of Lake Turkana.84 Kenya's ethnic groups can be divided 
into three broad linguistic groups, Bantu, Nilotic and Cushite. While no ethnic group 
constitutes a majority of Kenya's citizens, the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, makes 
up only 20% of the nation's total population. The five largest - Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, 
Kamba and Kalenjin account for 70%. Of these, the Kikuyu, who were most actively 
involved in the independence and Mau Mau movements, are disproportionately 
represented in public life, government, business and the professions. The Luo people 
are mainly traders and artisans. The Kamba are well represented in defence and law 
enforcement and the Kalenjin are mainly farmers. While a recognised asset, Kenya's 
ethnic diversity has been the source of ongoing disputes and interethnic rivalries and 
resentment over Kikuyu dominance in politics and commerce have arguably hindered 
national integration.85 
Ethiopia has a population of approximately 90 million people with a relatively high 
population growth rate of 2.6% per annum.86 Income poverty is widespread and deep. 
Some 31 million people live below a poverty line equivalent to 45 US cents per day 
and between 6 and 13 million people are at risk of starvation each year.87 Pastoral 
farming, undertaken by 12%-15% of the population, is also limited by extreme 
poverty in its capacity to cope with the increasing aridity of grazing lands. This sector 
is also threatened by pressure to convert land to other uses.88 With 85% of the 
population dependent on livelihoods linked to this volatile agriculture sector, many 
commentators argue that vulnerability to food insecurity in Ethiopia is inevitable. 
Ethiopia is characterised by a considerable variety of ethnicities and inequalities. The 
main ethnic group in the country is the Oromo, comprising 34.5 percent of the 
population. Amhara (26.9 percent), Somali (6.2 percent), and Tigray (6.1 percent) 
make up the other main ethnic groups (Horne 2011). Amharic is the official language 
and is spoken by approximately 27 million people although dozens of local languages 
and dialects are also spoken. 
Political context 
According to the United Nations Development Project (UNDP 2010) Kenya and 
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Ethiopia are listed as forty-first and twelfth, respectively, from the bottom of 169 
countries. In terms of their political systems ‘Freedom in the world 2011’ lists 
Ethiopia as ‘not free’ and scores 6 on political rights and 6 on civil liberties;89 Ethiopia 
represents the most significant setback in terms of freedom scores in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as it has declined from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’. Ethiopia is an ethnic federal 
republic, made up of 9 ethnically based states. These states are designed, in theory, to 
provide self-determination and autonomy to Ethiopia’s different ethnic groups. In 
theory this decentralisation would lend itself to the localised decision-making explicit 
in a Food Sovereignty model. 
Although technically a multi-party democracy, Kenya has experienced steady, 
incremental declines in recent years, and in 2010 the pace of erosion accelerated due 
to the widespread repression that accompanied national elections. Kenya in 2011 is 
classified as partly free and scores 4 for political rights and 3 for civil liberties. The 
two countries have been influenced by different political ideologies in a post cold-war 
context, with Kenya embracing a Western liberal economic system and Ethiopia doing 
the same for a period. However post 1972 and the fall of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia 
embraced a Marxist ideology with backing from the Soviet Union. The relative 
political systems in these countries are relevant in a past and present context 
particularly in terms of the government’s responsibilities to their people and how this 
has impacted on the issue of food insecurity for certain population groups.90 
Ethiopia remained independent during the ‘scramble for Africa’91 with the exception 
of a brief period under Italian control as part of Italian East Africa. It has, however, 
experienced decades of internal conflict and border disputes with Eritrea, in part as a 
result of allegiances and alliances developed during the colonial era. More recently 
Ethiopia has had cross border conflicts with Somalia (2005), which are yet to be 
resolved. Kenya, on the other hand, was colonised by the British and gained 
independence in 1963 in a period of global expansion and relative stability. 
Commodity prices were high and the country had significant foreign exchange 
reserves. In the first decade of independence, tremendous economic progress was 
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made in that gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.6% (Rono 2002). Life 
expectancy, which was 44 years at independence, had increased to 69 years in the 
1980’s with infant mortality rates during the same period dropping from 219 per 1000 
live births to 68 per 1000 live births (Swamy 1994:196). Overall, in terms of all 
UNDP health indicators the record of the first decade of Kenyan independence was 
impressive and often referred to as ‘the golden years’. This period, however, was short 
lived and serious challenges to the progressive pattern began after 1973 partly as a 
result of the increase in oil prices, and the world recession that followed the economic 
crises of the 1970’s. Kenya is a member State to several international and regional 
human rights instruments, one of which is the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. However, the country has not taken legislative steps to 
implement the rights enshrined in the Covenant, as social, economic and cultural 
rights are not present in the Constitution, or in the Bill of Rights. Like Ethiopia, 
Kenya is now involved in cross border conflicts with Somalia.92 
Food insecurity context 
Whilst Ethiopia has experienced acute famines in both a historic and a contemporary 
context, Kenya has experienced no recorded famine, to date, but many of its people 
suffer from chronic hunger and the constant threat of famine. It is estimated that 10 
million people suffer from chronic food insecurity and around two million people rely 
on food assistance at any given time. Around 32% of the entire population is 
considered undernourished (FIAN 2010) Furthermore, child nutrition in Kenya has not 
improved during the last 20 years, and according to Kenyan government figures from 
2005/6, levels of stunting, wasting and underweight among children under five years 
old had increased slightly to 33%, 6.1%, and 20.2%, respectively. It is already clear 
that Kenya will not reach the targets of Millennium Development Goal 1, which is a 
major concern in terms of the progressive realisation of the right to food in Kenya.93 
According to the current Kenyan government (2011) the root causes of hunger in 
Kenya are poverty (inability to produce own food and lack of means to access food); 
unemployment and underemployment; landlessness; vagaries of weather (especially 
because of dependency on rain-fed agriculture); the maize syndrome (overemphasis on 
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maize which locks people into risky maize-based subsistence agriculture even in areas 
where maize production is unsuitable); education (especially female education 
because of its effect on child health and nutrition); inadequate sanitation, health 
facilities and clean water (effect of common infectious diseases on nutrition and 
health); and socio-political issues affecting access to food (disempowered groups, 
especially women, have limited access to food and incomes). Of these reasons the two 
most relevant to this discussion are the issue of food production and the socio-political 
issues affecting access to food. Both concepts are integral to Food Sovereignty and 
encapsulated in the second principle of Agrarian Reform and the seventh principle of 
Democratic Control. 
Agriculture is the foundation of the Ethiopian economy, employing 80 percent of the 
country’s 90 million people. The country’s well-being is, therefore, dependent on both 
internal and external factors including the global food system. The latest assessment is 
that 3.2 million people will require emergency food aid during 2011. In addition, there 
are 8.2 million Ethiopians classed as chronically food insecure, being unable to 
overcome persistent drought conditions. 
There is also extreme vulnerability to famine, with consumption rising and falling 
dramatically from year to year as the result of drought, ill health, or other family 
shocks. Reports suggest that food price inflation exceeded 40% for the year ending 
May 2011, causing serious hardship for poor families in both rural and urban areas.94 
As a result, many families who are not currently poor are at constant risk of falling 
into extreme poverty, and are unable to accumulate enough assets to break out of 
poverty. The prevalence of ‘wasting’ in children under the age of 5 in Ethiopia was 
estimated as 11%.95 However, within this context of poverty and food insecurity the 
government leases vast stretches of prime agricultural land to business interests from 
India, the EU, the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia - mainly for sugar, meat, agro-fuels 
and flowers (FIAN 2009). As will be discussed later in this thesis the growth in 
prioritisation of foreign direct investment over and above meeting the food needs of 
national populations is a matter of growing concern in famine prone countries such as 
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The current Kenyan Constitution establishes three types of land: government land, 
private land, and trust land. As such, much of Kenyan land is privately owned (FIAN 
2010:18). Approximately 80% of the land is arid or semi-arid and only about 20% is 
arable. The disparity in rainfall amounts and distribution has a significant effect on the 
country’s capacity for economic production. Many parts of the country cannot produce 
adequate food from rain-fed agriculture, and are therefore exposed to frequent hunger. 
The arid and semi-arid lands depend mainly on livestock production; which is 
frequently adversely affected by drought (Kenya Government 2005). The organisation 
of land tenure, and how it impacts on food security, is a central tenet of Food 
Sovereignty. The issue of land will be explored in relation to both obstacles to and 
potential for a Food Sovereignty model in Ethiopia and Kenya in Chapter 7. 
In terms of land ownership, the Ethiopian government currently owns all of the 
country’s land and leases it. Although families enjoy lifetime tenure, there is currently 
no right to buy or sell land in Ethiopia thus, liberal economists argue, diminishing 
incentives for prudent management of soil and water resources. For example, poorly 
maintained hillside plots are particularly prone to erosion by intense rainfall. Almost 
65% of rural households farm plots of less than one hectare, with primitive tools and 
negligible access to capital. 
In recent years, a very different volatility – global food prices – has imposed a new 
dimension of risk. Projected cereal production in Ethiopia for 2011 is much the same 
as the average over the last five years. The country continues to be dependent on 
imports and exposed to the latest round of unstable prices. In 2004 Ethiopia joined a 
group of seven priority countries, selected by the Millennium Project, to draw up a 
scaled-up investment plan that would allow the country to meet the MDG targets.97 
Ethiopia’s medium term plans go beyond a vision of ending hunger and food 
insecurity. Ambitious growth in agricultural output is a key strategic component of the 
broader goal to achieve middle-income status. Government plans describe this 
strategy as ‘agriculture development led industrialization’ (Horne 2011). The intention 
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is to invest resources, not just in the chronically vulnerable households, but also in the 
more successful small farms, which have potential to graduate from subsistence to 
semi-commercial. Such investments would seek productivity gains through improved 
seed and chemical inputs, restoring degraded land and creating a rural infrastructure to 
develop market activity. The government has therefore announced its intention to 
maintain its financial commitment to agriculture. This is currently 15% of the national 
budget, considerably above the average for  Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The cost of the programme is nevertheless far beyond national resources and extensive 
donor support will be essential. If fulfilled, recent commitments by world leaders to 
support national food security plans in developing countries will go some way to 
towards making this possible. These new directions in government policies and what 
they mean for the development of a Food Sovereignty framework will be explored in 
later chapters. 
Concluding comments 
This opening chapter has demonstrated that the terms associated with food insecurity 
can be unclear and famine, in particular, has been understood to mean different things. 
Traditionally, famine has been understood as a catastrophic event resulting in mass 
starvation. Modern famine analysis, however, demands a more complex approach that 
recognises famine as a process with inter-related characteristics. Though the 
typologies introduced in this chapter seem somewhat overly simplistic in their 
demarcations, when most current research demonstrates a considerable overlap, they 
are useful because they highlight the idea that different types of famine and food 
insecurity demand different remedies. They also demonstrate that the international 
context has been absent from famine analysis in the past. The idea that ‘one size fits 
all’ has in many ways been the international response to famine in the past and goes 
someway towards explaining its failure in terms of lasting solutions to ongoing famine 
vulnerability. Most importantly, understanding different casual factors and different 
effects of famine are key to understanding how it can be eradicated in a permanent 
way. More politically, who can be held accountable when it is not prevented? There 
has been much written, with justification, about how the corrupt governments and 
elites in the developing world are to blame for the plight of their poor and hungry 
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people.98 This is a rejection of dependency theory, which locates almost all 
responsibility for gross global inequality in the developed world. There is no doubt 
that many governments in the developing world are non-democratic, corrupt, brutal 
and manifestly not acting in the interest of the poor majority. Indeed the issue of 
responsibility has led some famine analysts to believe that avoiding the famine ‘label’ 
has often been convenient for those seeking to justify slow or failed responses (Edkins 
2007: Ch3). Food crises in Niger 2005 and Ethiopia 2007-2008 have been cited as 
examples of national governments employing this tactic.99 However the role of foreign 
governments and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) within the current global 
food system is often underplayed, or completely overlooked in famine analysis. This is 
a key point and may explain how the logic of the GFS tolerates the persistence of 
chronic hunger for this very reason i.e. it is not labelled or considered as ‘famine’. The 
following chapter addresses this issue by considering famine vulnerability specifically 
within the framework of the global food system. 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 
This chapter introduces and explains the concept of the global food system and how it 
relates to contemporary food insecurity in parts of Africa. It discusses Africa’s place 
in the global system with specific reference to Kenya and Ethiopia. The GFS, as it is 
presented in this work, is a system that evolved, in part, through a project of rule. It 
will be argued that the position of Africa, as a whole, in the GFS is integrally linked to 
its colonial past and this past resonates in the present. It is acknowledged, however, 
that some African ruling elites played an active rather than a passive role in the 
establishment of their nations as dependent partners in the world economy (Bayart 
1993, 2009). The nature of land ownership, tenure and use is crucial to understanding 
the current patterns of food production and consumption; the link between access to 
land and political, social and economic freedoms in many parts of Africa is a 
fundamental one and central to the development of a Food Sovereignty framework.100 
Part 1 begins by addressing the following questions: what is the global food system? 
What are its key analytical features in terms of structures, institutions and processes? 
What are the various theories that have been proposed to make sense of it? Part 2, 
considers how the global food system evolved and importantly, from a political 
perspective, when and why it evolved. Part 3 sets out, in general terms, the 
relationship between the global food system, past and present, and food 
security/insecurity. The aim of this section is to understand how this relationship 
works in theory and in practice. Changes in African primary food production, 
particularly its orientation towards export crops are an issue of growing importance in 
debates on matters of food insecurity. The term ‘export crop’ is used to describe crops 
primarily grown for export in one form or another .101 These changes, coupled with the 
projected rise in foreign direct investment in productive land in  Sub-Saharan Africa 
are central elements of the critique of the global food system developed throughput 
this thesis. Part 4 of this chapter asks in what ways the changes to agricultural 
production can be linked to increased food insecurity and vulnerability to famine, in 
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Ethiopia and Kenya. It becomes evident that certain theoretical approaches to the 
global food system (GFS) are more relevant to Kenya than Ethiopia. 
1. Defining the Global Food System 
The concept of the global food system can only be understood in the wider context of 
‘globalisation’. For the purposes of this thesis, globalisation refers specifically to 
recent and current changes in the global economy. Critically understood, 
‘globalisation’ refers to the increasing integration of the world economy and the 
decreasing capacity of national governments to pursue policies that do not best serve 
the interests of international capital. There are widely differing opinions of how far 
this process has gone and the desirability of more or less integration (Collier 2008; 
Rosset 2006a). There is, however, a consensus that the current levels of economic 
integration go beyond previous levels and that this has increased the capacity of the 
largest states or regional groupings to make and implement policies (Pogge 2003, 
Stiglitz 2006). Susan George, a long-standing critic of the global food system defined 
it as ‘the totality of tangible and intangible means employed by a given community for 
the production, conservation, distribution and consumption of food.’ (George 1991: 
19). The process of globalisation has resulted in agriculture becoming a ‘system for 
transforming one series of industrial products into another series of industrial products 
which happen to be edible.’ (George 1991: 25). Thus the GFS can be understood as a 
process involving machinery, fertilisers, pesticides, irrigation systems and such like on 
the input end, with food (after manufacturing and processing) on the output end. 
Despite an abundance of literature exposing the inequities and unsustainable basis of 
this model in recent decades, the West, and the U.S in particular, is still generally 
perceived as having the most efficient food production system in the world (Patel 
2007; Shiva 2000a). So much so that the industrial system of farming has become the 
‘blueprint’ for many developing countries. For example, over recent decades the U.S 
system of farming has had a very significant impact on agricultural practices in South 
America, particularly Brazil.102 The move away from traditional farming methods to a 
system dependent on highly sophisticated technology and intensive energy inputs is 
one of the defining characteristics of the agricultural sector in recent times. This 
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development of institutions, structures, processes and power relationships that 
dominate the modern GFS has been referred to as the ‘factory farm complex’ 
(McMichael 2008:106-116). In terms of an environmental discourse, the current GFS 
can be understood as one of ‘economic rationalism’ as opposed to a ‘green 
rationalism’ that characterises a Food Sovereignty model.103 ‘The basic entities of 
economic rationalism are economic actors such as the WTO which regulates 
international trade undertaken by mostly private firms. This model assumes that 
natural relationships are competitive i.e. market relations and that actors are motivated 
by rational self-interest. Its key metaphors are mechanistic and based on notions of 
levels of production, price competition and efficiency. In contrast, the environmental 
discourse of the Food Sovereignty framework could be described as ‘green 
rationalism’ given its notions of the complexity of food production, the 
interrelationship of farmers and nature and the use of organic metaphors such as agro-
ecological food production. 
Indeed, the global food system can be understood in terms of some key analytical 
features, which contrast markedly with the model of Food Sovereignty. First and 
foremost, much of food production in the First World, especially in the U.S, takes 
place within an industrial or productivist model of agriculture. This means food 
production is largely controlled by huge corporate farmers or so-called agribusinesses 
and this applies to both livestock and arable farming.104 Most of the beef, chicken or 
pork available to consumers in the U.S, for example, is reared on industrially 
processed animal feed on industrial ‘feedlots’. Europe has developed a similar 
agricultural model, though most cattle and sheep are still grazed on pastureland, pigs 
and chickens are largely ‘factory farmed’ in sheds or coups. One of the most important 
features of this model, particularly with regard to its development in the Third World, 
is the conversion of labour to capital-intensive modes of product. Concentration on 
crops for export has also seen a rise in so-called ‘mono-culture, where a country’s 
entire agricultural sector remains dependant on one or two crops. Traditional food 
crops like grains and seeds have lost virtually all their retail value in the modern 
global food system. They are now part of industrial processes involved in 
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manufacturing bread or pasta or more recently as livestock feed or biofuels.105 There is 
empirical evidence that this pattern is on an upward trajectory with about two-thirds of 
global maize production currently used for animal feed (Massari 2003). Britain, alone, 
is estimated to use in excess of 4 million hectares of ‘ghost acres’106 to grow mainly 
animal feed (Lang & Heasman 2004:240). Understandably, many find this situation 
difficult to justify in view of the number of people around the world lacking in 
sufficient food. 
In terms of structural changes, deregulation has been central to the concept of 
globalisation and this is evident in the GFS. The model of agricultural trade in the 
GFS can thus be described as liberalised. Since the 1980’s large parts of nation-state 
regulatory systems, mainly those established after 1945, have been dismantled. This 
has led to an increased integration of the world economy and facilitated a 
strengthening of economic liberalisation. A crucial factor with regard to these highly 
sophisticated agricultural systems is their relative flexibility. Deregulation and 
contractual agreements, through international institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), agribusinesses and giant supermarkets can now be considered as 
defining features of the global food system. Indeed the WTO can be conceptualised as 
the lead organisation of the GFS operating through the use of key instruments such as 
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The WTOs remit has been extended to include issues such as investments, 
services, intellectual property rights and agriculture that go way beyond trade and in 
effect make domestic economic policy subject to global rules.107 
Furthermore the expansion and integration of agriculture on a global scale has resulted 
in tapestries of networks of commodity exchanges, known as commodity chains. The 
chain metaphor helps illuminate the inter-connectivity of people, places and resources. 
Many commodity chains have become dominated by a just a few agri-businesses from 
the First World (Vorley 2003). Cocoa processing of African cocoa, for example, is 
concentrated within only four companies (Cargill, ADM. Barry Callebaut and Hosta) 
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controlling 40% of cocoa grinding. 
In the current global food system, interactions between different food systems, in 
different parts of the world, are taking place with increasing frequency, but with more 
intense and often unintended consequences (Raikes & Gibbon 2000). When we 
consume products such as coffee, fresh fruit or vegetables we are often participating in 
a global process; it may feel like an individual experience but it is, increasingly, a 
social, political and environmental act. What is crucial to this analysis of the global 
food system is that recent changes are not necessarily in the interest of the most 
hungry or famine vulnerable communities. This can be demonstrated by the fact that a 
food trade surplus of $1 billion for developing countries in the 1970s was transformed 
into a deficit of $11 billion by 2004 (FAO 2004). Recognition of this transformation is 
integral to the Food Sovereignty movement and its reversal is the basis of the fifth 
principle which calls for an end to the ‘Globalisation of Hunger’.108 
Some theories of the global food system 
There are various frameworks of analysis that attempt to explain the global food 
system and the theories most relevant to the position adopted in this thesis are 
introduced here.109 These are Global Commodity Chain theory (GCC) (Hopkins & 
Wallerstein 1994) International Food Regime theory (IFR) (Friedmann & McMichael 
1989) and what I will call here Theory of Extraversion (ToE) (Bayart 1993, 2000). 
Several strands of the theoretical approaches are developed in this thesis with the 
specific purpose of exploring Food Sovereignty as a viable alternative framework 
within which to situate the global food system. Vandana Shiva’s depiction of the 
global food system as a battle between corporate ‘control and command’ methods of 
food production with the small farmer economy that predominates in the Third World 
resonates well with the arguments for a Food Sovereignty framework110 (Shiva 2000a). 
An analysis of the global food system characterised by the paradox of starvation and 
obesity also fits well with the position in this thesis (Patel 2007). The calls from 
international social movements for reclaiming food democracy in the global food 
system are optimistic and hopeful, and will be explored specifically within the context 
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of Food Sovereignty as an alternative to the existing food model.111 
The current position of Africa in the GFS can be explained in part by Global 
Commodity Chain theory (GCC) (Hopkins & Wallerstein 1994). GCC theory is 
situated within a World Systems Theory (WST) (Wallerstein 1993) which itself is a 
progression from Dependency Theory. Dependency Theory suggests that the 
international system, has a centre, i.e. the Western industrialised nations or the First 
World, with the U.S being the centre of the centre, the bull’s-eye on a dart board so to 
speak. Surrounding the centre is the Second World and on the periphery is the Third 
World.112 For dependency theorists, the former has consistently exploited the latter 
since colonial times and continues to do so. Indeed dependency analysis argues that it 
is development itself that creates ‘underdevelopment’ because countries are locked 
into unequal interdependencies created by colonialism. Early exponents of 
Dependency Theory believed that the remedy to correct this ongoing imbalance was to 
be found in the creation of a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
instituted by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Barratt-Brown 1987). The 
obvious weakness of Dependency Theory is its applicability to a global food system in 
the 21st century. Though its explanatory power perhaps resides in demonstrating why 
colonialism was so ‘easy’ and this is now well understood, it in no way explains why 
independence has not delivered food security for the people previously subjected to 
colonial rule. This lack of explanatory power will be discussed below in relation to the 
Theory of Extraversion. 
Like Dependency Theory the central feature of World Systems Theory is the 
relationship between economic activity and power between the ‘three worlds’. WST 
builds on the dependency concept and argues that a single division of labour is the 
organising concept of a ‘centuries-old world-economy’ (McMichael 2008:43). WST 
theory can be thought of as less rigid than dependency theory because it takes into 
account the flexibility of capital and the presence of long-term cycles in the global 
economic system(Raikes & Gibbon 2000:54).113 A global commodity chain can be 
defined as ‘a network of labour and production processes whose end result is a 
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finished commodity’ (Hopkins & Wallerstein 1994:17). All firms are involved in 
commodity chains and at a local level this involves short links and short geographical 
differences between producer and consumer. WST, however, within which the GFS 
can be situated is more interested in GCCs and therefore relevant for this discussion.114 
This theory of GCCs has been further developed and the distinction between 
‘producer’ and ‘buyer’ driven GCCs has been added (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 
1994).115 This more nuanced development is of increasing relevance to the agricultural 
changes in East Africa and shifts in the balance of power in the agricultural sector. 
The former are associated with complex industrial commodities like aircraft or 
military hardware whereas most agricultural commodities, especially food, are 
strongly and increasingly, buyer driven. Importantly, in modern complex food GCCs 
the shift in control has been from wholesaler to retailer, especially giant multi-national 
retailers (Vorley 2003). 
The applicability of WST/GCC for this thesis is the concern with the issue of power in 
relation to the restructuring of international economic relations. More specifically, 
GCC theory recognises that the location of power and how and by whom it is 
exercised can vary on a commodity-by-commodity basis. 
Another theoretical approach to the GFS that has influenced the understanding of the 
global food system presented in this work is International Food Regime theory (IFR). 
This theoretical position is also concerned with the location of power but the focus is 
more on the withdrawal of the state from corporatist or Keynesian forms of macro-
economic management(Friedmann & McMichael 1989).116. IFR theory is particularly 
relevant for this thesis, both in the way that structural adjustments (SA) have impacted 
on food security in certain East African countries and how national governments have 
become less able to prioritise their food security over and above other international 
trade agreements.117 From the IFR perspective, the current GFS is a result of the inter-
connectivity of three distinct historical periods: colonialism, developmentalism and 
globalisation. Situating the GFS within an historical context that recognises past and 
present power relations is central to the framework of enquiry in this thesis. 
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International Food Regime theory is perhaps the most applicable for this thesis 
because it provides a theoretical basis on which to evaluate both the potential and the 
obstacles to Food Sovereignty as a political project and as an alternative agricultural 
framework. The key point is that the potential and obstacles to Food Sovereignty 
reside in the relationships not just between the people and their governments but also 
between national governments and international political and economic institutions. 
 
It is fair to say that the theoretical basis of the Food Sovereignty framework is 
probably closer to the IFR theories than any other. Principle 7 of Food Sovereignty 
demands democratic control, which recognises the need for good governance, 
accountability and equal participation in economic, political and social life. This 
includes active decision making in food and rural issues.118 However, this lack of 
internal democracy, in an African context, cannot be fully explained by the previous 
theories. Thus, there is room in this discussion for an analysis of the GFS that rejects 
African ruling elites as passive players in the process. Rather, they can be considered 
as active agents in the establishment of their nations as dependent partners in the 
world economy (Bayart 1993, 2000). Bayart’s model is based on ‘the central role 
played by strategies of extraversion in the way that the relationship between Sub-
Saharan Africa and the rest of the world is articulated’ (Bayart 2000:231). From this 
perspective ‘dependence’ is viewed as an historical process rather than a purely 
structural concept as Dependency Theory conceives it to be. Thus Africans are actors 
in their own history and this extends to their position in the global food system. 
Bayart’s analysis is interesting and challenging on many levels and we will return to it 
in more depth when we consider the role of African governments and their 
responsibility for food insecurity in later chapters. In contrast to Dependency and IFR 
theories which view the capacity of Third World national governments to prioritise 
domestic food as being reduced by the structures and processes imposed by the GFS, 
Theory of Extraversion argues that both a big state and a slimmed down state (as a 
result of structural adjustment for example) largely serve the interests of the same, 
elite groups. Which ever theoretical position one accepts, the reality of Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the current GFS is one of dependence. 
                                                          
118
 See Appendix 3. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 2 
The Global Food System 
 Page 64 
 
2. The origins of the global food system 
Having set out a working definition of the global food system, this next section 
considers, when and why it evolved. The origins of the global food system are 
typically situated within the legacy of colonialism and giving further nuance by the 
recognition of distinct periods of ‘development’ (McMichael 2008). However the 
current system must also be understood in a postcolonial context; in other words 
understanding why independence has not eradicated food insecurity? (Thornton 1998). 
Proponents of IFR theory suggest that the first period of the modern GFS dated from 
the second half of the 19th century and then two separate periods can be located from 
the late 1940s-1970s and then from the late 1980s onwards (Patel 2007: Ch 4). 
Phase 1 
The first period was driven by the focus on food imports to support the 
industrialisation that was occurring in Europe. As stated, a characteristic shared by 
most of the continent of Africa is a common experience of European colonial rule and 
behind that the slave trade (Goldsmith 1994:57).119 This said, there is a great deal of 
literature that criticises the use of colonialism as a generic term because it subsumes a 
variety of different factors that are historical, political, cultural, administrative and so 
forth, ‘the examples and permutations are legion’ (Bayart 2000:221) From an IFR 
perspective, however, colonialism, in an African context, can be understood as the 
subjugation by physical and psychological force of one culture over another; the 
colonial power over the colonised.120 It is worth noting that colonialism predates 
European expansion during the 15th - 20th centuries and continues today with the 
Chinese colonisation of Tibet, for example. Generally speaking, colonialism has two 
forms, colonies of settlement, which often eliminate indigenous people such as the 
Europeans in the Americas or Australasia, or colonies of rule. African colonisation, by 
and large, took the latter form. The types of commodities traded within the modern 
global food system can be explicitly linked to these forms of colonisation. Early 
colonial imports consisted of grains and meats from the USA and other settler 
colonies, and tropical goods for both urban consumption and raw materials for 
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industrial input. Whilst the former goods came from countries that traded as nation 
states on an integrated world grain market, the tropical goods were a result of a very 
different colonial relationship, one of rule. They were often based on the coercion of 
native labour to supply these commodities and more importantly, this trade was not 
internationally integrated. British colonialism in Kenya, for example, resulted in large-
scale confiscation of peasant lands and mass migration of men to work on European 
estates. Thus colonial agriculture in Kenya was designed specifically for export crops 
such as coffee, tea and sisal (McMichael 2008:35). This relates to patterns of land use 
in the past and is evident in the present position of Africa in the global food system as 
is discussed in part 3 of this chapter. 
Phase 2 
The second phase of the GFS, sometimes referred to as ‘the development project’ 
(McMichael 2008) which started around the end of the Second World War was ‘more 
complex, ambiguous and, in the long run self-destructive’ (Raikes & Gibbon 2000:56) 
It involved a rapid expansion in Northern grain production as a result of new green 
technologies and massive producer subsidies, and the diversion of land, capital and 
ultimately grain to increased production of meat. Structural changes resulted in certain 
parts of the agricultural labour-process being replaced by industrial capital and 
industrial processes aimed at higher value products. The rise of the WTO saw farmers 
drawn into networks of contractual relations and other forms of regulation aimed at 
standardising quality and delivery and homogenising products for consumption in the 
industrialised countries. Internationally, this period had a dramatic effect on 
commodity flows, with Europe changing from being a net importer of grain to a net 
exporter. 
The area of new export growth most relevant to the developing world during this 
period, and particularly relevant to East Africa, was in fresh fruit and flowers. This 
period has been referred to as the development project because it was about 
restructuring a world market that was nonetheless subordinate to the development 
concerns of nation-states (McMichael 2008). It was arguably the beginning of a US 
centered world economy through which the US created an informal empire based on 
economic and military might as the European colonial project receded. Through the 
use of food aid and green technologies many developing countries were incorporated 
into international circuits of food and agri-business technology that persist. In the 
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postwar era the US set up a food aid programme to channel food surpluses to Third 
World countries.121 This ‘food aid regime’ evolved from the US agro-industrial model, 
protected by tariffs and subsidies and institutionalised by GATT (Friedmann 1982). 
US farmers were motivated to specialise in one or two commodities such as corn, 
sugar or dairy products, and with the incentives of technological and financial 
assistance from the public purse, over-produced as a matter of course. These subsidies 
set prices for farm goods above their price on the world market and the resulting 
surpluses flooded the developing world with cheap imports. In real terms it was a 
significant transfer of agricultural resources to the Third World and as a result the 
‘world-farm emerged alongside the world-factory’ (McMichael 2008:106). Crucially, 
the agricultural policies of many Third World governments switched from focusing on 
modernising agriculture as a domestic industry towards developing agriculture within 
a global industry. The negative impacts of such a shift are discussed in the next 
section. 
A crucial factor with regard to these highly sophisticated agricultural systems is their 
relative flexibility. They can adapt to an increase or decrease in market demand with 
surprising speed. Such a system can, therefore, respond reasonably quickly to changes 
in demand most crucially when that demand is expressed in monetary terms. This, 
however, can lead to increased vulnerability when a country’s entire agricultural 
production is virtually dependent on the vagaries of the international market both in 
terms of demand and price controls. The negative impact of price volatility of basic 
foods on developing countries has only recently been fully recognised and is now a 
key critisicism of the way the GFS operates in practice (FAO 2003; SOFI 2011). The 
recent rise in global food prices and the conversion of food crops to animal feed crops 
and biofuels are two relevant and important factors in calls for a change to an 
alternative model of Food Sovereignty. Though, under the current system, agriculture 
in the developed countries, guarantees high consumption of industrial inputs and 
energy and maximises the monetary value of output, in real terms it is also wasteful of 
land and grain and thus inefficient and unsustainable in the long term (Patel 2007). 
3. The relationship between the global food system and food insecurity. 
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An FAO report published in 2003 on 'Trade Reforms and Food Security' suggests that: 
...The potential gains from trade liberalisation are not guaranteed and will not 
necessarily be reflected in improved food security status of all groups within 
society. In particular, there are likely to be significant differences between the 
impacts on small scale and commercial farmers, rural non-farm producers 
and urban consumers both within and across countries. These need to be 
considered in identifying the food security implications of trade 
liberalization. (FAO, 2003: 16-17) 
As stated, from its earliest inception, European colonisation in Africa established a 
structure whereby colonies specialised in extraction and production of raw materials 
and primary goods that were unavailable in Europe. These included rubber, ivory, 
cocoa, peanuts gold, diamonds and cotton. This specialisation between European 
economies and their colonies came to be called the ‘colonial division of labour’ 
(Warnock 1993). This is explained by WST, which is based on the idea of a single 
division of labour as the organising concept of the world economy. This division of 
labour facilitated European industrialisation and pushed non-European societies into 
primary commodity production. It should be noted that there are significant 
differences between countries in Africa with regard to their role in the global food 
system and their vulnerability to famine. More pertinently, there are differences in the 
direction that African governments are moving in order to improve their food 
situation.122 There are, none-the-less, common characteristics, which may help explain 
the relationship between the GFS and food insecurity on the continent in regional 
terms before looking at countries at an individual level. 
As already made clear, European colonisation is the most obvious shared 
characteristic across the continent of Africa. The second characteristic and the most 
relevant in Sub-Saharan Africa is that, even now, the overwhelming majority of the 
population are peasants or subsistence farmers in as much as they live and work on the 
land to feed, clothe and house themselves and this makes them vulnerable in a number 
of ways.123 The third common characteristic is that these rural societies are extremely 
                                                          
122
 See Chapter 7 for a discussion on developments in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
123
 See FIAN 2010. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 2 
The Global Food System 
 Page 68 
 
poor, in the main still using simple tools, slashing and burning forests to plant crops 
and following herds of sheep and cattle over poor grazing ground. The fourth 
characteristic, and this is of vital importance, is that whatever agricultural 
development has taken place is largely of products for export to Europe; cash-crops 
such as cocoa, coffee, tea, palm oil, and bananas, textile fabrics or minerals such as 
copper, gold, bauxite and most recently oil (Gibbon & Ponte 2000:56) These cash 
crops demand enormous inputs in terms of time and space in the developing countries 
but in the GFS, as it is currently constituted, it is developed countries that directly 
benefit from them. As discussed earlier, the position of producers of basic 
commodities in modern global commodity chains (GCC) is, generally speaking, 
subservient to manufacturers and retailers higher up the commodity chain. Research 
on corporate concentration along commodity chains, from farms to consumers, shows 
how the dominance of a handful of northern-based agri-food firms in Rural 1 is 
making it difficult for commodity dependent developing countries to enter global 
markets. They are prevented from moving up the value-added ladder, reinforcing the 
cycle of dependency, economic stagnation and extreme poverty (McMichael 2008, 
Vorley 2003). 
Marx was an early critic of what he saw as the inevitable move towards more and 
more capital-intensive plants and to giant companies accumulating the necessary 
capital to finance them. The strength of the Marxist model of analysis is that by 
focusing on the process of production, it helps to explain the ongoing strength of the 
North American, Japanese and European industrially developed nations and the 
weakness of much of the rest of the world. This is not just the result of the bargaining 
strength between industrial and agricultural producers in terms of trade (though this is 
crucial), but also a result of the fact that profits are made, and the actual accumulation 
of capital takes place, inside the giant multinational companies. Crucially, where this 
capital should be invested is decided in New York, London, or Tokyo, not in the 
countries that are affected; it is not in the government offices of the producing nations 
but in the head offices of the multinational giant companies (Stiglitz 2006: Ch 4) This 
corporate control can be perceived as a very real obstacle to developing a Food 
Sovereignty model because of its undeniable power within the dominant agricultural 
model. The challenges it poses, not just to the right to food, but to land rights and the 
right to work as well, is inextricably linked to the concept of Food Sovereignty and 
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will be considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
There are certain aspects of the global economic system that have particular 
significance for African export agriculture. There is, for example a high degree of 
differentiation between different commodity chains with regard to raw material 
production, industrial processing/production and consumption. The cotton-to-textiles-
to garment commodity chain is probably the most complete in terms of being more or 
less fully globalised. (Raikes and Gibbon 2000:86) On the opposite end of the scale, 
there are commodity chains such as cocoa in which raw material production and 
industrial processing and consumption remain polarised along classic nineteenth-
century lines.124 In many processing industries this division is exacerbated by the trend 
towards capital intensity and technical complexity, which creates an increasingly 
unequal distribution of economic opportunities. GCC theory is also a useful tool in 
disaggregating certain agricultural products from others, edible and non-edible crops 
for example, and how they relate to land usage. This framework of GCCs allows 
analysis of certain crops within individual countries, fresh flowers in Kenya for 
example, and facilitates the measurement of the negative effects on food security. 
African crops may be non-edible as in cotton or flowers, edible with no nutritional 
value such as coffee and tea, or edible food such as bananas, sugar, wheat, vegetables 
or meat. The important thing to understand here is that the distinction between cash 
crops (food or non-food) and food crops is who uses or eats them. In the case of cash 
crops it is almost never the same people who produce them and in terms of finding 
viable solutions to reduce food insecurity this fact is of monumental importance 
because it is so obviously political.125 In Kenya, for example, forty percent of children 
work on plantations, which produce pineapple, coffee, tea and sugar for export. While 
these foodstuffs are destined for the European market it is estimated that 10 million 
Kenyans suffer from chronic food insecurity and around 2 million rely on food 
assistance at any given time (FIAN 2010:15) 
A fifth characteristic is that European colonisation led to national or state boundaries 
that were drawn fairly arbitrarily, cutting across tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious and 
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cultural divisions (Ake 1996).126 For example, a line was drawn through Somalia 
cutting off part of the Somali people and placing them within the borders of Kenya. 
Likewise the Masai nation was split into two between Kenya and Tanzania 
(Goldsmith 1994). As we will see, the failure of the Kenyan national government to 
address these issues at the time of independence has ongoing negative political, social 
and economic consequences today (Branch 2011).127 Transport links, railways and 
shipping were developed with the specific aim, to facilitate the export of natural 
resources to the colonial power. This dependent development has resulted in the 
division of labour that is still emblematic of the global food system, whether African 
ruling elites were complicit, or not. 
It is the case, of course, that colonialism allowed overtly aggressive approaches to 
Africa in defence of European national interests. The need for primary commodities 
and the competition for power and influence between the colonial powers were 
deemed both natural and justifiable (Gallagher 2011). For proponents of IFR theory 
this position, generally speaking, remains today, although it should be qualified that 
the motivation of self-interest is perhaps not the driving force it once was. Indeed it 
could be argued that the developed world has adopted a ‘constructivist approach’ 
based on ideas that might include notions of justice and responsibility, rather than the 
‘realist approach’ of the past which was motivated by interest alone. This change in 
approach to a more enlightened one, however, does not negate the argument that both 
famine and vulnerability to famine continue to be, to a great extent, a result of 
political factors both past and present. 
Lastly, and of great significance to the relationship between the GFS and food 
insecurity is the dependent trade relationship which evolved during the colonial era. 
This trade relationship resulted in the emergence of an elite class of state officials and 
traders, committed beneficiaries of the export/import business with European powers. 
Many of these ‘elites’ took control when the colonial powers withdrew or were 
expelled and their advantaged position, and how this relates to land and agricultural 
policies, remains important at many levels. The Theory of Extraversion can be 
invoked here. The ‘neo-patrimonial’ position goes as far as to say that ‘sovereignty in 
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Africa is exercised and maintained through the creation and management of 
dependence’ (Bayart 2000:228) With this in mind later chapters will look at how 
ruling elites can be held more responsible for ensuring food security through more 
democratic processes both within and beyond famine prone countries.128 
What is clear is that in the case of Africa, as a whole, global deregulation in 
conjunction with liberal economic policies and structural adjustments have resulted in 
significant changes in agricultural policy.129 What is of central importance is that these 
changes have intensified the marginalisation of many Third World countries within 
the GFS. In contrast to the promise of economic liberalisation, evidence suggests that 
deregulation, has been considerably one-sided. The introduction of lawyer-driven 
regulative regimes tends internationally to privilege forms of protection most 
applicable to advanced industrial economies (anti-dumping) over those historically 
employed by poorer countries with less sophisticated institutional structures (generally 
quota-based) (Raikes & Gibbon 2000:87). By way of illustration, many economists 
have criticised the Uruguay round of trade talks as being skewed in favour of the 
already rich and developed nations (Pogge 2003; Collier 2007; Sachs 2005) 
Agricultural subsidies are one of the most contentious of all the issues, which concern 
the global food system. The agricultural subsidies of the US, the EU and Japan 
amount to at least 75% of the total income of  Sub-Saharan Africa (Stiglitz 2006: 85). 
Were it not for enormous Government subsidies it would not, for example, pay the US 
to grow cotton.130 This causes direct harm to African cotton farmers who simply 
cannot compete in such an unequal arena. In globally integrated markets international 
prices affect domestic prices. Heavily subsidised agricultural products from the US 
and the EU not only affect farmers who could export but also those who sell at home. 
The usual political reason for continuing with such policies in the US is the 
government’s desire to protect the small family farmer and their traditional way of 
life. However, the evidence does not support this position. The over-whelming 
majority of subsidies go to very large, often corporate farms and in fact huge subsidies 
have actually driven out the small farmer in many areas.131 The US federal government 
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spent $114 billion on farm subsidies between 1995-2002, and it was estimated that the 
2002 Farm Bill would cost at least $180 billion for the ten years following its 
implementation.132 
Furthermore, countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia are at a particular disadvantage by 
the ways in which developed countries have structured agricultural trade tariffs. By 
placing higher export tariffs on manufactured goods than on raw materials, developing 
countries have been discouraged from developing any processing industries. Through 
these escalating tariffs countries in the European Union, for example, continue to 
receive a supply of cheap raw materials while reducing the threat posed to processing 
industries from the developing world. Judging by the crops chosen for production in 
East African large-scale land acquisitions this structural inequity in the food system is 
likely to be perpetuated.133 
One further factor in the relationship between the global food system and food 
insecurity is the link between rising oil prices and the rise in the price of basic foods 
such as cereals. Rising oil prices contribute to costs of agricultural production through 
the cost of fertiliser, other inputs and transport. Oil prices have been rising steadily for 
the last three years and this is generally understood as having contributed to the food 
price rise since 2008. In the wake of an oil price rise in 1974 there was a wave of food 
crises, which led to famine, across parts of Africa and Asia. At least as important as its 
direct effect on food prices is an indirect consequence of the price of oil. The rising 
cost of oil has led to a shift in the US, with encouragement from government 
subsidies, to the use of corn in the production of ethanol as an alternative energy 
source. Nearly one third of corn acreage in the US has now been diverted to ethanol 
production (Crow 2008) Global food grain stocks are at a 25-year low, encouraging 
speculative trading in food grains or food grain futures contracts. All these factors - 
the oil price rise, the shift to ethanol production and the reliance on the global food 
market, rather than national reserve stocks, to make up agricultural scarcities - have 
reduced the supply of cereals for food thus increased global food insecurity. 
                                                          
132
 US Farm Bill 2002:Its implications for World Agricultural Markets, available at 
http://networkideas.org Accessed 29/11/09. 
133
 See Chapter 7. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 2 
The Global Food System 
 Page 73 
 
The GFS and exports from Africa. 
This section will look specifically at how certain aspects of the global food system are 
increasing food insecurity in parts of Africa (Massari 2003) and have led to what has 
been referred to as a ‘crisis in primary production’ (Vorley 2003:14-20). The 
UNCTAD report on international trade commodities showed that while Africa 
increased its share of fuels on the world market, it experienced severe losses in 
agriculture and non-fuel commodities. In fact the least developed countries have lost 
market share for all commodity groups except fuel (UNCTAD 2004).134 This, 
potentially, has a very serious impact on a country’s ability to feed its own people and 
to protect itself from price volatility because it has to import much of its food needs. 
In the last four decades, the continent of Africa has changed from being a net exporter 
of basic food staples to relying on imports and food aid (Massari 2003). 
These are however, predictable feature of a GFS that continues to be liberalised, WTO 
led and driven by economic rationalism. Two specific areas are generally considered 
to have had the most negative impacts in an African context. Firstly, concentration on 
the production of certain crops in the GFS deprives African countries, in general, of 
value added in the production price as profits are most significant in the 
manufacturing process (Raikes & Gibbon 2000). Thus the rationale of the GFS has 
driven a conversion from labour to capital intensive production and corporate 
concentration in agriculture.135 Secondly the type of crops that have been grown for 
export is relevant and the growth of non-food crops has had a clear negative impact on 
national food security in parts of Africa. Kenya can be considered as a classic example 
of this phenomenon. 
In general terms the most obvious negative impacts of the GFS in Africa are related to 
the terms of trade and range of export crops. The range of the continents main export 
crops is relatively narrow and has shown only limited evidence of broadening in 
recent decades (Raikes and Gibbon 2000). African Exports can be divided into two 
general groups, usually referred to as ‘traditional’ and new or ‘non-traditional’ export 
crops. The traditional export crops, which originated during the colonial period, 
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include coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton, tobacco, sugar and rubber. The non-traditional 
export crops, which, as explained earlier, expanded during the second phase of the 
development project, include potatoes, tomatoes, peppers, pulses, onions, fresh fruits 
(including canned fruit) and cut flowers. Of these new export crops cut flowers are the 
most important and in terms of their growth in food insecure countries, the most 
controversial. The other general observation about the negative impact of the way the 
GFS is structured is the growth of biofuel production, in competition with food 
production, and the risks this imposes on food availability.136 
With regard to the terms of trade, FAO Trade Year Books 1984-86 and 1994-96 show 
a continual fall in the value of Africa’s share of exports and an ongoing deterioration 
of the ‘terms of trade’ for Africa’s main ‘ traditional’ export crops (Raikes & Gibbon 
2000:61). This situation arises when the cost of imports continues to rise faster than 
income from exports. As stated, farmers in the poorest countries rarely control the 
processing technology or distribution systems, which could add value to their produce. 
Multinationals now control most of these areas and import the raw materials from 
developing countries then export the finished products back to source at hugely 
inflated prices.137. The latest series of FAO trade yearbooks, which started in 2004, 
show a continuation of this trend. The three sectors most obviously affected by the 
inequity of this process are coffee, cocoa, grains and oil-seeds. 
How the GFS deprives African countries of value-added: coffee, cocoa and grains. 
Coffee is one of the world’s most valuable agricultural commodities, next to oil, 
coffee is the most valuable commodity exported from the tropics. The world’s largest 
coffee producers are Brazil and Columbia but the countries with the highest national 
dependency on coffee exports are Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda (Vorley 
2003: 47) Indeed the coffee bean is believed to have originated in Ethiopia and the 
Arabian Peninsula (Bates 1997). Roughly half of the world’s coffee comes from small 
farms, of less than 5 hectares in coffee production, thus making it a very important 
commodity in terms of rural livelihoods. For many nations coffee constitutes a major 
source of foreign exchange, and everywhere it has been grown the politics of coffee 
has proved central to the politics of national development (Brazil can be considered 
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the classic example). Because of its importance as an export crop the politics of coffee 
is not just about domestic issues such as land rights, marketing controls and labour 
conditions but also international issues such as global prices and terms of trade. The 
global coffee market is mature with global consumption at about 7 million tonnes 
(FAO 2010). Coffee producing countries however, are not the main beneficiaries of 
this lucrative trade and thus it is not altogether surprising that the Food Sovereignty 
framework evolved from the international farming and peasant movement, La Via 
Campesina, which originated in Brazil. 
In the early 1960s developing nations succeeded in forming a political agency to 
regulate international trade of the product – the International Coffee Organisation 
(ICO) (Gibbon & Ponte 2000). However the multi-lateral market mechanisms to 
regulate coffee production instigated by (ICO) have broken down since the collapse of 
the International Coffee Agreement (ICA), which was in place between 1962-1989. 
The ICA successfully raised and stabilised coffee prices but it was undermined and 
ultimately failed, it has been argued, due to the power wielded in the processing 
countries (Bates 1997). Again, this is perhaps a predicable outcome of a liberalised, 
WTO led GFS predicated on economic rationalism. Whatever the reasons, it seems 
clear that the end of the ICA signaled a shift in the balance of power in the coffee 
chained in favour of the commercial interests in the industrialised countries where the 
processing takes place. This is reflected in a higher proportion of value being added in 
the consuming countries. The main importing countries of unroasted coffee (known as 
green coffee in the industry) are the US, Germany (from where a significant quantity 
is re-exported), Japan and the rest of the EU. According to Ponte (2001) between 
1989/90 and 1994/95 the proportion of total income gained by producers dropped by 
13% whereas the proportion retained by consuming counties rose to 78%. Research 
commissioned by Oxfam, shows a stark decline in the share of coffee retail prices 
retained by producing countries. Coffee, which left farms/plantations as ‘fresh cherry’ 
or wet processed coffee earned $0.06/kg and retailed at $3.57/kg.138 
Cocoa is another export crop that is if major importance to many African countries. 
Four of the eight largest cocoa-producing countries are in Africa; they are Cote 
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d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. Ten million Africans are involved in Cocoa 
production, most of which is exported to countries within the EU. Like coffee, two-
thirds of all cocoa is ground in the consuming countries in the developed world and 
the value added margin in the producing country has declined from around 60% to 
less than 30% in the last three decades. (Vorley 2003:49-50). Coffee and cocoa 
farmers are amongst the most poverty stricken groups in African farming. Despite 
some African countries benefiting from the market liberalisation rationale of the 
global food system, Ghana is often cited as an example,139 the general pattern resulting 
from withdrawal of government support from price setting and marketing has been 
deeper impoverishment. Small farmers have been systematically exposed to the 
extremes of market volatility and the superior bargaining power of international 
commodity buyers through the WTO. 
Cocoa processing is concentrated within only four companies (Cargill, ADM. Barry 
Callebaut and Hosta) controlling 40% of cocoa grinding. The impact of the 
liberalisation in the cocoa sector has had a particularly negative impact on the Côte 
d’Ivoire. The domination by the multi-national processors has meant that the local 
exporters share of the export market has declined from 43% in 1997-98 to 10% in 
19999-2000.140 Apart from price volatility, the impoverishment of cocoa farmers has 
led to serious human rights abuses with issues of forced labour and child slavery in 
African cocoa plantations.141 
Grains 
In the contemporary global food system, grains are produced for three reasons: human 
consumption; animal feed; and industrial purposes including biofuels. The fact that in 
the modern GFS cereals and oil seeds have virtually no retail demand but are sold as 
inputs to industrial processes that include the rearing of livestock and the production 
of bread, pasta and sweeteners is of great and growing significance. The impact, in 
terms of value added, affects both the countries that produce the raw materials (China 
and India in the main) but more importantly on the developing countries that import 
them. It is the case that developing countries account for nearly 80% of all wheat 
                                                          
139
 See ‘The cocoa market –a background study at www.maketradefair.com Accessed 04/05/11 
140
 See International task force on commodity risk management in developing countries (2002) at 
www.itf-commrisk.org/documents. Accessed 04/05/11 
141
 See ‘What is the Real Cost of Chocolate’ at http://www.worldvision.com.au. Accessed 04/05/11 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 2 
The Global Food System 
 Page 77 
 
imports (Vorley 2003:39). Corporate control of the global grain trade was high on the 
political agenda in the 1970’s and this has been further entrenched ever since.142 The 
conversion, from labour to capital-intensive farming is an integral part and a defining 
feature of the modern GFS. 
Concerns are generally expressed about the effects of the production phase, especially 
farming and processing, because these effects are more obvious. However, patterns of 
food consumption also contribute considerably to the lack of sustainability of the 
global food system and the changing use of grains is central to this debate.143 
4. Changes in export crop agriculture in Kenya 
The growth in non-traditional export crops such as flowers, fresh fruits and vegetables 
(FFVs) in Kenya is significant for this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, in terms of GCC 
theory this sector is essentially a short, buyer driven chain with very little state 
involvement, and is thus offered very little social protection. Profits, however, are 
highly concentrated at the end of the chain in the importing countries. The power of 
the retailer is paramount and when people in the developed world talk about 
‘supermarket power’ it is generally to this particular area that they are referring to. 
This power is manifested in terms of exclusive contract growing and highly controlled 
quality standards set by the MNCs. Research by Dolan et al (1999) estimated that 46% 
of retail value of FFV exports from Kenya is retained by supermarkets whereas the 
producers share was only 14%. Such concern is echoed in the report of the FAO Panel 
of Eminent Experts on Ethics in Food and Agriculture (2000) which noted that ‘there 
are serious power imbalances arising from the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of a few’ (DFID 2004:5).144 
The second important point is the shift from smallholder contract production 
introduced in the late colonial and early independence period to centralised 
employment on farms and packing-houses. This shift to large-scale commercial 
farming has transformed Kenyan farmers, particularly women farmers, into a migrant 
labour force as a necessary household survival strategy (Dolan 2004) The increased 
vulnerability of Kenya’s food sufficiency, as a result of these changes, is of real 
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concern on a number of levels (Humphrey 2008). 
Though Africa is by no means the major global exporter of FFVs (China, India, 
Brazil, the US and EU account for 70% of global exports) a sizeable export orientated 
horticulture industry has developed in both Kenya and Ethiopia for the European 
market. In Kenya about 90 percent of horticulture is destined for Europe (especially 
the UK) with main the exports being canned pineapples, fresh vegetables and cut 
flowers. Fruit, flower and vegetable exports from Kenya have increased by 70% since 
1995. Horticulture is now Kenya’s second biggest earner of foreign exchange and the 
industry supports as many as 500,000 workers (Vorley 2003:69). Despite workers in 
this sector earning more than workers in many other sectors, the flexibility required to 
meet supermarket standards has led to a worsening of labour conditions, long hours 
and the casualisation of labour.145 
What this growth in non-traditional exports from Kenya is indicative of is the global 
shift from traditional cereal consumption to other food types such as meat, fruit and 
vegetables. The evidence suggests that those parts of the world that have already 
achieved adequate amounts of food, i.e. 60% of the global population, are now 
demanding an ever greater variety of food stuffs and there is empirical evidence to 
show that middle-income countries food consumption patterns are converging.146 
Many Asian populations, for example, who up until the 1980s consumed most of their 
cereal intake as rice, now demand wheat products such as bread and noodles along 
with more meat, fruit and vegetables.147 Food consumption patterns in Thailand in 
recent decades offer a good example of this phenomenon where rice comprised 99% 
of cereal consumption in 1960 compared with less than 70% in the 1990s and less 
than 50% by 2000.148 Whether or not these changes are consumer driven or corporate 
producer led is beyond the remit of this discussion.149 What is not in dispute, however, 
is that the trend is on an upward trajectory (SOFI 2011). These emerging patterns are 
of increasing significance in the way that changing global agricultural demands impact 
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on a country’s ability to feed itself, and this is certainly the case in Kenya. 
Export crops in Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia offers an interesting contrast to Kenya in terms of its position within the 
global food system. The absence of colonial rule meant that Ethiopian agriculture was 
not developed, specifically, for exporting raw materials and other produce to the 
European colonial powers. None the less its main agricultural produce is coffee and, 
as explained by GCC theory, this subjects Ethiopia to the inequities of the global 
trading system. Coffee accounts, on average, for about 35 percent of Ethiopia’s export 
earnings (AFRODAD 2005). In addition, unlike Kenya, Ethiopia covers a vast area 
but it is landlocked and is mainly dependent on Djibouti for its import/export trade. 
This restricts, to a large extent, the level that it can engage with the international 
economy because its transport and freight costs are relatively high. It has a 
predominantly agricultural economy with more than 80% of the population dependent 
on some sort of agricultural production for their livelihood. Within this context, 8.2 
million Ethiopians are classed as chronically food insecure, being unable to overcome 
persistent drought conditions. They are assisted by the government’s Productive 
Safety Net Program (PSNP) which provides cash in return for labour on community 
projects, or food for those unable to work. In this regard, the IFR theories cannot fully 
explain Ethiopia’s decades of food insecurity, but there have clearly been other 
political factors at work. The first is undoubtedly the role of conflict, particularly 
those concerning border disputes with Eritrea. The second relates to land-ownership, 
in as much as in a present context, all Ethiopian land is government owned. According 
to liberal economic theory this may explain why agricultural production has remained 
fairly static and international technological advances have not materialised. However, 
this may well be about to change. The current government in Ethiopia has declared 
medium term plans that go beyond a vision of ending hunger and food insecurity in 
their country. Ambitious growth in agricultural output is a key strategic component of 
their broader goal to achieve middle-income status. Government plans describe this 
strategy as ‘agriculture development led industrialisation’. The government’s intention 
is to invest resources, not just in the chronically vulnerable households, but also in the 
more successful small farms, which have potential to graduate from subsistence to 
semi-commercial. Ethiopia's flower industry has become a new source for export 
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revenue. The industry began in 2004, when the government made an aggressive push 
for foreign investments by establishing a presence at major international floricultural 
events. Since then, export earnings from this sector have grown significantly and are 
projected to double over the next few years. Along with pulses and oil-seeds, 
horticulture is very likely to attract more foreign direct investment and land 
acquisition in the coming years. Whether or not this transition will be attempted 
through the current industrial/ export model of agriculture or it will develop along 
lines more akin to a Food Sovereignty model is an interesting question to which the 
answer is not yet known. We will return to this question in Chapter 7. 
Concluding Comments 
First and foremost, this chapter has established that the global food system can be 
understood within an historical context in which the developed, industrialised world 
represented itself as a model for future economic growth. It evolved during the era of 
European colonialism and changed shape but continued after the Second World War 
becoming part of the so-called globalisation project (McMichael 2008). This new 
direction reflected the growth in scale and power of the international financial 
institutions and corporations and their influence on the global food system as it is 
currently constructed. The present GFS cannot be described as sustainable in that it 
cannot ensure the present and future quality and access of food for all. Even a cursory 
glance at the global food situation reveals a system characterised by contrasts and 
disparities, perhaps nowhere more obviously than in the simultaneous problems of 
obesity and serious under-nutrition. The most food insecure communities are, to a 
large extent, smallholders, landless workers, pastoralists or fisherfolk, often situated in 
marginal and vulnerable ecological environments. Moreover, they are often neglected 
by both national and international policies. Without proper support they cannot 
compete with increasingly subsidised industrialised agriculture. For many of them 
market liberalisation has resulted in damaging and often unfair competition with 
farmers or commercial entities that have ‘acquired’ comparative advantages through 
decades of direct and indirect subsidies. The situation often results in smallholders 
being forced off their land and moving to even more marginal areas or migrating to 
the shantytowns around cities. From a political perspective, food consumption is 
ultimately about power and access to resources. A critical view of the global food 
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system cannot but challenge an agricultural model, which dictates that the availability 
and distribution of a basic and precious resource such as food must be governed by 
market forces that favour only those with bargaining and purchasing power. A broader 
understanding of the inefficiencies of the current dominant agricultural model is 
gaining momentum and so is the pursuit of an alternative model. This line of enquiry 
will be developed in the next chapter, which focuses on the concept of Food 
Sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 3 – FOOD SOVEREIGNTY-THE IDEA 
Food Sovereignty implies the implementation of radical processes of 
comprehensive agrarian reform adapted to the conditions of each country and 
region, which will provide peasant and indigenous farmers – with equal 
opportunities for women – with equitable access to productive resources, 
primarily land, water and forests, as well as the means of production, 
financing, training and capacity building for management and interlocution. 
Agrarian reform, above all, should be recognized as an obligation of national 
governments where this process is necessary within the framework of human 
rights and as an efficient public policy to combat poverty. These agrarian 
reform processes must be controlled by peasant organizations – including the 
land rents market – and guarantee both individual and collective rights of 
producers over shared lands, as articulated in coherent agricultural and trade 
policies. We oppose the policies and programs for the commercialization of 
land promoted by the World Bank instead of true agrarian reforms accepted 
by governments. (Final Declaration, World Forum on Food Sovereignty, 
Havana Cuba, September 7, 2001).150 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce and critically explore the concept of Food 
Sovereignty. Food Sovereignty is conceptualised throughout this thesis as both a goal, 
in and of itself, and a process by which this goal could be achieved. This chapter 
begins by defining Food Sovereignty and highlights the essential conceptual 
differences between three key approaches to food insecurity: the right to food, food 
security and Food Sovereignty. Part 2 then explores the origins of Food Sovereignty as 
a social movement, particularly in a Latin American context, with a view of exploring 
it in an African context in later chapters. Its development is traced over the last 15 
years or so and includes a discussion of the factors that inspired the movement and a 
brief overview of the core declarations and documents that have been crucial to its 
development.151 It is impossible to explore the development of Food Sovereignty 




 See Windfuhr & Jonsén 2005:47-52 for a comprehensive overview of the Food Sovereignty 
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without acknowledging the centrality of the role played by the international movement 
known as La Via Campesina (which literally means ‘the peasants way’).152 Part 3 of 
this chapter considers the scope for institutional reform as identified by the 
International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC).153 The Food 
Sovereignty policy framework includes a set of principles that protect the policy space 
for peoples and countries to define their agricultural and food policies, and their 
models of production and food consumption patterns. This section introduces four key 
areas of reform which are now generally understood as necessary for Food 
Sovereignty to become a reality. These are: the right to food, access to productive 
resources, mainstreaming of agroecological production and local markets (Lee 
2007:6). Advocates of Food Sovereignty stress that the framework is a 'total package'; 
that the four pillars of the framework cannot be isolated from each other and that 
reform of food and agricultural requires fundamental change. 
A key area of reform for the argument developed in this chapter is land reform. Land 
allocation is a political issue and addressing the ownership and maldistribution of 
productive land is a prerequisite in the Food Sovereignty model.154 Failures in the 
private control of food security identified in the previous chapter are leading to a 
response in the form of Food Sovereignty (Lee 2007, McMichael 2009). First and 
foremost, this response calls for the control of food production and consumption to be 
resituated within democratic processes operating in localised food systems. The 
changes advocated by a Food Sovereignty model can be likened to bringing current 
international political and economic policies on food closer to a Kantian 
understanding of justice.155 The Food Sovereignty model is committed to finding ways 
of organising both production and distribution to meet needs, including material 
needs, the absence of which destroys capacities or power to act autonomously. The 
conclusion reached in this chapter is that the concept of Food Sovereignty is a 
persuasive and highly political one, although not without significant challenges. 




 IPC is a global network of grass-root organisations and NGOs/CSOs concerned with Food 
Sovereignty and it is the focal point for this coalition. It includes social organisations representing small 
farmers, fisher folk, indigenous peoples, agricultural workers' trade unions; sub-regional/regional 
NGOs/CSOs and NGO networks with particular expertise on issues related to Food Sovereignty and 
agriculture.  
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1. Definition. 
The notion of sovereignty has, in the past, been used by governments to obstruct 
international action aimed at preventing them from starving their own populations156 or 
at the very least from failing in their obligation to fulfil the ‘right to food’. This is, to a 
great extent, due to the way in which sovereignty is defined; sovereignty can be 
understood as pertaining to the State, the government or the people. In terms of 
international law it is generally interpreted in terms of the State or government, 
whereas from a human rights perspective it is obviously predicated on the people. 
However, if sovereignty can be defined as having the means to achieving self-
determination, then it is logical that self-determination must relate to the people not 
just the State. Accordingly, Food Sovereignty does not primarily refer to nation-state 
sovereignty. A new and modern definition of sovereignty can be found in the different 
interpretations of Food Sovereignty. Sovereignty is used to demand the right to control 
policies, the distribution of resources, and national and international decision-making 
for those who are directly affected by these policies. Indeed it can be conceived of as a 
model based on deliberative democracy.157 The term has, therefore, connotations of 
local democracy, direct democracy, participatory development, and subsidiarity158 
rather than national policy formulation and government bureaucracies. In other words 
the people must be given some guarantees and protections to enable them to provide 
for, and have control over, their own futures. It is within this political and democratic 
context that Food Sovereignty can be more fully understood. 
Food Sovereignty is defined by the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy 
Council (IPC) as 
The RIGHT of peoples, communities, and countries to define their own 
agricultural, labour, fishing, food and land policies which are ecologically, 
socially, economically and culturally appropriate to their unique 
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circumstances. It includes the true right to food and to produce food, which 
means that all people have the right to safe, nutritious and culturally 
appropriate food and to food-producing resources and the ability to sustain 
themselves and their societies.159 
Food Sovereignty, therefore, can be understood as an extension of the right to food in 
that it demands democratic autonomy for people with respect to food, in a way that the 
right to food does not. Key elements of democracy such as equality, representation, 
accountability and transparency, particularly with regard to how they relate to food 
systems, are central to the concept of Food Sovereignty. Food Sovereignty, therefore, 
involves the right to consume and produce food and a range of other sub-rights, so it is 
a more complex and ambitious idea than the simple right to food. This broader 
perspective on rights and food is summed up by Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur of 
the Commission on Human Rights on the Right to Food: 
The right to food is a human right that is protected by international law. It is 
the right to have regular, permanent and unobstructed access, either directly 
or by means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively 
adequate and sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the 
people to which the consumer belongs, and ensuring a physical and mental, 
individual and collective, fulfilling and dignified life free from anxiety. 
Governments have a legal obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to 
food… 
Whilst emphasising both the primary obligation of government and the need for 
international cooperation, Ziegler goes on to say that 
…more attention should be paid to the alternative models proposed by civil 
society, particularly the concept of Food Sovereignty. Access to land and 
agrarian reform, in particular, must be the key elements of the right to food. 
(Ziegler 2008) 
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The seven key strategic principles of Food Sovereignty are summarised below.160 
1. Food: A Basic Human Right – Everyone must have access to safe, nutritious 
and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to sustain a 
healthy life with full human dignity. 
2. Agrarian Reform – A genuine agrarian reform is necessary which gives 
landless and farming people – especially women – ownership and control of 
the land they work and returns territories to indigenous peoples 
3. Protecting Natural Resources – Food Sovereignty entails the sustainable care 
and use of natural resources, especially land, water, and seeds and livestock 
breeds. 
4. Reorganizing Food Trade – Food is first and foremost a source of nutrition and 
only secondarily an item of trade. National agricultural policies must prioritise 
production for domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency. 
5. Ending the Globalisation of Hunger – Food Sovereignty is undermined by 
multilateral institutions and by speculative capital. The growing control of 
multinational corporations over agricultural policies has been facilitated by the 
economic policies of multilateral organizations such as the WTO, World Bank 
and the IMF. 
6. Social Peace – Everyone has the right to be free from violence. Food must not 
be used as a weapon. 
7. Democratic control – Smallholder farmers must have direct input into 
formulating agricultural policies at all levels. The United Nations and related 
organizations will have to undergo a process of democratisation to enable this 
to become a reality. 
Food Sovereignty can also be conceptualised as something other than previous 
demands for food security. The right to food, for example, is a legal concept; food 
security is considered more of a technical one; whilst Food Sovereignty is essentially a 
political one.161 Food Sovereignty emanated from a political discourse focusing on the 
self-determination of local communities and allowing self-defined ways to seek 
solutions to local problems. This differentiation is an important one both conceptually 
                                                          
160
 See Appendix 3 for a more comprehensive list of the seven principles. 
161
 See Windfuhr & Jonsén (2005:19-24) for a helpful comparison between these three concepts.  
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 3 
Food Sovereignty - The Idea 
 Page 87 
 
and in policy-making terms and so merits further explanation. 
The ‘right to food’ is the oldest concept used in the discourse on food insecurity and 
was recognised by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It was also 
included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights of 
1976. Thus the ‘right to food’ is indeed a legal concept, enshrined in international law 
and considered a fundamental human right, arguably upon which most other rights 
depend. As a human right, it implies that an individual can require the State and the 
communities of states to respect, protect and fulfil their needs for appropriate access 
to sufficient food of an acceptable quality. The right to food provides for individual 
entitlements and related state obligations, which are enshrined in national and 
international law. In this sense the right to food empowers oppressed communities and 
individuals against the State and other powerful actors. The reality, of course, is that 
the ‘right to food’ is a right that is frequently unfulfilled. The ‘right to food’, therefore, 
is commonly seen as an aspirational right that cannot be judicially enforced but is 
rather a statement of intention from government towards its citizens. However, since it 
is in the category of a human right, rather than a contested political concept, it has an 
essentially different and less contentious character than food security and Food 
Sovereignty. 
‘Food security’ is a much more problematic term and one against which the concept of 
Food Sovereignty is very often contrasted. Smith et al (1992) pointed to the fact that 
food security has been defined in at least 200 ways not least because it can be 
differentiated in terms of scale, which varies from household to regional, to national 
or global. Hence the bias of the concept of food security towards global, national or 
regional availability of food, rather than individual access to food by deprived persons 
or groups. The FIVIMS analysis, however, is becoming more comprehensive in this 
respect, allowing an improved recognition of typical groups of affected people at the 
national or regional level.162 There is, however, still a significant difference between 
this and a rights-based approach that starts from the entitlement of an individual, 
family or group. 
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The definition of food security has also changed over time and tends to reflect the 
relevant political and economic context. The FAO have tracked the evolution of food 
security as a concept, which sheds light on how and why the meaning of food security 
has been repeatedly redefined (FAO 2003). The first official definition of food 
security originated in 1974 and was defined as 
The availability at all times of adequate food supplies of basic food stuffs to 
sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in 
production and prices. (United Nations 1975 cited in FAO 2003) 
According to Patel (2009) the utility of this definition is derived from the political and 
economic context at the time. The 1970’s saw devastating famine in the Sahel region 
of Africa (Watts 1983) which, in part, gave rise to the notion of a ‘New International 
Economic Order’ (NIEO) aimed at improving the position of the developing world in 
the global economy (Barratt-Brown 1987).163 This new economic order was to be 
achieved by the guarantee of stable and fair prices for Third World raw materials, free 
access to Northern markets, an end to subsidies and trade policies biased in favour of 
the developed world, alleviation of debt and so forth. These policy changes were to be 
developed during a series of negotiating rounds referred to as the Uruguay round 
(1986-1994). This round also gave rise to an international organisation dedicated to 
administrating the rules of world trade – the World trade organisation (WTO), which 
superseded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It was arguably the 
most powerful period for Third World governments in terms of their ability to 
influence the international agenda. The establishment of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as a tool for stabilisation of 
commodity prices is a reflection of this relative power (Rajagopal 2000). 
In this context states were perceived as the most appropriate and effective basis for 
redistributing resources, providing those resources were made available to them. From 
this perspective it was logical to think in terms of sufficient global supplies and price 
stabilisation as the primary concerns of Third World governments. 
However over the last three or four decades both the priorities of food security and the 
language used have changed significantly. In 2001 the FAO declared: 
                                                          
163
 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 3 
Food Sovereignty - The Idea 
 Page 89 
 
Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have 
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food 
that meets the dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life (FAO 2001) 
This more recent definition is more wide-ranging and to a considerable extent reflects 
the growth in influence of NGOs and activists in the food policy-making community. 
Perhaps the most important effect is that their growing influence has allowed the 
agents involved in policy making to include non-state actors. The most significant 
shift has been from a concentration on production and trade based issues towards a 
broader set of concerns that include a variety of rights based issues. It is also relevant 
that this period in the evolution of defining ‘food security’ coincided with what critics 
regard as a breakaway from the commitment to a full meeting of human rights to the 
‘watered down version of the Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs)164 (Patel 
2009). The authors of the UNDHR had intended rights, such as the right to food, to be 
implemented universally and with all due haste. Whereas, from a critical perspective, 
the MDGs are a set of realistically achievable goals with a more elastic time frame. 
The early 2000s were also a time when institutions such as the FAO, which were 
created to eradicate hunger, were looking increasingly irrelevant in the core policy 
making with regard to food production and consumption priorities. (Martinez-Torres 
& Rosset 2010) Thus the expansion of the definition of food security within the FAO 
reflects both a progressive change in its approach to understanding food security but, 
equally, its failure as a guiding principle in shaping contemporary international food 
policy. 
From a critical perspective the basis on which food is, or is not, made available by the 
international community has shifted away from institutions that might have prioritised 
issues of food security (certainly according to the latter definition) to a position that 
defers to the mechanisms of the market. The market, of course, is driven by an 
altogether different set of priorities than those which favour and safeguard food 
security. The definition of food security has clearly broadened in scope and has shifted 
from being simply concerned with issues of production and distribution of food to a 
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whole variety of concerns around nutrition, social control and public health. In terms 
of this analysis it is relevant to ascertain the extent to which this broadening in scope 
was a direct result of the evolution of Food Sovereignty. 
As stated, La Via Campesina introduced the concept of Food Sovereignty as a policy 
framework and discourse in 1996 at the World Food Summit, principally as a 
response to the inclusion of agriculture within the world trading system through the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).165 The trade rules agreed in the AoA were not 
significantly different from the policy recommendations given previously by the 
World Bank and the IMF. The key difference was that the rules for trade now became 
fixed in a binding international agreement which member countries had to adhere to; 
otherwise they could face penalties or sanctions through the dispute settlement 
procedure. Most importantly for this analysis, trade policy rules became increasingly 
political since they set not only the terms for tariffs, but also stringent conditions and 
regulations for national policies. From food safety regulations to intellectual property 
protection, from agricultural subsidies to price support for basic staple foods, the 
WTO regulations came to deeply affect national policy frameworks. 
If we consider again the 2001 definition of food security (FAO 2001), what is critical 
is that this definition does not in anyway address the social or political control of the 
global, or even local, food system. It is entirely possible, for example, for people to be 
food secure within a brutal dictatorship, an occupied territory or a refugee camp totally 
dependent on food aid. From a state centred perspective, the absence of specifying 
how food security should come about is an entirely rational position to take. 
Obviously, the introduction of any kind of commitment to a particular set of internal 
political arrangements would have made agreement on defining food security 
considerably more difficult. 
However, having evolved, largely due to negative outcomes in food security, partly as 
a result of structural adjustment (SA) and other policies, La Via Campesina’s position 
was entirely different and specifically challenged the prevailing approaches to food 
security.166 From the outset La Via Campesina’s position was that the inclusion of 
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internal political arrangements was a necessary component of food security. Indeed 
Food Sovereignty was deemed a necessary precondition for food security. 
Long-term food security depends on those who produce food and care for the 
natural environment. As the stewards of food producing resources we hold 
the following principles as the necessary foundation for achieving food 
security. . . . Food is a basic human right. This right can only be realized in a 
system where Food Sovereignty is guaranteed. Food Sovereignty is the right 
of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic 
foods respecting cultural and productive diversity. We have the right to 
produce our own food in our own territory. Food Sovereignty is a 
precondition to genuine food security. (La Via Campesina 1996) 
The crucial point is that questions were being raised about the context of food 
security, not just the content. By definition, this poses questions about the power 
relations that dominate decision making with regard to how food security should be 
attained. Thus, the introduction of the notion of Food Sovereignty recognised for the 
first time that the power politics of the global food system need to feature explicitly in 
the discussions of food security. The Food Sovereignty framework also applies a 
rights-based approach; it includes the rights of access of smallholder farmers, 
pastoralists and fisherfolk to food-producing resources as well as the right to food and 
availability of just markets. It is written more from a rural perspective, where most 
food insecurity exists, and can be seen as a new blueprint for rural development 
policies. Unlike food security, which is a set of goals for food and nutrition policies, 
the Food Sovereignty framework is formulated as an alternative policy proposition to 
liberalised industrial agriculture and it combines elements from different policy areas 
into one framework. 
In view of the fact that Food Sovereignty, as a concept, emerged during a period often 
thought of as the epitome of US hegemony (McMichael 2008), and the triumph of 
liberal capitalism (Fukuyama 1992), it would be easy to assume that the chances of 
any real success would have been minimal. However, given States’ reluctance to 
discuss the means by which food security was to be achieved (FAO 2003), it made 
absolute sense for the Food Sovereignty movement to adopt language that States had 
already committed themselves to (Patel 2009). Thus the language of Food Sovereignty 
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fits neatly into the existing international discourse by making rights and democracy its 
central tenets. These concepts are, after all, the cornerstones of liberal democracy, the 
political system of choice in most of the developed world. 
2. Origins of Food Sovereignty as a social and political movement. 
This next section looks at some of the key factors behind the development of Food 
Sovereignty over the last decade and a half and looks at how this process is continuing 
to evolve. As stated, the concept of Food Sovereignty is most closely associated with 
the organisation known as La Via Campesina. Over recent decades local, regional, 
then national movements against neoliberal policies were spilling over national 
borders and were rapidly developing into transnational networks (Desmarais 2007). 
Thus it was in 1992 that peasant and family farmers’ organisations from Central 
America, North America, the Caribbean and Europe met in Managua, Nicaragua at the 
second congress of the National Union of Farmers and Cattle Ranchers (UNAG) and 
the idea of la Via Campesina came to fruition (Edelman 1998). This was followed up 
in 1993, when more than 70 peasant and farm leaders from various countries met in 
Mons, Belgium, to develop a strategy with which to challenge the negative impact on 
their communities as a result of a neoliberal international economic agenda. Over the 
next decade they and millions of peasants and small-scale farmers around the world 
used La Via Campesina to forge a powerful and radical force of opposition. La Via 
Campesina is now an international alliance of peasant organisations, family farmers 
and workers, indigenous people, landless peasants and rural women and youth, 
committed  to collective action. By 2008, the regional components of La Via 
Campesina were North America (including Mexico), South America, Central 
America, the Caribbean, Europe, South Asia, East and South East Asia and most 
recently, two regions of Africa, grouped as Africa 1 and Africa 2. In August 2011 the 
first ever European Forum for Food Sovereignty took place in Krems, Austria.167 
This global farmers movement is still in the process of developing Food Sovereignty, 
conceived as an alternative proposal for restructuring food production and 
consumption at the local, national and global level. Unlike the top down approach, 
associated with the failed attempts of international institutions such as the IMF and 
the WTO, the concept of Food Sovereignty proposes that every country and people 
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have the right to establish their own policies with regard to their food and agriculture 
system, providing these policies do not harm developing countries.168 This concept, 
since it was launched to the general public at the World Food Summit in 1996, has 
become a global social movement with the clear objective of promoting alternatives to 
neo-liberal policies for achieving food security. Its evolution can be traced from 1996 
onwards by a growing list of publications, declarations and statements that have 
continually elaborated and refined the Food Sovereignty framework.169 
An in-depth study of the dynamics and strategies of La Via Campesina has already 
been undertaken170 but the key points of its development are worth mentioning for two 
reasons. Firstly, from a political perspective, it is crucial to understand the 
circumstances that produced both the capacity and the will to challenge multinational 
agribusiness corporations and international institutions whose power and influence 
increasingly dictate national government food policy. Secondly, understanding the 
origins of this movement in a Latin American context can provide a platform from 
which to proceed, at a later stage in this thesis, with the feasibility and challenges to a 
Food Sovereignty model for East Africa. What is of great importance in the 
conceptualisation of La Via Campesina is the way in which its members view the 
movement. In the words of a representative of its International Secretariat it evolved 
as ‘a struggle to find a space to occupy. Small farmers needed their own voice thus 
they had to become politicised and effective at the international level’.171 
The driving forces 
Throughout history, advocates of trade liberalisation have always maintained that it 
will bring unprecedented prosperity via the so-called ‘trickle-down effect’. Thus, over 
recent decades, countries of the global South have been persuaded to open up their 
markets to the global North by reducing man made barriers to the flow of goods and 
services. This liberalisation of trade was pursued under the umbrella term of structural 
adjustment. However, there is much empirical evidence to show that the predicted 
benefits to the global South, through the pursuit of structural adjustments policies, 
                                                          
168
 One could imagine the application of Rawls’ difference principle in this context (Rawls 1971). 
169
 See Appendix 4. Also, see Windfuhr & Jonsén (2005:47-4) for a comprehensive overview and 
analysis of the core documents on Food Sovereignty. 
170
 Annette Desmarais provides a vivid portrayal in ‘La Via Campesina: Globalisation and the power of 
the Peasants (2007). 
171
 In a statement given by Nico Verhagen at the UK Food Group 2011 Autumn Conference, London.  
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 3 
Food Sovereignty - The Idea 
 Page 94 
 
have not always materialised.172 
In fact three decades of neo-liberal structural adjustments in much of the developing 
world (characterised by budget cutting, privatisations and de-regulated markets) have, 
in many cases, seriously undermined national food production capacity.173 The current 
situation, in the global food system, is that many countries have neither sufficient food 
reserves nor sufficient production capacity and are dependent on imports affected by 
increasingly volatile prices (Crow 2008). The second dimension of power and the 
recognition of the importance of agenda setting is as relevant to trade as it is to any 
other area of politics and international relations, i.e. how decisions are made, who 
controls the agenda, how disagreements are resolved, how rules are enforced and by 
whom, and so on (Lukes 2005). The response to these structural inequities, 
particularly in Latin America, has been the advance of Food Sovereignty as a new 
agricultural framework, with La Via Campesina as the driving force behind the 
movement. The capacity of this movement to bridge so many diverse geographical 
and cultural divides is both surprising and impressive. We can now consider how this 
powerful movement has arisen. 
Evolutionary phases of Food Sovereignty 
Researchers looking at the history of La Via Campesina have identified five phases in 
its birth and evolution: The first phase took place during the 1980s up to 1992. During 
this period several national rural movements felt the impact of similar global policies 
on local and national conditions caused by structural adjustments; the second phase 
(1992-1999) was marked by the consolidation of continental networks in Latin 
America and the birth and structuring of La Via Campesina as a global movement; the 
third phase (2000-2004) essentially consisted of La Via Campesina successfully 
becoming a key player on the international stage, illustrated by the growth in 
international awareness of Food Sovereignty as a political concept;174 the fourth phase 
(2004-2008) was marked by the growth and internal strengthening of the movement, 
including establishing seven discrete regions and setting up regional secretariats;175 
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more recently, phase 5 (late 2008-present date) the movement has taken on and 
prioritised gender issues and defined itself more clearly in opposition to transnational 
corporations (TNCs). The 5th conference held in Maputo, Mozambique, in October 
2008 declared for the first time that capitalism was the ultimate source of the 
problems faced by the rural world and TNCs were the worst enemy of peasants and 
farmers around the world (Via Campesina 2008). More radically, it was declared that 
all forms of violence faced by women in society, be they physical, social, economic or 
through inequity of power are also present in rural societies, and by definition, rural 
organisations. Thus the decision was taken to end the silence on these issues and make 
a commitment to achieving true gender parity in all spaces and areas of debate, 
discussion, analysis and decision-making undertaken in the Food Sovereignty arena. 
Particular emphasis is now given to La Via Campesina's fight to gain legitimacy for 
the Food Sovereignty paradigm, to its internal structure, and to the ways in which the 
(re)construction of a shared peasant identity is a crucial lynchpin that holds the 
struggle together despite widely different internal cultures. The most recent stage is 
understood as a response to recent changes in the world and reflects a maturing 
political-economic analysis (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010:149-175).176 Above all, 
the movement has become increasingly focused and radicalised by structuring itself to 
effectively battle against the dominant agro-economic model. There has been a 
marked shift in emphasis towards propositions of how to change the food system, 
whilst still resisting the dominance of industrial food production. 
It is not surprising that the La Via Campesina originated in Latin America since Latin 
America is the region of the world with the most unequal distribution of land and 
income, and the region that experienced the sharpest decline of living standards during 
the 'lost decade' of the 1980s as neoliberal economic policies hit Latin America 
(Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010). As a result of this decline Latin America underwent 
a continent-wide process of peasant civil society networking throughout the 1980s. 
This began with the Continental Conference on Agrarian Reform and Peasant 
Movements held in Managua in 1981, which brought together revolutionary peasant 
organisations, national peasant organisations and independent peasant organisations, 
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beginning a process of exchanges of experiences that led to an embryonic Latin 
American peasant movement (Sevilla Guzman & Martinez-Alier 2006). Continental 
peasant meetings then took place every year until 1989, when a similar process was 
begun in Colombia in preparation for the ‘500 Years of Indigenous, Afro-descendant, 
Peasant and Popular Resistance Continental Campaign’. As part of this Campaign, 
continental conferences were then held every year until 1992 (Edelman 2003). 
Drawing on the powerful symbolism of the quincentennial of the arrival of Columbus 
in the Americas, and in opposition to the big celebrations planned by governments, the 
Declaration of Quito after a ‘500 Years of Indian Resistance’ meeting in 1990 
outlined the basis of what was becoming a transnational peasant movement. The 
participants expressed a collective concern for the destruction of nature, with what 
Stefano Varese (1996: 60) calls the “moral management of the cosmos” or “moral 
ecology”: 
We do not own nature … it is not a commodity … it is an integral part of our 
life; it is our past, present, and future. We believe that this meaning of 
humanity and of the environment is not only valid for our communities of 
Indoamerican people. We believe that this form of life is an option and a light 
for the people of the world oppressed by a system which dominates people 
and nature. (Declaration of Quito, quoted in Varese 1996, 69) 
According to Varese  
the “ecological cosmology” of rural communities, based essentially on the 
notion and practice of individual usufruct177 of collective property and the 
primacy of use value, resisted (with different degrees of success) the 
intrusion of a cosmology based on exchange value that corresponded to the 
capitalist market economy (Varese 1996, 62).  
Referring back to the “moral economy” of James Scott (1977), Varese argues that 
even while indigenous and peasant families participate in capitalist market relations 
that are external to their communities, they maintain and reproduce non-capitalist 
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relations on the inside. In this moral economy, community economic relations are 
based on the logic of reciprocity and production for subsistence. Along the same lines, 
Marc Edelman (2005) argues that the transnational peasant movement is bringing the 
'moral economy' directly into the global debate over the future of agriculture, counter-
posing it to the dominant 'market economy' paradigm. In other words, drawing up the 
battle lines between the dominant agricultural model and the model of Food 
Sovereignty. The table below separates out the key features of these opposing models 
and helps to conceptualise this battle between the discourses of economic rationalism 
and green rationalism based on agroecology.178 
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Table 1. Dominant model versus Food Sovereignty model 
Issue Dominant model based on 
economic rationalism  
Food Sovereignty based on green rationalism  
Trade Free trade in everything Food and agriculture exempt from trade 
agreements 
Production priority Agroexports Food for local markets 
Crop prices ‘What the market dictates’ (leave 
the mechanisms that create both 
low crop prices and speculative 
food price hikes intact) 
Fair prices that cover costs of production and 
allow farmers and farm workers a life with dignity 
Market access Access to foreign markets Access to local markets; an end to the 
displacement of farmers from their own markets 
by agribusiness 
Subsidies While prohibited in the Third 
World, many subsidies are allowed 
in the US and Europe, but are paid 
only to the largest farmers 
Subsidies are ok that do not damage other 
countries via dumping (i.e. grant subsidies only 
to family farmers for direct marketing, 
price/income support, soil conservation, 
conversion to sustainable farming, research, etc.) 
Food Chiefly a commodity; in practice, 
this means processed, 
contaminated food that is full of 
fat, sugar, high fructose corn syrup 
and toxic residues 
A human right: specifically, should be healthy, 
nutritious, affordable, culturally appropriate, and 
locally produced 
Being able to produce An option for the economically 
efficient 
A right of rural peoples 
Hunger Due to low productivity Problem of access and distribution due to poverty 
and inequality 
Food security Achieved by importing food Greatest when food production is in the hands of 
the hungry, or when produced locally 
Control over 
productive resources 
(land, water, forests) 
Privatised Local, community controlled 
Access to land Via the market Via genuine agrarian reform 
Seeds Patentable commodity Common heritage of humanity, held in trust by 
rural communities and cultures; ‘no patents on 
life’ 
Rural credit and 
investment 
From private banks and 
corporations 
From the public sector, designed to support family 
agriculture 
Dumping Not an issue Must be prohibited 
Monopoly Not an issue The root of most problems 
Overproduction No such thing, by definition Drives prices down and farmers into poverty; we 
need supply management policies in US and EU 
Farming technology Industrial, monoculture, Green 
Revolution, chemical-intensive; 
uses GMOs 
Agroecology, sustainable farming methods, no 
GMOs 
Farmers Anachronism; the inefficient will 
disappear 
Guardians of culture and crop germplasm; 
stewards of productive resources; repositories of 
knowledge; internal market and building block of 
broad-based, inclusive economic development 
Urban consumers Workers to be paid as little as 
possible 
Need living wages 
Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) 




Not possible/not of interest   
 Adapted from Rosset 2006b:6. 
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The politics of representation as the rationale for Food Sovereignty 
La Via Campesina was, to a great extent, responding to the politics of representation 
in as much as the neoliberal policies of the 1970s and 1980s all too often left out the 
voices of the peasants and the farm workers (Uvin 1994, McMichael 2008). Thus it is 
within a context of lack of representation and rolling back of state protection that La 
Via Campesina emerged. As governments were radically downsizing, services aimed 
at providing safety nets in food provision dried up.179 The privatisation trend of 
neoliberalism affected the foreign assistance and funding policies of international 
donors, who increasingly cut aid to governments and passed it instead to NGOs 
(Conroy et al.1996). These changing global economic and political processes have 
produced new actors, at supranational, international and local levels, ‘that are 
increasingly appropriating state authority from above and below’ (Duffield 2001: 70). 
Donors thus encouraged the growth of organisations that were able to make claims to 
represent a constituency in the global South (Chandler 2006). From a critical 
perspective, these organisations have been able to ‘deliver’ the peasantry and comply 
with the structures of 'accountability', 'transparency' and 'participation' that have 
emerged in response to the criticisms received by the international financial 
institutions. This ‘delivery’ has been the key to the survival of many of these NGOs. 
(Patel 2007, 78-9) 
This tendency of NGOs to speak 'on behalf of peasants' led one Via Campesina leader 
to state in 1996 that, 'To date, in all global debates on agrarian policy, the peasant 
movement has been absent: we have not had a voice. The main reason for the very 
existence of the Via Campesina is to be that voice and to speak out for the creation of 
a more just society' (Paul Nicholson, cited in Desmarais 2002, 96). 
It is for this reason that La Via Campesina, from the very beginning, clearly 
differentiated itself from NGOs and will not allow the membership of organisations 
that are not true, grassroots-based peasant organisations. It has also separated itself 
from foundations and aid agencies, by refusing to accept resources that come with 
compromising conditions attached. In addition it does not permit any kind of external 
interference in its internal decisions in order to guarantee the independence and 
autonomy which are so critical to its being (Martinez-Torres & Rosset 2010). In many 
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ways the political tactics of La Via Campesina are more ‘outsider’ than ‘insider’ and 
err towards protest rather than lobbying.180 That is not to say that it does not engage 
with insider institutions such as the FAO but it has developed its own fairly effective 
strategies. Its typical strategy is to occupy or defend political space and then move the 
debate beyond the technical realm (of food security, for example) and into the moral 
realm of rights and wrongs. This has proven to be an effective strategy that can be 
illustrated by the impact La via Campesina has had on the profile of the Food 
Sovereignty movement over very recent years. Added to this is the recognition by the 
movement that gender inequalities are not only a principle source of injustice but also 
a limitation to the success of the movement. The relationship between capitalism, 
patriarchy, machismo and neo-liberalism and the detrimental impact on women 
peasants and farmers has become a central feature of the struggle. Representation, in 
terms of gender issues, is now implicit in the construction of a new model; ‘if we do 
not create new gender relations, we will not be able to build a new society’ (La Via 
Campesina 2008). It is perhaps not unrelated that the FAO has also officially taken 
on-board the gender issues related to food insecurity. The FAO State of Food and 
Agriculture 2010–11 makes the “business case” for addressing gender issues in 
agriculture and rural employment. It argues that the agriculture sector is under-
performing in many developing countries, in part because women do not have equal 
access to the resources and opportunities they need to be more productive.181 
3. The scope for institutional reform (the levers). 
Of the seven principles of Food Sovereignty identified in the previous section there 
are two key areas of reform which are both crucial to Food Sovereignty and central to 
the argument developed throughout the chapters in this thesis. These are the issues of 
land reform and agricultural trade reforms, enshrined in principles 2 and 4 of the Food 
Sovereignty framework.182 In terms of the IPC four priority areas, or pillars (the right 
to food; access to productive resources; mainstreaming of agroecological production; 
trade and local markets) the pillars relating to access to productive resources and trade 
and local markets are most relevant here. This section looks at land and trade reforms 
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in a general context and will return to them in a more specific context of Ethiopia and 
Kenya in Chapter 7. 
Land reform from above 
Small farmers are known to be a key source of food for the worlds working poor 
(Murphy 2006). Their displacement from the land and their replacement with policies 
that convert food into commodities (to be purchased by the global minority with 
purchasing power) is being challenged from many directions (Albritton 2009; Davis 
2006; McMichael 2008; Patel 2007). For those who are seriously looking at reforming 
the current agricultural model, it is widely accepted that land reform is a key element 
in any future sustainable development. It is understood that severe inequality in land 
tenure retards economic growth, impedes poverty alleviation and curtails efforts to 
improve soil sustainability (Deininger et al 2003). 
Whilst the World Bank and other institutions including governments and aid agencies 
have taken the lead in promoting and sometimes financing comprehensive reforms of 
land tenure, these policies are largely failing to address the underlying causes of food 
insecurity. Most of these reforms have been carried out within the existing neo-liberal 
policy environment and, as such, have not led to real positive change (Borras 2005). 
One of the key reasons for this failure is that market-based solutions tend to 
depoliticise the problem of landlessness, which can only be resolved by structural 
changes. Accordingly, these structural changes can only be addressed in the sphere of 
politics as opposed to the sphere of the market (Rosset 2006a). 
According to Rosset et al (2011), only two contemporary governments in Latin 
America, or elsewhere, can be said to have genuinely made a commitment to land 
reforms which include a transition to a model supporting family farms and cooperative 
agriculture. These countries are Cuba and Venezuela.183 Whilst Cuba’s original land 
reform took place in the 1960’s, work by Funes (2002) shows how a second period of 
reform allowed Cuba to escape from a food crisis in the 1990s and provides, to date, 
the closest example of a real transition from an agroexport model, (based on export 
crops produced under conditions of monoculture and natural resource extraction), to a 
Food Sovereignty model in keeping with the vision of la via Campesina. Four key 
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factors can be identified as facilitating its success: 1. Access to land by the rural 
majority was achieved in two separate stages. Firstly, the expropriation of land from 
landlords had taken place post revolution, enabling the break up of state farms into 
smaller cooperatives and individual production units in the second phase. 2. Cuba had 
the de-facto protection from food dumping provided by the trade embargo from the 
United States. This provided a positive condition in that higher prices for local 
farmers provided the economic incentives and hence the viability of agriculture to 
survive the crisis. 3. There was state support for the transition to the new agricultural 
model through credit availability, access to research and education and so forth. 4. A 
highly organised rural sector, which allowed for rapid change to occur and the 
dissemination of both accumulated peasant knowledge and modern agroecological 
technology from scientific institutions (Funes 2002). The results in Venezuela have 
been more uneven and less definite184 but there are lessons to be learnt from both these 
examples with regard to developing an alternative agricultural model in East Africa.185 
An observation worth making is that both these transitions have included state and 
civic involvement. 
The empirical case for land reform from below 
It has been noted that ‘In every Latin American case where land redistribution 
benefiting the rural poor took place, the State played a decisive role’ though it was 
also noted ‘in every case where reform was denied or deformed, the State also played 
a critical role’ (Barraclough 1999:33) As a result of this latter observation the last two 
decades have seen an increase in well-organised movements of landless peasants and 
rural workers with the aim of challenging or even side-stepping state policies on land 
issues. Today movements around the world are engaged in activities such as land 
occupation to pressurise governments to respond. Landless movements are bringing 
land reform to national and international debates with examples in Brazil, Bolivia, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India, South Africa and Zimbabwe, to 
name but a few (Rosset 2006b: 9). 
What these movements all have in common is their challenge to government inaction 
or policy failure with regard to food insecurity by resolving to take control themselves. 
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The landless workers movement (MST) of Brazil is probably the best-known example 
of this type of organised movement. Founded in 1985 MST organises landless 
workers and uses the ‘social function of land’ clause in the Brazilian constitution to 
legalise their claims to occupy idle lands (Wright & Wolford 2003). Land reforms in 
Brazil provide a good illustration of how the creation of a small farm economy is not 
only good for local economic development, but is also more effective as a social 
policy to prevent the rural poor from migrating to overcrowded cities that cannot 
provide meaningful living conditions or livelihoods. Thus, it can be argued that land 
reforms hold the potential to not only address food insecurity but also chronic 
underdevelopment in many developing countries. Because small farms use more 
labour and less capital, small farms can absorb more people into gainful employment 
and reverse the patterns of migration from rural areas to burgeoning cities (Davis 
2006). Furthermore productivity gains have been widely documented as a result of 
shifting to small-scale, more labour intensive modes of production. Research shows 
that small farms almost always produce more agricultural output per unit of land than 
large farms and they do so more efficiently (Rosset 1999; Shiva 2000). This is widely 
recognised within agricultural economics as the ‘inverse relationship between farm 
size and output’ (Rosset 2006b: 12).186 Brazil offers a good example as it has a total of 
5.2 million farms and 4.4 million of these are less than 10 hectares. These smaller 
farms occupy only 24% of total farmland yet they manage to produce more than half 
of Brazil’s food. Furthermore, the smaller farms employ more labour than 
agribusiness, providing jobs for 75% of those employed in agriculture (Araujo 2009). 
It is largely because of the crops produced by small farmers that Brazil is self 
sufficient in food and, unlike most other countries in the global South, it was not 
adversely affected by the world food crises in 2008.187 
Thus there is good evidence to suggest that redistributive land reform is not likely to 
reduce productivity of food; in fact the reverse may well be achieved. If you add to 
this the observation that 80% of untilled arable land is in Africa and 50% of the 
population there are less than 15 years old (Moyo 2010), then small-scale labour 
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intensive agriculture may well be the most successful and efficient model for future 
agricultural production on the African continent.188 Indeed one of the key aims of Food 
Sovereignty is to reinvigorate the role of small farmers and peasants. This group 
actually produce half of the world’s food therefore they are not an anachronism that 
can be continually overlooked in the agriculture policy process. Thus, if the focus of 
policy makers was shifted to who is producing food, this would include small food 
producers who may require investment in agricultural education and research and not 
just the TNCs. West Africa can serve as a useful example here; West Africa produces 
excess cereals including sorghum, millet, maize and rice, not as a result of industrial 
sized farming, but through small-scale producers. Calls for West African Food 
Sovereignty are more organised and advanced than East Africa, mainly as a result of 
the establishment of ROPPA (Network of Farmers’ and Agricultural Producers’ 
Organisations of West Africa) but this situation is slowly changing.189 ROPPA is 
active in finding ways that small farmers can resist the industrial model and is 
carrying out research to show that small farmers can provide enough food for the 
region. Their focus on monitoring small farms is crucial because much of the global 
small-scale production is not included in international food monitoring, thus its 
contribution not acknowledged or supported. 
It must be acknowledged that land reforms have not always been successful, but a key 
feature of successful land reforms appears to be the way that farm families are 
perceived. In successful reforms, small farmers are viewed as key actors to be 
mobilised in pursuit of national economic development. In failed reforms, they have 
typically been viewed as indigents in need of charitable assistance. This is a crucial 
aspect in terms of the likelihood of Food Sovereignty successfully replacing the 
current dominant model. Small farms, and those who farm them, must be conceived as 
crucial players in achieving food self-sufficiency, not as obstacles to economic 
progress.190 Ethiopia offers both an opportunity and a challenge for a Food Sovereignty 
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framework as a means of overcoming the current level of food insecurity and will 
explored in Chapter 7. 
The considerable land reforms after the Second World War demonstrate both success 
and failure. Extensive research by Sobhan (1993) has shown that when quality land 
has been redistributed to the poor and the power of rural oligarchs diminished, the 
result has invariably been poverty reduction and improved human welfare. In contrast, 
countries with reforms that gave only poor quality land to beneficiaries and failed to 
address existing rural power structures, failed to make any real progress in reducing 
rural poverty and hunger.191 This latter scenario is evident in much of post-colonial 
Africa and is particularly applicable to communities in Northeastern Kenya. Despite 
its current political instability, land reforms that began in Zimbabwe, but were 
prematurely ended, showed that beneficiaries were substantially better off than others 
(Deiniger et al 2000).192 The potential of such reforms, at present, remains largely 
unfulfilled and grassroots movements remain most prevalent in South America. With 
the growth of the global reach of Food Sovereignty movement, however, this is very 
likely to change as the developments in West Africa indicate.193 The geographical gap 
in land reform both in terms of policy making and as a driver of social movements 
clearly provides an opportunity for further exploration. Accordingly, this thesis, is 
essentially interested in the ways this alternative model could, with the right support 
mechanisms, be transported to East Africa with specific regard to Kenya and 
Ethiopia.194 
Food Sovereignty in an African context through trade reforms. 
According to the definition of Food Sovereignty issued in 2002, the section that deals 
specifically with the issue of trade says: 
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‘Food Sovereignty does not negate trade, but rather, it promotes the 
formulation of trade policies and practices that serve the rights of people to 
safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production’. (Peoples Food 
Sovereignty network 2002)195 
This later definition (in its entirety) is perhaps emblematic of the diversity of opinions, 
positions, issues and priorities of Food Sovereignty as a movement. It is a fairly 
cautious definition, which incorporates the right to define food policy whilst 
acknowledging that Food Sovereignty, in any real sense, could not exist in a world 
without trade. Above all it could be thought of as a definition written through 
compromise and in committee, not unlike the UNDHR of 1948. In terms of trade 
policies, the demand from the IPC is for 
“...a radical change in the rules that govern food and agriculture at the 
international level, removing these from the WTO and challenging bilateral 
and regional trade agreements and policies, based on the neoliberal model of 
economic development which reduces farmers, fishers, food and farming to 
focus on tradeable commodities.” (World Forum for Food Sovereignty, 
2007).196 
In terms of production methods, the objective is to “...promote the use of locally-
controlled, diverse, small-scale agroecological production methods and artisanal 
fisheries in all regions of the world.” (World Forum for Food Sovereignty, 2007). 
The Food Sovereignty framework is based on the reality that current international 
trade practices and trade rules are not working in favour of smallholder farmers. While 
the opening up of markets in developed countries is a key demand of many 
development NGOs, the Food Sovereignty framework is asking for the right of 
nations and peoples to restrict trade, if this is needed to protect smallholder farmers 
and other rural marginalised communities against dumping and unfair competition. 
The focus of Food Sovereignty is to guarantee trading conditions that are not 
threatening to smallholder farmers. There are many ways that the current trading 
system could be reformed to protect the developing industries, particularly in 
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agriculture, from the threat of cheap imports from the advanced industrial nations. In 
terms of a practical approach, the first step could simply be to develop policies to 
ensure that prices fully reflect social and environmental costs of food production 
(McMichael 2008). Additionally, the capital invested in perverse subsidies197 for 
agriculture in OECD countries (estimated at more than $US 300 billion per year, a 
quarter of this in the US alone) could be invested in support of small farmers in rural 
communities in Third World countries (Myers and Kent 2001). From a public choice 
perspective, the benefits to the developed world would be realised through the ability 
to proceed with liberalisation between themselves and a reduction in projects aimed at 
relieving poverty or, as Gallagher puts it, ‘morality working in tandem with 
enlightened self-interest’ Gallagher (2011:7). This proposal was recognised by the EU 
when in 2001 it unilaterally opened up its markets to the poorest countries and 
removed almost all tariffs and trade restrictions. The EU recognised that its members 
would benefit from lower prices and product diversity at very little cost, whilst the 
poorer countries would benefit enormously.198 Though critics have pointed to the fact 
that there has been little real trade expansion as a result of the ‘Everything but Arms’ 
initiative (EBA) the idea remains a powerful one, full of potential. The obvious 
problem with this initiative is that it is still wholly situated within a market led system 
but a framework of Food Sovereignty demands something far more radical. 
The possibilities and potential benefits of Food Sovereignty must also be assessed 
within the context of the current control of transnational corporations (TNCs) over 
agricultural policies. International institutions, at least as they are currently 
constituted, fail to hold powerful nations and TNCs to account. This is due, in part, to 
the fact that one of the key principles of WTO agreements is that governments give 
equal treatment to foreign and domestic companies, and this principle is applied in 
areas of domestic policy, including agriculture. This is a critical obstacle that the Food 
Sovereignty framework would attempt to overcome through the pillar of trade and 
food. This pillar aims to promote policies which tackle the effects of subsidised 
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exports, food dumping, artificially low agricultural prices and other negative elements 
of the agricultural trade model. The power of the TNCs and big businesses have 
enabled them to lobby the WTO to draw up rules in their favour such as the 
controversial TRIPS (Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreements. TRIPS 
provide monopoly privileges over what was once common property and thus facilitate 
the control over genetic material and life forms such as seeds and livestock breeds. 
These systems not only prevent the free exchange of these seeds and livestock breeds, 
but also allow corporations to expropriate farmers’ knowledge of food production and 
prevent farmers from sharing this. Today TNCs own whole sequences of genes in, for 
example, soya. (Windfuhr & Jonsén 2005:8) This means that they are able to control 
more and more of the production cycle and farmers have to purchase licenses in order 
to continue farming. Intellectual property rights agreements are a clear obstacle to the 
spread of knowledge and technology among smallholder farmers and to their access to 
seeds and livestock breeds. The WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) requires all members of the WTO to implement 
plant variety protection legislation, through patents or other IPR systems, at the same 
level as the most developed countries. Historically a nation’s patent legislation system 
is gradually implemented in line with the country’s industrialisation and development 
of science and technology. The fact that developing counties lack the resources to 
establish a patent system as advanced as the rich counties is clearly reflected in the 
distribution of the patent applications on plant and animal resources. Whereas more 
than 90% of genetic resources for food and agriculture are from biotopes in the South, 
corporations in developed countries claim 98% of the patents on genes and living 
organisms (Windfuhr & Jonsén 2005:9) It is also reported that the world’s largest 
agribusiness corporation, Cargill, initially drafted the US’s position on agriculture, 
which then became the WTO’s position on agriculture (Curtis 2001: 90). 
Understandably, the WTO is often perceived as the organising body of the global 
economy on behalf of the rich developed world or global North.199 
It has been proposed, however, that the World Bank could provide a model for the 
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WTO. At present the WTO is simply a place of bargaining where the poorest 
countries have no demonstrable power at all. The WTO is not like other international 
organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF or the UN in that it does not transfer 
any resources to the developing countries. The important point, however, is that it 
could. It could, for example, offer unreciprocated trade offers, like a gift, at the start of 
each round. The evolution of the World Bank, from a mutual assistance organisation 
to its additional role as an international development association could, in this 
instance, provide a useful model (Collier 2007: 171-172). The claim that current 
global food production and consumption, is instituted largely for the benefit of the 
rich and powerful nations, and not for the benefit of the world’s poorest, is empirically 
difficult to refute (see World Bank 1999).200 It is worth noting that it is not just radical 
writers who make these condemnations (Curtis 2003;George 1991, 1994, 1996; 
McMichael 2008); numerous United Nations reports have also documented the 
unequal and undesirable effects of WTO agreements. Thus the issue of responsibility 
has been recognised in an international institutional context. For example, the UN 
sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights has been scathing 
about the WTO’s effect on developing countries and has stated: 
The assumptions on which the rules of the WTO are based are grossly unfair 
and even prejudiced. Those rules reflect an agenda that serves only to 
promote dominant corporatist interests that already monopolise the arena of 
international trade (UN 2000).201 
Arguably, the issue of trade poses the greatest challenge to Food Sovereignty as a 
coherent and viable concept and is the most obvious area in which it can be accused of 
inconsistency.202 None the less, the centrality of it demands that advocates of Food 
Sovereignty continue in the search for policies which tackle the effects of subsidised 
exports, food dumping, artificially low agricultural prices and other negative elements 
of the agricultural trade model. 
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Concluding comments 
This debate is very often framed in terms of a clash of economic development models 
for the rural world (Rosset 2006b: 4). The contrast lies between the dominant 
industrial model of the current GFS, versus the Food Sovereignty model. Food 
Sovereignty can be viewed as an international response to agriculture becoming 
commercialised on a global scale, which is a defining feature of the current food 
security model. It was argued in the previous chapter that the dominant model has, in 
many ways, increased global food insecurity. With regard to the provision of food, key 
actors in the GFS, especially international financial institutions and TNCs, very often 
supplant and over-rule the priorities and policies of developing countries. An 
overview of the literature on Food Sovereignty clearly shows that it is not just radical 
writers or anti-big-business protesters who make these observations. Increasingly, 
economists and UN reports have documented the undesirable effects of WTO 
agreements and IMF structural adjustment programmes (Collier 2007; Easterly 2006; 
FAO 2003; IAASTD 2009).203 However, the prioritisation of food self-reliance, over 
and above trade, is obviously problematic in terms of the current WTO regime, which 
still favours international trade as the key to food security but that is not to say that 
this position could not change. Food Sovereignty is a broad church and encompasses 
not just the political aspect of rights but includes climate change, trade justice, gender 
issues and the power of TNCs and supermarkets. It advocates a wide range of 
sustainable development objectives right down to recognising the particular needs of 
fishing villages, women and forest dwellers. This of course can be perceived as its 
strength; Food Sovereignty is a ‘big tent’ which allows different groups to organise 
themselves behind a specific programme. Furthermore this broad approach illustrates 
very well how Food Sovereignty is ideologically opposed to liberal ideology because 
collective interests are considered, unequivocally, more important than individual 
ones. 
At present Food Sovereignty is still very much a grassroots movement, portrayed as a 
peopled-centred resistance against the commercial domination of agriculture. Civil 
society is seen as a key driver of Food Sovereignty but the fact remains that in many 
African states civil society is weak. This fact, coupled with the East African political 
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structures, may well prove to be an obstacle, certainly in the short-term. We will 
return to the potential contradictions and obstacles to Food Sovereignty when it is 
applied ‘hypothetically’ to Kenya and Ethiopia in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 – LIBERAL ECONOMIC THEORIES AND 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
Under nourishment, starvation and famine are influenced by the working of 
an entire economy and society - not just food production and agricultural 
activities. It is crucial to take adequate note of the economic and social 
interdependences that govern the incidence of hunger in the contemporary 
world (Sen 1981: 162). 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the ongoing importance of liberal 
economic theory on famine analysis and food insecurity policy. Liberal economic 
models have featured both as solutions to global food insecurity and more recently, as 
theories of causation. Sen’s ‘entitlement theory’ is discussed in the context of an 
explanatory theory of famine and structural adjustment is discussed as a set of 
economic policies that have led to greater vulnerability to famine. The Food 
Sovereignty movement can be understood, in part, as a response to the failure of 
liberal economic theory, in both its explanatory and practical policy modes with 
regard to food insecurity. A key instrument of liberal economics is known under the 
umbrella term of ‘structural adjustment’ and has been widely imposed on much of the 
Third World in recent decades. The medium- to long-term effects of the structural 
adjustment programs, not only on the economy, but also on society and the practice of 
politics became the subject of a major theoretical debate involving two broad schools 
of thought. For the purpose of this discussion, these schools will be referred to as the 
neo-liberal political economy and the radical political economy schools (Olukoshi 
1999). The differing position articulated by both schools is, in many respects, a 
reflection of their understanding of the sources of the African food crises and the role 
of the post-colonial state in the developmental process. 
Part 1 of this chapter begins with a brief look at the classical economic approaches to 
famine, which have influenced the neo-liberal political economy followed by a 
critique of the modern micro-economic analysis of famine. This section recognises the 
important contribution of Amartya Sen and his focus on individual exchange 
entitlements, known as ‘the entitlement approach’ (Sen 1981). There are, however, 
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limits to Sen’s analysis, (Fine 2010) and this chapter argues that structural adjustment 
programmes have made it more problematic. This first section also introduces a more 
controversial aspect of the economic theories, where famine analysis is understood in 
terms of economic winners and losers (Keen 1994a). This public choice analysis fits 
within a neo-liberal political economy. The focus from this perspective is on who 
actually benefits from the occurrence of famine or food insecurity, rather than the 
perception that it is an economic failure of some kind. The relevance of this 
perspective is in how it relates to the beneficiaries of the current global food system, 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the issue of responsibility for overcoming food insecurity, 
which is considered more fully in Chapter 6. 
Part 2 of this chapter explores the global economic context of food insecurity from a 
radical political economy perspective. Food insecurity is considered from a macro-
economic perspective, with a particular emphasis on the way it has been redefined in 
relation to ‘development’, specifically, economic development. This has led to the 
pursuit of deeper integration in global markets for the least ‘developed’ countries. The 
focus is on structural adjustment policies and the impact that these economic reforms 
have had on the withdrawal of state support for agriculture in much of the Third 
World over recent decades (Devereux 2007(ed); McMichael 2008). The term 
‘structural adjustment’ (SA) describes both development strategies, i.e. a set of policy 
prescriptions, and a lending instrument of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI).204 In 
the former instance, SA consists of programme lending, medium- term loans not 
linked to specific investments or projects made in return for macro- economic policy 
reforms negotiated with the lender. The implementation of such reforms constitutes 
the ‘condition’ for the loan of funds, hence the term ‘conditionality’.205 The key 
characteristics of SA are the wholesale adoption of neo-classical liberalism which 
includes a firm belief in the virtues of the free market, the benefits of the trickle down 
effect and the merits of export orientated growth (Uvin 1994: 231). 
This chapter concludes that structural adjustment has increased food insecurity in East 
Africa. 
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 The Bretton Woods Institutions are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
They were set up at a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA in July 1944. 
Their aims were to help rebuild the shattered post-war economy and to promote international economic 
cooperation. 
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1. Micro-economic perspectives 
Early Economic Theories 
Famines have always raised questions about whether economic and political 
institutions help to protect people from starvation or, indeed, make matters worse. 
Economists have always contributed to this debate and have been highly influential in 
public policy with regard to famine and food insecurity (Ravallion 1996). Theories 
developed by Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Malthus in support of a 
laissez-faire attitude with respect to food markets, for example, were instrumental in 
the approach to famines in the British colonies during the nineteenth Century (Gray 
1991). These early economic analyses tended to focus on supply side factors and made 
the assumption that people starve because of a local, national, or regional shortage of 
food. These theories are often referred to as food availability decline (FAD) theories. 
They tended to view food scarcities and subsequent hunger as relatively isolated 
problems that could be corrected by the economic incentives of pricing systems and 
free-market allocation. The main failure of this approach was the way it relied on 
measures of aggregate food availability, which completely overlooked the complexity 
of famine causation and its effects (Sen 1981). The relevance of this critique is in the 
way it has resurfaced as a critique of SA and the orthodox economic pre-occupation 
with aggregate food availability. 
As centuries passed domestic and international transport links improved and 
agriculture became more productive and market orientated. Governments in Western 
Europe sought to free themselves from their old obligations of feeding populations 
and regulating markets. In Britain, for example, the Corn Laws were repealed in 1814-
15 and finally abandoned in 1846; market forces became the sole regulator of this 
staple commodity. The triumph of laissez-faire economics and the belief in free trade 
had a profound effect on the role of the State in terms of the supply and marketing of 
grain. For centuries the state rulers or monarch had been considered as the ultimate 
provider (through a notion of their duty rather than through any concept of people’s 
rights), and although this expectation was by no means always fulfilled it had never 
been so overtly denied as it was by the early Nineteenth Century. In ‘Wealth of 
Nations’, written in 1776, Adam Smith was highly critical of the way governments in 
the past had (as he saw it) been held to ransom by public pressure and had intervened 
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in the food supply to uphold public order. He viewed the grain traders and merchants 
not as predators who exploited the disadvantaged poor but rather as a group whose 
position reflected that of the community at large. He rejected the theory of the ‘just 
price’ and argued that the merchants and dealers made very little during good harvests 
due to a glut in corn, and only during poor harvests could they reap the benefit of their 
enterprise. The intervention of the state or even worse the intervention of the mob 
through food seizures and demands for cheaper food robbed the merchants of their 
legitimate income and discouraged the influx of food supplies from elsewhere. From 
this perspective, without prices being allowed to rise, thus giving incentives to 
merchants to import grain from elsewhere, what may have begun as a scarcity, would 
eventually become a famine. Smith was unequivocal in his belief that the unrestricted 
and unlimited freedom of the corn trade was not only ‘the best palliative of the 
inconveniences of dearth’ but the ‘only effectual preventative of a famine’ (quoted in 
Arnold 1988:110). In Malthusian terms, it was the recklessness and profligacy of the 
poor which were likely to turn scarcity into a famine not the operation of a naturally 
self-correcting free market. The resurgence of this belief in the unrivalled benefits of a 
free market was the basis of the neo-liberal political economy framework and 
epitomised by the dominance of structural adjustment as a preferred strategy during 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
The transition from moral economy206 to political economy, however, has never passed 
without upheaval (Powelson 2000). In Western Europe, for example food riots in the 
late eighteenth century, aimed at reasserting the concept of the just price, are well 
documented (Thompson 1971). According to Arnold (1988: 111) ‘Bread or Blood’ 
was a slogan still bandied about the English countryside as late as the 1830s. In other 
parts of the world, food riots have occurred much more recently. In recent decades 
riots have occurred in Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt (Warnock 1993). These acts of rebellion were essentially 
against escalating food prices that were, in many cases, a result of structural 
adjustments imposed by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF and 
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activity. It refers, in this context, to the economies of Europe before the rise of classical economics 
when a variety of formal and informal regulations prevented greed from overcoming morality.  
It includes notions of collective ownership of resources, such as water, and common grazing land 
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the World Bank, in part as way to collect interest on loans. The riots were frequently 
referred to as the ‘IMF riots’ in recognition of the fact that the terms for repayment of 
foreign debt were often set by the International Monetary Fund (McMichael 
2008:136). A report for the IMF by Rabah Arezki and Markus Brückner in March 
2011 shows that increases in food prices significantly increase the incidence of intra-
state conflict. In particular they demonstrate that for the Low Income Countries 
increases in the international food prices significantly increase the incidence of anti- 
government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict.207 Recent food riots have occurred 
in Guinea, Mauritania, Mexico, Senegal, Yemen, and Haiti to name but a few. 
History shows that whatever its merits or demerits, in countries such as England, 
laissez-faire and the prioritisation of free trade evolved over time in response to the 
country’s changing economy. The balance between social needs and economic 
freedom was addressed by the increasing role of the State and, most importantly, the 
development of a robust welfare state. However, the application of these economic 
doctrines elsewhere, imposed from above as it were, without sufficient attention paid 
to the social costs, had profound and adverse repercussions in terms of food security. 
The colonised countries of Ireland and India offer two prime examples of how the 
adherence to an economic policy, during times of desperate need, resulted in huge loss 
of life (O’Grada 1999; Sen 1981). 
It is evident that, historically, a combination of Malthusian theories of population and 
natural checks, and the economic theory of Adam Smith, encouraged an exceptionally 
negative and irresponsible attitude amongst governments towards famine and its 
alleviation. This is principally because, in the past, economic perspectives of food 
insecurity focused on two narrow parameters: aggregate food availability, commonly 
known as food availability decline (FAD), and population growth.208 As can be seen in 
much of the current media coverage of the current East African food crises many of 
these classic nineteenth-century debates persist in the views of ‘experts’ and ‘non 
experts’ alike.209 
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 At the time of writing (October 2011) the common perception of the East African food crises is that 
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The entitlement approach. 
During the 1980s a new body of literature emerged, that used the tools of economic 
analysis to shed a different sort of light on the causes and persistence of famine and 
what could be done about it. The main distinguishing feature of this literature was an 
emphasis on understanding the position of individuals in famine vulnerable settings 
and how their circumstances interact with other economy-wide variables. This is most 
relevant to this discussion because of the concern with the impact of structural 
adjustment and the way that economic policies imposed from outside have negatively 
affected internal food security. More explicitly, in what ways structural adjustment 
programmes have affected individual ‘entitlements’ and access to food resources. This 
departure from traditional supply-side economics, i.e. seeing famine as the outcome of 
a decline in aggregate food availability or disruption in the production and flow of 
food, is most associated with the work of Amartya Sen. His seminal book, Poverty 
and Famines (1981), was an original study of the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 
together with reappraisals of the famines in the 1970s, in Bangladesh, the Sahel and 
Ethiopia. Later studies have confirmed the value of Sen’s micro-level account and 
reveal that FAD played only a minor part in the causation of recent famines in 
Ethiopia (1999-2000; 2005), Niger (2000-2001) and Malawi (2001).210 
Unlike the earlier economic theories that focused purely on income or effective 
demand for food, Sen introduced the concept of ‘entitlement’ to food’.211 Most people 
experience a range of sources of entitlement to food expressed by Sen as 
A persons ability to command food - indeed to command any commodity he 
wishes to acquire or retain – depends on the entitlement relations that govern 
possession and use in that society. It depends on what he owns, what 
exchange possibilities are offered to him, what is given to him free, and what 
is taken away from him (Sen 1981: 154-155). 
In Sen’s analysis the four main categories of entitlement relations that exist in private 
ownership market economies are: 
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 See Devereux & Tiba (2007) for an analysis of 21st century ‘free-market famines’. 
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 Sen uses ‘entitlement’ in purely descriptive rather than prescriptive terms. (1981: 2). He is careful to 
distinguish his use of the word in contrast to Robert Nozick’s normative interpretation in his 
‘Entitlement theory of Justice’ (Nozick 1973). 
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1. Trade-based entitlement, which describes what one obtains through trading 
something one owns with a willing party. 
2. Production-based entitlement, which describes the right to own what one 
produces using one’s own or hired resources. 
3. Own-labour entitlement, which describes ownership of one’s labour power and 
thus any trade or production-based entitlements derived from the sale of one’s 
labour power. 
4. Inheritance and transfer entitlement, which refers to the right to own what is 
willingly given by others or perhaps inherited after their death.212 
Thus ‘entitlements’ have two components, that which is owned by a person, i.e. his or 
her endowment, and that which can be obtained by exchanging some of that 
endowment for other commodities. According to this basic entitlement approach a 
person is reduced to starvation if some change either in his endowment (e.g. alienation 
of land or loss of labour power due to ill health) or in his exchange entitlement 
mapping (e.g., fall in wages, rise in food prices, loss of employment, drop in the price 
of the goods he buys and sells) makes it no longer possible for him to acquire any 
commodity bundle with enough food. (Sen 1981: 8). 
In the market economy that now dominates the global food system, we are, at least 
technically, free to exchange what we own for other commodities through trading, 
production, or indeed a combination of the two. Sen uses the term ‘exchange 
entitlement’ to describe the set of all the alternative bundles of commodities that one 
can acquire in exchange for what one owns (Sen 1981: 3). Thus, given the 
endowments, there are various ways of converting them into goods and services. 
Some endowments, such as money can be directly traded into goods. Others have to 
be put into a production process, seeds or ploughs for example, so they can yield 
output that can be converted into another good. Labour power has a dual status in this 
scheme: it can be directly sold for wages, which can then be converted into other 
goods and it can also be engaged into a production process (along with other inputs), 
which will yield output, which again can be sold. Land, as an endowment, also 
provides various ways of obtaining other goods. It can be sold outright and the sum 
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gained used to live off or it could be rented out and the rent then used as an income. 
Alternatively, it could be given to a sharecropper for half the output, or the owner 
could cultivate it himself or herself, with or without hired help. Thus with the 
ownership of one asset, land, there are various possibilities, each of which will 
convert into a basket of consumption goods. 
An individual’s entitlement set collapses for one of two reasons: their endowments 
shrink; or their exchange entitlements are reduced, resulting in a decline in their 
‘terms of trade’ with the market for food. Typically, the two components of 
entitlement failure work hand in hand to create conditions of food insecurity. This has 
had very obvious adverse effects on the Kenyan population and their levels of food 
insecurity in recent times. 
Sen’s entitlement approach has had enormous impact on famine studies by shifting the 
focus from supply-side analyses of food to one of demand failure. In the process it has 
emphasised that crudely aggregated generalisations, such as availability of food per 
capita, overlook the crucial aspect of unequal distribution.213 Equally, by focusing on 
the individual or group access to food rather than misleading aggregations of an entire 
region or country, this approach is sensitive to how different occupational groups may 
be affected and so avoids treating whole societies as if they were an homogenous 
entity. Sen’s account thus explains why, even when the overall ratio of food to 
population is relatively high, particular occupational groups may starve because of 
their inability to establish command over enough food.214 Most importantly, Sen’s 
analysis can help explain how the global food system, as it is currently constituted, 
can impact negatively on particular entitlement sets. This is a critical point for 
advocates of Food Sovereignty who demand that the control over food systems should 
be in the hands of local people with an emphasis on the right of people to define their 
own agricultural and food policies.215 
Other economists (Ravallion 1987, 1996) have shown how the impact of prices and 
income changes can be highly diverse even amongst poor people. Those with 
chronically poor endowments will obviously be particularly vulnerable to famine. 
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Peasants with enough land to be net producers of food will gain from higher food 
prices but landless labourers will clearly lose out. Thus, whatever the macroeconomic 
dimensions of food shortage, the microeconomic incidence of starvation depends on 
how individual households are placed in terms of their endowments and, through 
these endowments, in their exchange entitlements.216 Ravallion’s research on 
individual entitlements links to the importance placed on land rights, for all, within 
the Food Sovereignty framework. 
Ravallion suggests that the ‘single most important relative price determining the 
prospects of starvation in most famine vulnerable economies is the food grain 
purchasing power of the wage rate for unskilled labour, which is more often than not 
the wage for casual agricultural labour’ (Ravallion 1996: 14). This reduction in the 
purchasing power of the landless labourer can therefore keep prices low, even in times 
of food shortage. However, this is not the current situation in famine vulnerable 
countries in the horn of Africa in 2011. Since 2008 there has been a huge volatility in 
commodity prices including most basic foods (FAO 2011). 
Unlike the so-called FAD approach, which viewed famine as a result of a market 
failure to supply sufficient food to those who need it, the entitlement approach sees 
famine as a predictable consequence of normal market processes. Given that markets 
respond to purchasing power rather than to needs, no major disruption of the economy 
is necessary or required for famine to occur. Famines, therefore, need not imply 
market failure, though it is accepted that markets in famine prone, traditional 
agricultural economies are almost certainly incomplete markets with scope for ‘Pareto 
improvements’ (Ravallion 1996: 21).217 
Ravallion’s analysis of the role of the market in the 1974-75 famine in Bangladesh 
was early proof of the danger of relying on market allocation of food during famines 
because markets tend to exacerbate food inequalities. In normal times, we may 
tolerate a degree of market inequity or failure because the costs of avoiding it 
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outweigh the gains. In the case of food crises, however, those same features of the 
market can magnify adverse external shocks with devastating outcomes. For example, 
‘panic buying’ occurs in all markets if shortages are predicted.218 Thus, prices rose 
dramatically in the lean months prior to the main winter harvest (1974/5) and in fact 
doubled between March and October 1974. This resulted in a contraction in command 
over food for those with little in the way of personal endowment to fall back on 
(Ravallion 1996: 22). The harvest when it came was in reality only 5% less than the 
previous level, which had been unusually high; but the consequences were disastrous 
and were exacerbated by government policies and principal aid donors. Thus the 
failure of the food grain market stemmed from both domestic and international public 
action failures. Three decades later the 2001-2002-food crisis in Malawi, which cost 
between 47,000 and 85,000 lives, displayed depressingly similar characteristics. The 
food crisis of 2001/2002 followed two bumper harvests, and the ‘failed harvest’ of 
2001 was actually 6% above the 10-year average (Devereux and Tiba, 2007). 
Importantly, however, the “new famine” thinking shifts the burden of explanation 
from analysis of production failures and entitlement failures to understanding response 
failures (Devereux (ed) 2007). 
The key point is that these entitlement failures occur not because there is a real 
shortage of food, but because there is a price rise that results in hoarding, speculation 
and a failure to move food to the areas where it is needed.219 The fact that there are 
well-documented examples of food being exported from areas hit by famine, both 
historically and in the present tense, emphasises the weakness of the FAD approach, 
lends weight to the explanatory power of the entitlement approach and demands a 
greater understanding of the response failures. 
Sen’s entitlement approach provides a robust challenge to the neo-Malthusian 
explanations of world hunger, which are by comparison analytically weak. For 
example, the enduring ‘Malthusian Pessimism’, reflected in the view that there are too 
many mouths to feed, has resulted in much policy being aimed at simply reducing the 
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fertility of the poor rather than addressing underlying causes of famine, such as 
poverty and political powerlessness. At the same time however, ‘Malthusian 
optimism’ has resulted in a failure to anticipate the occurrence of famines because of 
its analytical focus on figures of food per capita. Thus a delayed response from 
government and aid agencies has led to fatal consequences for millions of people (Sen 
2001). A failure to respond to the food crisis in Ethiopia meant that Emperor Haile 
Selassie and his regime were ultimately held responsible for the famine of 1973/4, 
which claimed 200,000 deaths. He was overthrown a few months later. Similarly, by 
reputedly ignoring the famine of 1984/5, in case it took away the sheen of the tenth 
anniversary of the socialist Derg junta’s accession to power and the creation of the 
Worker’s Party of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam signed the beginning of its end 
(Lefort 2009). Whether or not the failure to prevent famine in 2008 will trigger a 
similar movement against Zenawi’s current rule in Ethiopia remains to be seen. 
The key point is this: if food supply per capita is taken as evidence that food 
consumption is rising accordingly, then much needed evasive action is unlikely to be 
taken. Empirical evidence and the theoretical approaches of Sen and Ravallion 
demonstrate that starvation may occur when food availability per head is constant, or 
even rising; it is the distribution of access to that food which is vital (Devereux & 
Tiba 2007). 
Limits of the entitlement approach 
Predictably the entitlement approach is not without its critics and some have argued 
that it added little to what was already known about famine causation.220 A crucial 
point for the arguments developed in this thesis, concerning the global food system, is 
that Sen paid insufficient attention to whether edible or non-edible crops are grown. In 
the case of the former, a portion of the output can be directly consumed and the 
market price does not enter the equation. For non-edible crops however, there has to 
be a sale before there can be a purchase. This has a significant impact on one’s 
‘entitlement set’. This is of enormous importance in terms of the growth of 
agribusiness and the concentration of cash crops in many Third World countries. 
Those involved in the production of non-edible crops are clearly more vulnerable to 
hunger than those growing edible ones. Kenya offers a relevant example. The 
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revenues derived from exports of traditional agricultural products such as coffee and 
tea were stagnant or declining in the 1990s. In the case of coffee, for example, both 
the volume and price per tonne of exports from Kenya to the EU fell by about 30 per 
cent in the 1990s, resulting in an overall decline of revenue from coffee exports to this 
market of 60 per cent between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the twenty-
first century (Humphrey 2008). Kenya’s recent concentration on fresh fruit and 
flowers has been a response to this declining market.221 The unfortunate reality, of 
course, is that Kenya is now increasingly dependent on imported food with prices 
continually rising and having more than doubled over the last 3 years.222 
More generally, Sen can be criticised for his methodological individualism, in that he 
overlooks the roles of local, national and global actors in famine situations. In the 
context of this thesis this is the most critical oversight, since Sen’s account fails to 
adequately situate famine and food insecurity within the context of the global food 
system or the political and economic structures both within and beyond famine-prone 
communities. In other words Sen’s model of analysis takes as given the existing 
distribution of wealth at individual or household level, rather than questioning how 
and why assets and incomes came to be unequally distributed (Fine 1997). The impact 
of structural adjustment on Sen’s entitlement framework also makes aspects of his 
theory problematic. More specifically, the entitlements Sen emphasises may be 
unclear, particularly with regard to private property rights. Societies traditionally 
based on communal land ownership, for example, are not easily reconciled with his 
model. This is particularly true of nomadic societies and especially pertinent to many 
parts of East Africa where hunger and vulnerability to famine is most prevalent. The 
position of nomads in northern Kenya offers a contemporary example of how certain 
aspects of the entitlement approach are not particularly relevant. Issues of land tenure 
and land rights, which are often customary rather than legally enshrined, are 
particularly problematic in terms of establishing ‘entitlements’. This aspect is 
becoming even more relevant with the increase in land acquisition in East Africa by 
foreign governments; so-called ‘land grabbing’.223 
In addition the effects of war can completely disrupt established entitlements systems, 
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thus undermining elements of the theory’s explanatory power. The forced relocation 
of entire communities during the 1998-2000 Ethiopian/Eritrean war, for example, is a 
case in point. The breakdown of accepted moral and ethical codes, as a result of 
conflict, have devastating and well-documented consequences. Acts of looting or 
pillaging or abandonment of women and children by men called upon to fight, can 
result in the reduction or indeed total collapse of the entitlement system on which Sen 
bases his theory. This is an important critical observation and perhaps the most 
substantive. For other famine theorists, conflict assumes a far greater importance than 
Sen allows in his analysis (de Waal 1989, 2005; Keen 1994a).224 
Thirdly, and relatedly, the entitlement approach can be criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to the scale of death caused by factors not relating to food 
entitlements. De Waal’s ‘health crisis model’, for example, which focuses on the 
indiscriminate nature of disease, weakens the explanatory power of entitlements and 
the hypothesis that famine mortality is inversely correlated to individual entitlements 
or income (de Waal 1989). Keen’s work in Sudan is relevant here in the way his 
understanding of the Dinka’s wealth and increased vulnerability contradicts Sen’s 
theory. This insight underlines the importance of the broader political environment 
within which individual entitlements are set. 
It is clear that disagreements between the theoretical approach of ‘entitlements’ and 
the empirical observations of the ‘coping strategies’ literature (Jodha 1975; 
Rangasami 1985) reflect, to a great extent, the contrasting perceptions of what famine 
actually is. It can be said that Sen’s entitlement theory reflects the idea that people are 
plunged into famine, by a catastrophic event whereas those who have used household 
consumption data view famine as a process, rather than an event. Crucially from this 
sociological perspective it is an event during which a number of adjustments and 
coping strategies are made which the entitlement approach overlooks.225 
Desai (1988) suggests that a major omission in Sen’s work is his insufficient attention 
to the dynamics of famine situations. From this perspective the state of the overall 
economy/ecology, within which a trigger factor such as a drought may occur, is highly 
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relevant. If the economy is already weakened by previous episodes it will obviously 
have limited reserves for coping with such a crisis. It is also very likely that, if there is 
no quick and effective relief, one year’s crisis will affect next year’s output. This is 
particularly true in the case of livestock where, if many cattle die during a famine, 
restocking may take several years due to the usual gestation periods. This is highly 
relevant to the current situation in East Africa where severe drought conditions are 
having devastating consequences for certain vulnerable communities. For example 
famine has now been declared in five separate regions in Somalia (FAO 2011) and 
both Kenya and Ethiopia are experiencing serious food crises. 
A second dynamic in contemporary famine analysis is the interaction between 
different socio-economic groups. The assets of these different groups, their ability to 
save and the opportunities for investment open to them during normal times, dictate to 
a great extent how long they can last during times of shortage. Those with adequate 
reserves of grain assume positions of social power and, indeed, may benefit from 
famine conditions (Keen 1994b). When famine is over, those who had to sell all their 
assets start again in a position of increased vulnerability while those who were 
prosperous to begin with start from an even stronger position (Devereux 2007). 
Economic benefits of food insecurity 
Following on from this it would be useful to introduce a concept of particular 
relevance for understanding some of the potential obstacles to promoting Food 
Sovereignty in an African context.226 David Keen has shown that certain groups enjoy 
positive economic benefits during times of famine, and his perspective works well in 
linking an economic analysis of food insecurity with the political analysis in Chapter 
6. So where as Sen emphasised the economic nature of famine in terms of the failure 
of liberal economics to protect individual entitlements, Keen argues that in certain 
instances famine promised and to some extent delivered important economic and 
military benefits. Keen cites the 1983-1988 Sudanese famine as evidence to support 
his theory and he demonstrates that this famine was also linked with sexual 
oppression and religious indoctrination (Keen 1994b: 111). One need not dismiss 
Sen’s link between poverty and famine to realise that, in certain cases of famine, 
particular groups are victimised. In the case of the Sudan, it has been the inability of 
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certain groups to secure effective representation within the Sudanese state, rather than 
their lack of assets, that has exposed them to famine. In other words it is a lack of 
political power not a lack of economic entitlements that has led to famine in some 
areas. As will be seen in Chapter 6 there are important parallels with marginalised 
groups in both Kenya and Ethiopia and their levels of food insecurity. Work by 
Devereuex demonstrates how pastoralists in the Somali region of Ethiopia are in the 
paradoxical position of being wealthier than highland farmers in Ethiopia but 
politically excluded, geographically marginalised, and intensely vulnerable to 
livelihood shocks (Devereux 2007). 
Studies of the 2001-2002 Malawi famine also lend weight to the idea that famines 
provide opportunity as well as catastrophe. The key point for this chapter is that 
although the abolition of food security policies as a result of SA’s, led to a weakened 
institutional response to the famine, nonetheless there were many economic 
beneficiaries. In Malawi, as in many other cases, famine was considered to have been 
an avoidable tragedy from which many profited (Devereux & Tiba 2007). 
2. Macro-economic theories 
This section situates the conceptualisation of famine within the wider context of 
extreme poverty and perceived lack of economic development. There are two general 
concepts of poverty that are relevant to this discussion: absolute poverty which 
specifies the levels of absolute deprivation on a widely accepted basis; and food 
poverty which is based on the minimum nutrient requirements needed for healthy 
growth and maintenance of the human body. Neo-liberal political economy/public 
choice theories are important because of the way they have influenced both the 
response of the international community and its financial institutions, and promoted a 
free market rationale. In particular a preoccupation with ‘economic development’ has 
led to a single-minded approach of imposing and enlarging a capitalist market 
doctrine. From a radical political economy perspective, the consolidation of a world 
economy resulted in a US led model of development culminating in the debt regime of 
the 1980s. This regime imposed financial constraints via structural adjustment (SA) 
undermining economic nationalism and the ‘political dismantling of the Third World’ 
(McMichael 2008:117). This ‘political dismantling’ is of most importance in the area 
of government policy and agriculture because of how national government withdrawal 
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from agriculture and food policy has been linked to increased food insecurity. 
One of the earliest critics in this area of research is Susan George who presented her 
analysis of the effects of global capitalism on the poorest countries in How The Other 
Half Dies (1976). Her work has remained influential over more than three decades and 
thus many of her key criticisms are addressed within a Food Sovereignty framework. 
George suggested that there are three basic paradigms in the literature on hunger 
(George 1991).227 The first is the previously mentioned ‘growth/trickle down model’. 
This has traditionally been the theoretical position adopted by the UN Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) since the first World Food summit in Rome in 1974 
and has recently had a renaissance (Easterly 2006). This model seeks to increase gross 
national product (GNP) through industrialisation, increased land use and investment 
in those sectors of society that are most modern and entrepreneurial. There is an 
inherent belief in the idea that the accumulated wealth of modernising elites will 
trickle down and so benefit the worse off. The model encourages the import of both 
foreign capital investment and technology and assumes that the development in the 
least economically developed countries will imitate the one that occurred in the now 
industrialised Western world.228 
The logic of liberal political economy/public choice is one of short-term self-interest; 
the market solution to food insecurity, therefore, is to make agriculture more 
profitable. This can be achieved by increased production to provide extra food either 
through domestic production or trade. The larger the economic pie, so the theory 
advocates, the greater the prospects for the poor to escape absolute poverty. This view 
reflects the World Bank’s approach to food insecurity throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
when it supported the withdrawal of government from the business of food and 
promoted free markets to control supply and demand. It can also be said to be the 
theoretical basis of the food security paradigm. The following five principles guided 
this approach: a) less state activity, especially food subsidies for the poor; b) the 
freeing up of world markets; c) using price incentives in agriculture, stressing the 
advantages of cash crops for export; d) reduced emphasis on food self-sufficiency; e) 
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reduction in state spending on basic needs (Uvin, 1994). These economic initiatives 
are collectively known as structural adjustment policies and have become a central 
feature of the current global agricultural model. 
Importantly for its advocates, this model presupposes that harmony either exists, or 
can do so, at the national and international level. In other words we live in a pluralist 
world of increased global interdependence and the present system is potentially 
beneficial to all nations through increased trade and cooperation.229 Hence it is often 
referred to as the ‘optimistic perspective’ or more critically as a resurgence of 
nineteenth century utopian ideals based on a ‘harmony of interests’.230 This position is 
summed up by the then US Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, who declared at 
the World Food Summit in Rome in 1996 that ‘free and fair trade promotes global 
prosperity and plenty’ and ‘the private sector is the great untapped frontier in the 
world war on hunger’.231 Though this liberal economic model had been generally 
recognised as failing, particularly in an African context, because it underplays the 
political nature of economic structures (Rono 2002), it has recently undergone a 
revival with a few important alterations. For example the negative impact of multi-
nationals with regard to food production has been recognised, as has the need for 
increased participation of developing countries at all levels of the process 
(Mkandawire & Soludo 1999; Sachs 2005). The idea that markets exist and operate in 
a political vacuum is now less defensible than it was in the past, because of the 
recognition that markets are products of the prevailing political structures and bases of 
power (Stiglitz 2006). 
The second of George’s paradigms often referred to in the literature as ‘dependency 
theory,’ suggests that the international system has a centre, i.e. the Western 
industrialised nations, with the U.S being the centre of the centre, the bulls eye on a 
dart board so to speak. On the periphery is the developing world. The former has 
consistently exploited the latter since colonial times and continues to do so 
(Wallerstein 1993). As was discussed in Chapter 2, this second model dominates the 
critical literature on the current global food system. Early exponents of this theory 
believed that the remedy to correct the ongoing imbalance of power was to be found in 
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the creation of a so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Barratt-Brown 
1987). This remedy was to be achieved by the guarantee of stable and fair prices for 
Third World raw materials, free access to Northern markets, an end to subsidies and 
trade policies biased in favour of the developed world, alleviation of debt and so forth. 
Campaigns such as Jubilee 2000 and the Millennium Development Goals could be 
considered as more recent examples of this kind of initiative.232 This model, 
historically, has been the stance of virtually all Third World governments in 
international negotiations (the so-called Group of 77 in contrast with the G8) and 
many NGOs. Indeed, some contemporary African leaders continue with this stance 
and place full responsibility on ex-colonial powers for the state of their country’s 
declining economic and political stability; Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe is an obvious 
example here. 
George’s third paradigm often referred to, as the radical political economy model is 
the one that fits best with the Food Sovereignty model. This model does not deny the 
need for a NIEO, but is more politicised by adopting a class analysis of the global 
system of production and consumption. From this radical political perspective, the 
world is not simplistically divided into rich/powerful and poor/powerless nations. 
Rather, all nations, including the rich ones, are characterised by having a dominating 
and a dominated class, albeit with further subdivisions in each (George 1991). From 
this perspective the NIEO is an incomplete solution to the problems of food insecurity 
because nothing guarantees that increased national revenues will benefit the worse off 
in any given national society.233 Empirical research shows that an over-reliance on 
income-based development has made it possible to overlook the poorest of the poor 
(Sen 2010). In addition the NIEO is incomplete because it tends to apportion all the 
blame for inequality on the developed world and this is clearly not always the case. As 
we will see in chapter 6 many Third World governments can be held responsible for 
the unequal access and distribution of basic goods such as food to their own people. 
Thus, this third model goes further than demanding greater equality between states 
and calls for greater equality within states too. As will be made clear this more radical 
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model is a much closer fit with the vision of human society and the responsive policy 
framework advocated by the Food Sovereignty model. 
From a sociological perspective, what distinguishes this third model from the 
growth/trickle-down model is that it assumes the presence of conflict, not harmony. 
Third World elites, along with all other political elites will not give up a share of their 
wealth and privileges willingly and therefore the idea of benefits ‘trickling down’ is 
no more than a fallacy (Bayart 1993). In addition, rich nations will continue to exploit 
poor ones, but as a double blow to the poorest, they will also continue to support the 
often-corrupt elites in these developing countries in order to ensure the status quo.234 
The separation of the role of human agency from environmental factors, such as 
drought, is a crucial one, particularly in an East African context. It necessitates a 
political analysis to demonstrate responsibility with regards to food insecurity and will 
be explored in Chapter 6.235 
Economic development and the Millennium Development Goals 
From the comparison of the three approaches outlined above, one can conclude that 
the neo-liberal model, (incorporating the mistaken FAD approach) continues to 
dominate the international approach to food insecurity. However, within this context 
developmental economists have produced an enormous amount of work aimed at 
understanding and overcoming a myriad of global inequalities including food 
insecurity. Analyses of the ‘fourteenth century reality of the global poor’ (Collier 
2007)236 reveal a consensus in terms of the poor being stuck in a variety of traps 
though there are distinct differences in angles of emphasis on causal factors.237 
Whatever the differences it is now generally understood by development economists 
that, despite all efforts, the bottom billion of humanity, located in the Third World, 
has become poorer, both relatively and in absolute terms (Pogge 2003). The economic 
position of people in these societies, relative to the rest of the world, has been one of 
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massive and accelerating divergence. Collier offers the truly ghastly image of ‘a 
billion people stuck in a train slowly rolling backwards downhill’ (Collier 2007: 10). 
Economists have identified many reasons as to why this should be and these factors 
have been categorised and presented as essential traps to development (Collier 2007; 
Easterly 2006; Sachs 2005). Collier (2007), for example, applies four separate but 
often related traps to his analysis of African economic inequalities: the conflict trap; 
the natural resources trap; the trap of bad governance in a small country; and the trap 
of being landlocked with poor neighbours.238 Some of these perceived obstacles to 
economic development are considered below. Some of these obstacles result from 
neo-liberal macro-economic theory whilst others are more independent of it in the 
respect that they result from being landlocked. In terms of advancing Food 
Sovereignty as an alternative framework for agriculture then the former must be 
afforded relative primacy. 
Innovation 
There is a huge difference between rich and poor countries and their tendency to 
innovate. Rich countries have large markets, which standard economic theory 
suggests, increases the incentive for innovation, bringing new technologies to the 
market, further raising productivity, and hence expanding the size of market. From 
this perspective one can clearly see a chain reaction which economists call 
endogenous growth. In the rich countries of North America, Western Europe and East 
Asia there is massive investment in research and development (R and D) leading to 
sales of patent protected products in the global market. These investments are not just 
left to the market though; rich governments are also heavily investing whereas in most 
poor countries the innovation process simply never gets started. The growing 
innovation gap over the last two centuries is given as one of the most fundamental 
reasons why rich and poor countries have diverged to such a degree (Sachs 2005). 
This is of particularly relevance with respect to food technologies and ownership of 
intellectual property rights that apply to patented seeds and grains. These issues are 
central to the second pillar of Food Sovereignty; access to productive resources.239 
Population/land ratios 
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In The End of Poverty (2005) Jeffrey Sachs,240 claims that until two centuries ago just 
about everyone was poor, with the exception of a small minority of powerful rulers 
and large land-owners. The economic historian, Angus Maddison, puts the average 
income per person in Western Europe in 1820 at around 90% of the average income in 
Africa today, and life expectancy in Western Europe and Japan was about forty years 
(cited in Sachs 2005: 26). The past two centuries, however, have been a unique era in 
economic history, a period of modern economic growth and one, Sachs argues, in 
which both population and per capita income have come ‘unstuck’. By this he means 
they expanded at rates never seen before, world population increased by six-fold, and 
per capita income in the U.S twenty-five-fold, with Western European per capita 
income at fifteen-fold during this period (Sachs 2005:28). Importantly, however, total 
worldwide food production more than kept up with a booming world population, 
notwithstanding of course that vast numbers of people still go hungry today. By way 
of explanation, Sachs applies an alternative methodology, one he calls ‘clinical 
economics’.241 Through the macro lens of clinical economics, Sachs rejects popular 
explanations of food insecurity, which often focus on the faults of the poor (i.e. the 
Malthusian view that they have too many children) or view poverty purely as a result 
of corrupt leadership and backward cultures that obstruct modern economic 
development. Rather, something as complex as a country’s economic system has too 
many facets to presume that only one thing can go wrong. Problems occur in different 
parts of the economic machine and sometimes combine to bring the machine to a near 
halt. 
Top-down approach 
Much of the focus of macro-economic analysis on global disparities has been on the 
failure of the developed countries attempts to improve the position of the least 
developed countries. Easterly (2006: Ch 2), for example, is highly critical of the big 
push, top-down approach advocated by Sachs and exemplified by the policy paradigm 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Some economists see many of the 
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macro-economic policies of the past as playing a causal role (albeit unintentional) in 
keeping the least developed countries so impoverished and thus call for a rejection of 
such ‘utopian goals’ (Moyo 2010). Much of the criticism from development 
economists is directed at the aid and trade industry242 but their criticisms have also 
been applied to structural adjustment policies and their link to increased food 
insecurity. Economists, such as Easterly, for example, advocate a move towards local, 
piecemeal innovations that will actually make the poor and hungry better off. Though 
the concept of Food Sovereignty does not feature at all in the work of the economists 
mentioned here, their suggestions and recommendations for a new direction in policy 
actually fit very well within a Food Sovereignty framework. 
It can be said that lack of economic development is very often viewed as the principal 
cause of poverty and thus food poverty in development literature. This perspective can 
be conceptualised as follows.243 
The key problem for many of the poorest countries is that poverty itself becomes a 
trap; when poverty is extreme the poor simply do not have the ability to change things 
by themselves. Poverty, caused by lack of capital per person, is often manifested in the 
following ways: Poor rural villages lack transport both in terms of vehicles and good 
road networks, power generators and irrigation systems. So-called, ‘human capital’ is 
very low; people are hungry, diseased and struggling for survival. Natural capital is 
depleted, trees have been cut down and soil nutrients are often exhausted. In these 
conditions the requirement is for more capital, physical, human and natural but this 
requires saving and investment. When people are extremely poor there is simply no 
capacity to save. There is, in economic terms, no margin of income above survival 
that can be invested in the future. This is why the poorest of the poor, usually the rural 
poor, are most prone to becoming trapped within low or negative economic growth 
rates. From this perspective, the inability to save is crucial in preventing the poor from 
freeing themselves from their current predicament. (Sachs 2005: 56-57).244 This 
approach sums up the ‘development project’, which has been deeply criticised 
(McMichael 2008).245 
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However, even if the explanation of the poverty trap is accepted it does not explain 
why some impoverished countries are trapped and some are not. Among many 
economists and others in the development field there has been the realisation, over the 
last decade, that the answer to this often lies in the physical geography (Collier 2007). 
It has been noted that Americans often believe that they generated their wealth all by 
themselves, overlooking the fact that they inherited a vast continent rich in natural 
resources, fertile lands and an agreeable climate. In addition the continent has 
navigable rivers and miles of coastline providing a perfect foundation for water based 
trade (McMichael 2008). Many poor countries, especially those in Africa, are not so 
blessed. Landlocked countries incur high transport costs and lack the natural 
advantages of rivers, coastlines and natural harbours. Collier’s work on the 
relationship between geography and economic development showed that 38% of 
people living in ‘the bottom billion’ are landlocked (Collier 2007: 54). Therefore a 
country’s geographical position offers a better (albeit partial) explanation of the 
persistence of food insecurity in certain cases, such as Ethiopia and Niger, than culture 
or birth rate (Devereux 2009b). 
Critics, of course, are quick to point out those European successful economies such as 
Switzerland, Austria and Luxemburg are also landlocked, thus geography alone does 
not necessarily condemn a country to poverty and slow economic growth.246 In these 
countries agreeable climates and navigable rivers also play an important part. 
However the relevance of geographical positioning in African development has 
perhaps been, until now, seriously underplayed, but as the analysis of vulnerability to 
food insecurity becomes more sophisticated, this is changing. The key point is that the 
geographical factor could be included in directing policy that is more country specific. 
Research conducted by the World Bank focused on transportation costs around the 
world and discovered that costs for those in landlocked countries were significantly 
higher than elsewhere (Collier 2007: 54). Landlocked countries are to a great degree 
dependent on the transport infrastructure of their surrounding countries. They are, in 
Collier’s words, ‘hostages to their neighbours’ (ibid: 55). The obvious consequence of 
this is that poor countries, surrounded by poorly developed countries, have 
                                                          
246
 It should be noted that landlocked European countries do not have transport networks created purely 
for colonial exploitation of natural resources, which is often the case in African countries. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 4 
Liberal Economic Theories 
 Page 135 
 
considerable obstacles to integration into global markets. Relatively high transport 
costs, for example, can preclude poor countries from developing manufacturing, 
which, to date, is considered the most powerful tool for rapid development .247 These 
obstacles are important because they demonstrate some of the flaws in the 
unquestioning pursuit of free market solutions to situations of food insecurity. 
It is fair to say that some of these concrete obstacles may well be insurmountable in a 
local context, but this is arguably not the case in a global context if policy making 
were to focus on protecting human rights and reducing global economic inequality. As 
stated, being landlocked, per se, is not the problem, but it is when combined with 
other factors. One evidently important factor is the kind of neighbours surrounding a 
country. Switzerland, for example, has Germany, Italy, France and Austria, all with 
well-developed infrastructures and fully functioning markets. African landlocked 
countries are not so fortunate. Ethiopia for example has Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan 
and Eritrea, countries that have for decades had combinations of stagnant economies, 
civil conflicts, border invasions and, in the case of Somalia, total state collapse. 
In terms of economic development it is relevant that there are other opportunities open 
to landlocked countries. Botswana, for example, has benefited enormously from its 
large natural resource surplus. More importantly, the fact that it has managed this 
resource well, and enjoyed a stable government, has enabled it to overcome many of 
the problems normally associated with being landlocked.248 As stated, over 30% of 
Africa’s population lives in landlocked, resource scarce countries. In the rest of the 
developing world only 1% of the population live in this situation (Collier 2007: 57).249 
Other kinds of geographical disadvantages are also at play in terms of economic 
development. Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia suffer arid conditions, are prone to 
prolonged droughts and low agricultural productivity. In addition, Sub- Saharan 
Africa also has the misfortune of ideal conditions for mosquito breeding, making it the 
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epicentre of malaria and other killer diseases, a point emphasised by Sachs (2005).250 
What is really important here, and a critical point in favour of developing the concept 
of Food Sovereignty, is that none of these conditions per se need be fatal to economic 
development. What it does mean is that some countries need investment to overcome 
these adversities, which other, more fortunate, countries have not needed to make. In 
other words policy needs to be directed towards making the playing field more level 
before imposing an economic model that has been designed to work in developed 
countries. Put plainly, policy development and implementation needs to be sensitive to 
local circumstances. Transport infrastructures can be built, linking land locked 
countries with coastal countries. Tropical disease can be controlled, land can be 
irrigated and local agricultural productivity can be boosted. The crux of the matter, 
though, is rather obvious - these improvements are costly and these costs need to be 
met. 
Even if the economy is not completely impoverished, the government may lack the 
resources to pay for the infrastructure on which the necessary economic growth 
depends. Governments are crucial to any investment in public goods and services such 
as primary health care, transport power grids and suchlike. There are many reasons 
why governments may lack the financial means to provide these public goods some of 
which are wholly internal (corruption, mismanagement and so forth) but others stem 
from an economic policy environment imposed externally. 
Firstly, the population may be so poor that taxation may not be feasible. Secondly, the 
government may be inept or corrupt and therefore not capable of utilising an efficient 
tax system. Furthermore, when governments survive on ‘rents’ from natural resource 
wealth they often fail to develop a tax system at all, which has serious repercussions in 
terms of accountability. Accountability and transparency are key criteria of democratic 
governance. Thirdly, the government may be saddled with enormous debt carried over 
from earlier decades and previous regimes, therefore any tax revenue that is collected 
may have to be used to service the debt rather than to finance new investments 
(AFRODAD 2005; Stiglitz 2006).251 
Cultural or religious norms may also be an obstacle to economic development. 
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Repression of women for example may leave half the population without education or 
legal and political rights, in effect preventing half the population from contributing to 
overall economic development. The central role of women, both to the economy in 
general and agriculture in particular has become a key feature of the Food Sovereignty 
movement. Equality and justice are corner stones of Food Sovereignty and a feminist 
perspective has become entrenched in its core ideals. Gender inequality can also delay 
or prevent the demographic transition from high to low fertility.252 Similarly, cultural 
boundaries may apply to religious or ethnic minorities, excluding them from 
schooling, healthcare, employment all of which are crucial factors in measurements of 
development as per the United Nations Human Development Index. 
Arguably, the most important feature of modern geo-politics, and the way it relates to 
food, is trade. As was discussed in Chapter 2 on the global food system, the barriers 
erected, by rich developed countries, can seriously impede a poorer country’s chances 
of achieving economic development. Perhaps the most obvious example here, (as 
discussed in the previous chapter) is that subsidies paid to EU and US farmers 
severely handicap farmers in the developing world who are unable to compete on the 
world market.253 
3. Structural adjustment and increased vulnerability 
This last part of the chapter focuses on the macro economic policy of structural 
adjustment and how the implementation of these policies has increased food insecurity 
and vulnerability to famine. For this discussion the imposition of structural adjustment 
by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) provides an important link between the 
economic causes of food insecurity and the way that food aid has developed to 
compensate for these economic failures, discussed in the next chapter. The overlap 
between economic and political consequences of SA is considerable but for the 
purposes of this thesis SA will be separated along two lines: the first, which is the role 
of the IFIs will be discussed in this chapter; the second is the impact on governments’ 
control of agricultural policy and will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
As stated earlier, in order to facilitate economic development during the 1980s the 
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dominant strategy became one of structural adjustment which emphasised the need for 
economic liberalisation and state withdrawal from agriculture along with all other 
sectors of the economy. Because of the central role of IFIs this neo-liberal policy has 
also been referred to as the World Bank’s ‘political economy’ (Olukoshi 1999). The 
speed with which SA spread as the dominant economic strategy is indicated by the 
signing of IMF agreements with 85 developing countries between 1980 and 1990 and 
the World Bank gave 220 adjustment loans to 63 countries in the same period. (Uvin 
1994: 232). By 1990 SA financing accounted for more than 25% of World Bank 
lending, a considerable rise from nothing in 1980 (World Bank 1990). 
This so-called ‘rolling back the state’ as a key component of structural adjustment 
(most associated, domestically, with the Reagan administration in the US and the 
Thatcher government in the UK) was, on the face of it, aimed at increased 
productivity.254 In much of the Third World, it was specifically aimed at increasing 
agricultural produce to stimulate economic growth. This did include food but, 
crucially, it was directed at food for export. The most controversial aspect of SA for 
this discussion is how the constraints that international institutions imposed on Third 
World states affected their ability to solve issues of domestic food insecurity for 
themselves. The Food Sovereignty framework is very much a response to the resulting 
decline of control over food issues at a national and regional level. In Malawi, for 
example, most government mechanisms for dealing with food insecurity were 
dismantled under liberal reforms imposed by the World Bank and other agencies 
during the 1980s and 90s (Devereuex 2009).255 The same policy outcome applied to 
Kenya (Rono 2002) and Ethiopia (Riddell & Robinson 1992). Thus the most critical 
of commentators have argued that the neo-liberal paradox is that ‘free’ markets 
exclude and/or starve populations displaced and dispossessed by their implementation 
(Patel & Delwiche 2002). Research on the famine in Malawi in 2001 reinforces this 
connection between liberal economic policies and famine vulnerability (Devereux & 
Tiba 2007). Indeed the current food crisis in the horn of Africa has been exacerbated 
by the volatility of food prices on world markets and the absence of government food 
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stocks and adequate safety net programmes.256 Although it is recognised that many 
grain-marketing boards were inefficient and in some cases corrupt, it has been argued 
that their abolition through structural adjustments has increased famine vulnerability. 
Therefore reform of these institutions, rather than abolition, would have been a far 
more effective approach to food insecurity (Paul & Wahlberg 2008). 
Over a decade ago questions raised by structural adjustment programmes within the 
framework of the World Banks ‘political economy’ were many and varied (Olukoshi 
1999). Attempts to understand the negative aspects of SA in an East African context 
generated questions such as: Can economic adjustment occur without a simultaneous 
program of political and administrative reforms? Which sections of the state elite can 
be expected to be reliable allies in the quest for market-led reforms?257 How might 
technocrats be “insulated” from undesirable interest group pressures that might 
compromise the integrity of the adjustment package? What capacities exist locally for 
initiating or grasping orthodox market reforms? What lessons can be learnt about the 
timing, phasing, and sequencing of reform policy implementation? Which regime 
types are best suited for structural adjustment implementation? How might the 
“winners” from structural adjustment be supported to constitute a local resource for 
the program and how might “losers” be compensated or out-manoeuvred in order to 
prevent them from obstructing the implementation of the program?258 
The purpose of including these questions here is not to answer them in any definitive 
sense,259 but to emphasise the centrality of politics to the process of economic 
development and that the structural adjustment framework for economic reform 
should, itself, be open to a more critical analysis. This lack of analysis has been one of 
the key failures in the application of these economic programmes in the Third world in 
recent decades. As stated by Olukoshi (1999) ‘There is nothing sacrosanct or settled 
about the neo-liberal structural adjustment model; persistence with it in the framework 
of popular disaffection may, in fact, compound Africa’s crisis of governance.’260 This 
questions the underlying assumption that informs the World Bank’s “political 
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economy” and the thinking of the public choice theorists that the problem in Africa 
today is not so much with an orthodox economic reform model, which is both 
“rational” and aims to restore “rationality” to African economies, but with the 
framework for politics and governance which is essentially “irrational” and 
“dysfunctional” on account of all-pervading “neo-patrimonial” structures and 
processes built into the post-colonial state form (Bayart 2000). 
What Africa needs is not so much “good” governance defined in narrow technocratic, 
functionalist terms that are meant to further the goals of an adjustment model that is as 
controversial as it is contested but a system of democratic governance in which 
political actors have the space to freely and openly debate, negotiate, and design an 
economic reform package that is integral to the construction of a new social contract. 
As has been noted even “good” policies introduced in ignorance of local conditions 
inevitably fail and may even make things worse (Mkandawire & Soludo 1999). 
This serious drawback can be more fully understood within the agricultural 
framework that would be developed through Food Sovereignty. Food self-sufficiency 
using as much local material and human resources as possible, for example, would not 
be overlooked or overridden by greater economic integration.261 Most importantly, 
Food Sovereignty demands a fundamental reassessment of power and control over all 
aspects of agriculture and food systems. These are political issues, and are addressed 
in the following chapters: Chapter 5 explores the politics of food aid; Chapter 6 
considers the obstacles and potential for state and government control of food issues; 
and chapter 7 assesses the feasibility of Food Sovereignty in an East African context. 
Kenya as an example. 
Research by Manundu (1997) offers an insight into both the statistical evidence of 
structural adjustment programmes in Kenya and the perception of the population with 
regard to the negative impacts. From the late 1980’s onwards Kenya experienced 
economic instability due to fluctuating prices on the country’s major exports, high 
population growth and increasing debt. This resulted in a decline in GDP, wide spread 
poverty and food shortages. It was within this context that the implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes began. In contrast to the ‘golden years’ of the first 
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two decades after independence the period 1980-1990 is sometimes referred to as ‘the 
lost decade’ due to the severe external and internal challenges that Kenya faced. 
(Rono 2002). 
Manundu’s work (1997) showed that SA led to increasing household poverty, and 
hence food insecurity in both relative and absolute terms for the rural and the urban 
poor.262 Manundu’s countrywide research records the extent of both poverty rates in 
1994. Generally speaking the rates are very similar or higher for food poverty in the 
data he presents. His data on the perception of Kenyan households on changes in the 
poverty situation in 1994 compared to 5 years earlier reveals that 77% considered that 
their poverty situation had worsened, 15% that their situation had not changed and 
only 8% perceived that their poverty situation had improved (Manundu 1997). A 
2005, report on the progress of the MDGs in Kenya, showed that in 2003, 56 per cent 
of the population were still living below the poverty line with a projection that, at the 
current trend, 65.9 per cent of the Kenyan population would be living below the 
poverty line by 2015 (Millennium Development Goals in Kenya 2005). These findings 
add weight to the widespread claims that structural adjustment has aggravated poverty 
in Kenya. 
In terms of SA impact on Kenyan agriculture two points are most relevant and 
discussed in more detail elsewhere in this thesis. One is the liberalisation of markets 
so local products have been subjected to competition from imported ones, which are 
often subsidised commodities. Secondly government investment in agriculture has 
seriously declined over recent decades and has been skewed in favour of support for 
export crops such as flowers. If we apply Sen’s entitlement theory, those involved in 
the production of non-edible crops are clearly more vulnerable to hunger than those 
growing edible ones. In terms of regional investment pastoralists in the livestock areas 
of the rift valley and Northern Kenya, for example, have not seen any investment. The 
result has been growing economic disparity between regions, reflected in the pattern 
of food insecurity in a current context. The peoples of Northern Kenya, for example, 
are more adversely affected by the present food crisis than the central region.263 
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Structural adjustment in Ethiopia 
As previously stated Ethiopia’s recent past is characterised partly by socialism, civil 
war, recurrence of drought, and economic mismanagement. Its economy is heavily 
dependent on agriculture, with 80% of its population living in rural areas being 
employed in the agriculture sector. The dynamics of population growth, low 
productivity, compounded with some of the aforementioned factors, have been 
perceived as major obstacles to economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Thus over the last two decades a series of economic reform programs have been 
introduced to facilitate Ethiopia’s transition from a command to a market oriented-
system. The stated intention of these reforms has been one of restoring 
macroeconomic stability and creating a favourable international business 
environment. Structural adjustment was the first of these reform programmes and was 
introduced in 1992. The SA programme was initially aimed at stabilising the economy 
and breaking with the order of central planning. The SA programme was extended in 
1996 to include the objectives of bringing a faster rate of growth of national income, 
lower inflation, increased openness, and improvement in investment. 
In 1999, the new orientation towards poverty reduction in Ethiopia was indicated by 
the introduction of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The PRGF 
became a new conditionality to receive loans from the IMF and a reference for other 
donors and creditors to support developing countries economies. The first PRGF in 
Ethiopia was approved in 2001 for about US$110 million (AFRODAD 2005).264 
Real GDP growth during the 1990’s and 2001/02-2004/05 averaged 5%. However, 
critically for this debate, the performance of agriculture was very poor during this 
period. The adjustment programs were intended to restore growth and efficiency and, 
most importantly, rationalise the role of the state. Public expenditure was strengthened 
and made to focus on building the human and physical capacity of the economy. 
Accordingly, key Sector Development Programs (SDPs), including education, health, 
road, and agricultural extension programmes were formulated and implemented. 
Resource allocation favouring vulnerable groups/regions was further reinforced and 
managing sector development programs were emphasised. Moreover, other policies, 
such as the National Policy of Ethiopian Women and the National Environment 
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Policy, were brought into focus by way of mainstreaming the concerns of women and 
environmental issues in the development process. While implementing SA, Ethiopia 
developed an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) in 2000 and 
launched the full-PRSP known as Ethiopia’s sustainable Development and Poverty 
reduction Program (SDPRP) in 2002 aimed at securing economic growth averaging 
7% a year in order to reduce poverty by half in 2015. In October 2005, the second 
phase of the PRSP process, a Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End 
Poverty (PASDEP), was put into action as a guiding strategic framework for the five-
year period 2005-2010. The PASDEP carried forward important strategic directions 
pursued under the SDPRP related to human development, rural development, food 
security, and capacity building but also embodied some important new directions 
including particular emphasis on greater commercialisation of agriculture and the 
private sector and a scaling-up of efforts to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goal.265 
Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Ethiopian economy. However, as the data 
already produced in this thesis shows, little progress has been made towards achieving 
the government’s objectives on agriculture and food security. With only minor 
exceptions, the same policy intentions were restated during each of the annual 
arrangements under the Fund-supported programs. The principal objective of the 
government's agricultural policy, since the start of the reform programme, was to 
ensure food security through increased production, employment and income, and to 
increase foreign exchange earnings through increased exports. Yet agricultural 
productivity remained broadly unchanged during the program period, production 
remained extremely vulnerable to recurring droughts, and food insecurity remained a 
critical problem (with around five million people requiring food aid, even in a 
"normal" year) (AFRODAD 2005). 
According to the Citizens Report Card (CRC)266 published by PANE (Poverty Action 
Network Ethiopia) 2005, roughly one fifth of the farmers included in the survey had 
had to borrow money for agriculture and related activities thus increasing their 
personal debt. It also indicates the negative impact due to the absence of formal 
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commercial support. More than half of the farmers included in the survey reported 
loss of crops and cattle and agricultural extension services scored the lowest rate of 
satisfaction in the sectors covered by the survey (it included social services such as 
education and health, roads, employment and labour markets). 
It is fair to say that the SA programmes have had a mixed result in Ethiopia. Poverty 
and social impact analysis (PSIA) was meant to provide information on the trade-offs 
among different policy options for achieving both growth and reducing poverty. It was 
also meant to assess the timing and sequencing of possible reforms, estimate the risks 
involved, and consider appropriate compensatory and complementary measures. 
However, PSIA is currently at its early stage in Ethiopia and, as such, as not been as 
effective in measuring the impact of SA and subsequent reforms in Ethiopia as it 
could have been. 
However, the research that has been conducted shows that structural adjustment 
programmes based on the classical economic theory that output, employment and 
prices (including wages, interest rates and exchange rates) are best determined by the 
free play of market forces have not delivered. Prices are not necessarily the most 
effective instruments for the efficient allocation of resources. In most of the 
developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, realities have proved the 
other way round. Countries adopting the structural adjustment programme have been 
compelled to move towards freer markets with out being in a position to take full 
advantages of available market opportunities. To this end, because of the low capacity 
to adjust their supply, programmed countries such as Ethiopia have largely failed to 
enjoy the expected results. Despite being able to prop up its export supply, in keeping 
with the framework of the SA programme, Ethiopia has been negatively affected by 
the significant fall in the price of coffee export prices. We will return to the issue of 
Ethiopia and its current plans for agricultural reforms in Chapter 7. 
Concluding comments 
There is no doubt that, at the time of publication, Sen’s micro-economic contribution 
to famine analysis was a vital one. Despite its shortcomings his early work moved the 
presumption of famine causation from production to distribution and consumption, 
and, specifically, placed household purchasing power at the centre of much 
subsequent research. In one sense Sen’s analysis succeeded in shifting the debate away 
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from mono-causal arguments about famine and showed that droughts and other 
extreme climatic events are neither necessary nor sufficient to cause famines. In 
addition, famines have occurred with and without FAD, with and without food grain 
prices rising, and with and without natural disasters. Most importantly, for the 
argument developed in this thesis, Sen’s empirical work can be used to illustrate the 
deficiencies of liberal economic theory and the shortcomings of extreme liberalisation. 
His focus on rights and entitlements lends weight to the central concept of Food 
Sovereignty and its potential as an alternative to the market –led model of agriculture. 
This chapter refutes the idea of neutrality in the economic sphere, and argues that the 
developed world, along with political elites in the developing world, benefits from the 
current economic system, which includes the global food system. Furthermore, the 
imposition of structural adjustment programmes has increased food insecurity in East 
Africa. By linking foreign economic policies with increased famine vulnerability this 
discussion can now move towards the question of responsibility, which a more benign 
economic theory (the trickle down approach) overlooks. 
It is clear that economic development is dependent on a supportive and development 
oriented government. Governments must not only invest in infrastructure projects that 
benefit the whole population, rather than the few, as have occurred in Kenya and 
Ethiopia, but they must, according to liberal economic theory create an environment 
that will attract private investment as well (Sachs 2005, Stiglitz 2006, Collier 2007). 
However the findings in this chapter fit very well with the concept of Food 
Sovereignty. Specifically, in terms of food security, the best hope for the Third World 
may not be in greater integration in the global food system, but greater independence 
from it. There are convincing arguments for the benefits of global free trade, but they 
do not take account of the negative impact of the instability of markets, the volatility 
of prices nor the centrality of food to human well-being. The conclusion reached in 
this chapter is that certain liberal economic policies have had a long lasting negative 
impact on famine vulnerability and demonstrate an over-reliance on market responses 
to, what is in essence, a political problem. 
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CHAPTER 5 – FROM FOOD AID TOWARDS FOOD 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Hungry men listen only to those who have a piece of bread. Food is a tool. It 
is a weapon in the US negotiating kit (Earl Butz, US Secretary of Agriculture, 
1971-76 cited in Patel 2007: 91). 
Food: A Basic Human Right – Everyone must have access to safe, nutritious 
and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to sustain a 
healthy life with full human dignity. Each nation should declare that access to 
food is a constitutional right and guarantee the development of the primary 
sector to ensure the concrete realization of this fundamental right (Principle 1 
of the Food Sovereignty framework). 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how food aid fits within a framework of 
Food Sovereignty in an African context. Specifically, food aid is analysed in terms of 
how it promotes or negates the concept of food as a basic human right. (Principle 1 of 
Food Sovereignty). It makes explicit the link between the evolution of food aid as 
compensation for economic reforms and the conditionalities attached to the adoption 
of free market principle discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter also seeks to 
make explicit the conceptual and empirical links between food aid and Food 
Sovereignty. This includes understanding the extent to which food aid undermines 
Food Sovereignty. This chapter explores food aid as a method of dealing with both 
persistent hunger and sudden catastrophic famine. Domestic food aid programmes 
within developed countries are not part of this discussion rather the focus is on 
international food aid such as flows of food or cash to purchase food from richer 
countries to poorer countries.267 Part 1 provides an overview of the different types of 
food aid and how this aid is classified, financed and delivered. Part 2 offers a brief 
history of food aid and illustrates how food aid has evolved over time within the 
context of the global food system (GFS). The discussion includes various donor 
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countries, such as Britain and the founder members of the EU, but its primary focus is 
on the United States for three important reasons.268 Firstly, the US has the longest 
history of food aid; secondly it has, at present, the greatest amount, both actual and 
potential, of food to dispose of; and lastly, it has been unique in its unwillingness to 
institute reforms that would promote long-term agricultural recovery and thus see the 
balance of benefit tip in favour of the recipient countries of US aid. This is a key 
variable in the potential obstacles to developing Food Sovereignty in an African 
context, as discussed in chapter 7. 
Part 3 supports the argument that despite some successes, especially the growth in 
cash transfers, food aid, if ill conceived, can in fact exacerbate famine vulnerability in 
the long run. Numerous elements, including the politicisation of aid, farm subsidies, 
donor conditionalities and unintended consequences such as recipient dependency, 
make it impossible not to question at least some of the current functions of food aid in 
the fight against famine. Part 4 offers a critique of various proposals for the reform of 
food aid organisation and delivery, thereby directing international responses to famine 
towards permanent prevention policies. This reorganisation of food aid will be 
considered through the framework of Food Sovereignty. It is argued that donor 
countries could overcome most food aid challenges if they were to prioritise the needs 
of the hungry, rather than national strategic or commercial interests. 
1. Defining food aid 
For many decades food aid has played a key role in the response to extreme hunger in 
both natural and man-made disasters. Interest in this subject, however, extends way 
beyond the realms of academia or those directly involved with its implementation. 
Civil society, indigenous peoples and new social movements, are the prime movers 
behind a newly emerging Food Sovereignty policy framework269 and food aid is an 
important factor within this concept. Food aid is an emotive issue emphasising the 
need to move beyond the myths and rhetoric that inform divided opinion on this issue 
and concentrate on the facts. A great deal has been written about food aid but the issue 
has been clouded by analyses that are either highly technical or decidedly polemical 
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(Barrett & Maxwell 2005).270 Food aid is a complex, often contradictory and highly 
contentious area of the famine debate, but this contention relates more to its functions 
and outcomes than its definition. In the context of the WTO negotiations on 
agriculture (1999) the FAO offered this general description: ‘Food aid is the provision 
of food commodities by one country to another, free of charge or under highly 
concessional terms, to assist the country in meeting its food needs’.271 
Shaw and Clay give a more detailed description, 
Food aid is aid supplied as food commodities on grant or concessional terms. 
It includes donations of food commodities by government, intergovernmental 
organisations (particularly the World Food Programme) and private voluntary 
or non governmental organisations; monetary grants tied to food purchases; 
and sales and loans of food commodities on credit terms with a repayment 
period of three years or more. It does not include the larger transactions in the 
‘grey area’ between aid and trade of export enhancement and subsidy 
programmes. (Shaw & Clay 1993 Ch 1: 1) 
It is, however, this ‘grey area’ that is crucial to this thesis both because of the central 
role attributed to structural adjustment programmes272 and the change in policy 
direction advocated by those who wish to reform the current food aid system to be 
more compatible with the Food Sovereignty framework. 
Types of food aid 
Although there are some superficial differences in the definitions found in the food aid 
literature there are three general categories that denote the most common types of food 
aid. 
The first type is Relief or Emergency food aid which is generally considered the most 
targeted type of food aid, in that it attempts to deliver to all those in need and exclude 
those not in need.273 Emergency aid is a response to sudden natural disasters, such as 
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the 2004 Asian Tsunami or 2008 Chinese Earthquake, or shortfalls in production due 
to drought, pest or disease as in Niger in 2005. It is also a response to manmade 
disasters such as war or civil strife; recent examples of delivery of emergency food aid 
include Angola, Ethiopia and the Sudan. Emergency food aid is almost always free 
and is provided both bilaterally and multilaterally with NGOs assuming a more 
prominent role in the last two decades. Since the 1980s, emergency food has taken up 
an increasing proportion of food aid and by 2005 it amounted to half the US food aid 
budget (IATP 2005).274 In 1991, 26% of global food aid deliveries went to 
emergencies; in 2005 it was 64% (Wahlberg 2008a: 3). This increase in emergency 
funds is partly because conflicts have resulted in millions of refugees and displaced 
persons existing in makeshift camps in protracted relief situations with examples in 
Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the Sudan. 
In response to the global food price crisis, in June 2008, the U.S. Congress provided 
$770 million to USAID as part of the President’s Food Security Response Initiative 
(PFSRI) for international disaster and development assistance to address the needs of 
food-insecure populations worldwide. Of the total, $590 million represented funding 
for emergency humanitarian programming through USAID Office for Foreign Disaster 
assistance (USAID/OFDA) and USAID Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), with 
remaining funding designated for development assistance through USAID Bureau of 
Sub-Saharan Africa (USAID/AFR) and Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and 
Trade (USAID/EGAT). Much of the tension in the debate centres on getting adequate 
levels of food deployed to the most needy places using funds that are meant for 
temporary situations not permanent ones. 
The second type of food aid is Project food aid. This type of aid is non-emergency and 
usually targeted at specific vulnerable groups. It aims to transfer income to the 
impoverished to satisfy their minimum nutritional needs in normal years. This type of 
food aid is provided on a grant basis for specific groups (normally, but not exclusively 
the rural poor) and for specific development objectives. The World Food Programme 
(WFP) is the major provider of this aid but other providers include international 
organisations, national governments and NGOs. Objectives of project food aid 
include: 
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• Improving the nutrition and health of mothers and pre-school children through 
local health care centres; 
• Increasing access to education through primary-school provision for children 
and training programmes for adults; 
• Increasing employment through food for work programmes, typically labour 
intensive infrastructure building and community developments; 
• Providing practical help to poor households during land resettlements or 
changes to systems of farming-supported market reforms and price 
stabilization, through mechanisms such as establishing (or in some instances 
re-establishing) food reserves. 
In theory, funds saved from governments’ budgets through this kind of aid are used to 
expand and improve other social services. Project food commodities are sold 
principally in three ways. Firstly, to designated beneficiaries, project workers or 
members of cooperatives, often at subsidised prices (organisations such as Oxfam, 
Action Aid and Save the Children fund (SCF) have led the way in these types of 
enterprises). Secondly, as part of a project: for example reconstituted milk produced 
with food aid commodities in dairy development schemes. Thirdly, some goods can be 
sold on the open market, and the money then used to purchase local materials for the 
food aid project thus generating more employment and higher incomes. This process 
is referred to as monetization. It is usually practiced by large US funded NGOs and is 
highly controversial. Monetization of project food aid increased from 10% in the late 
1980s to over 30% in less than two decades (FAO 2006). The FAO and many others 
have urged organisations to stop monetizing project food because of its distorting 
effects on local markets. 
The third type of food aid is Programme food aid. This category is provided as a grant 
or loan on so-called ‘soft repayment terms’ and, unlike the previous two categories, it 
does not target the most needy groups. The main aim is to bridge the gap between 
demand at existing income levels and the supply of domestic food products and 
commercial imports, thus reducing pressure on food prices or additional demands for 
imports. It is provided on a bi-lateral basis. In 2006 the largest participants were the 
US, the EU and Japan (Wahlberg 2008a) 
Programme food aid was designed, in theory, as a macroeconomic resource allowing 
recipient countries to increase development expenditures without inflation or balance 
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of payment problems. During periods of economic crisis or periods of structural 
adjustment, programme food aid (food always procured in the donor country) was 
designed to help protect development expenditures that would otherwise have to be 
cut. The fact that food is often sold below market price is deeply controversial and has 
had harmful long-term effects on food security. Although this type of aid is declining, 
it still provokes intense criticism, and the recommendation is that all non-targeted 
food aid, including programme aid, should be completely eliminated (FAO 2005).275 
In practice, it needs to be said that the distinction between project and programme aid 
has become increasingly blurred. Funds from programme food sales have been 
targeted for project type activities and project food aid may be used to support sector- 
wide programmes. What they have in common, however, is that they can both be 
perceived as in some way compensating for liberal economic policy failures.276 
Food aid from developing countries 
In addition to food aid from the developed to the developing world, there are also a 
variety of arrangements for the transfer of food produced in the developing countries: 
firstly, there are triangular transactions in which a donor buys food in one developing 
country for use as food aid in another developing country. Secondly, there are 
trilateral operations in which a donor commodity is exchanged for a different one in a 
developing country, which is then used for food aid in yet another developing country. 
Donors can also make local purchases in a developing country for use as food aid in 
that same country. Lastly, exchange arrangements can be made, involving swapping 
one commodity for another: for example, swapping wheat which is provided by a 
donor for use in an urban area, with a local commodity such as maize, which is then 
used as food aid. 
Traditionally these methods have provided a relatively small but growing proportion 
of food aid; this type of aid, however, is increasingly popular amongst many of those 
involved in the food aid business. Government safety-net programmes involving 
combinations of food distributions, cash transfers, school feeding programmes and 
nutritional supplements are increasingly understood as the most desirable and 
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effective protection (in the short-term) for food insecure populations.277 Though there 
are constraints on larger scale operations the attractions of this kind of aid are 
numerous. At the most basic level, this type of aid increases cost effectiveness and 
speeds up the delivery of aid when and where it is needed. In addition, it can stimulate 
agricultural production and trade in the developing world and has the advantage of 
being integrated in the structure of local markets, thus it benefits local economies. The 
universal call from those who farm in the developing world is to focus on aid and 
assistance to small and subsistence farmers enabling them to protect their food self 
sufficiency. In the case of pastoralists, for example, protection of fishing, pastoral and 
subsistence agriculture would support the most productive and sustainable food 
system. These longer-term goals are embedded within the framework of Food 
Sovereignty, with particular relevance to principle 4, which calls for the reorganisation 
of food trade.278 The reform of food aid policy must be considered as an essential 
factor in food trade reform. At a more profound level though, this type of aid could 
help change the widely held perception of developing countries, which still tends to be 
one of victimhood, with the developed world viewed as some sort of rescue service.279 
The key players in food aid 
The main institutions involved in the business of food aid differ in terms of their 
financing and preferred modes of operation, and attract more or less criticism. Though 
there is an abundance of agencies involved, the following five will serve for 
illustrative purposes. They have been highlighted because they are considered to be of 
major importance in the power relations of food provision (Mousseau 2005). The five 
agencies considered are: the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World 
Food Programme (WFP), the Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal 
(CSSD) the Food Aid Convention (FAC), and the Central Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF). 
The FAO is a specialised agency of the UN involved in international efforts to defeat 
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hunger in both the developed and the developing world. It was founded in 1945 and 
demonstrates in figures and policies the number of people suffering from hunger and 
malnutrition. The Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) is the FAO’s flagship 
initiative for achieving the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 
hungry in the world by 2015. In 1999 this figure stood at 800 million, thus the target 
was 400 million by 2015. However, this figure had increased to 852 million in 2006 
(SOFI 2006) with an estimate of 1.02 billion undernourished people worldwide, in 
2009 (SOFI 2009). This figure fell to 925 million in 2010 (SOFI 2010). The FAO’s 
strategic framework (2000-2015) outlined its ambition to develop a rights based 
approach to food security and build a food secure world for present and future 
generations.280 However noble, the obvious failure of this vision to deliver on food 
insecurity, demands a different approach and one that is being developed within the 
Food Sovereignty movement. 
The World Food Programme (WFP) is the world’s largest humanitarian agency and 
provides food, on average each year, to 92 million people in 75 different countries.281 
In 2011 it aims to distribute nearly 4 million metric tons of food to victims of natural 
disasters and economic failures. The WFP is the food aid branch of the UN. It was 
first conceived at the 1961 FAO conference and established in 1963 on an 
experimental basis. In 1965 the programme was extended indefinitely. WFP 
operations are funded by donations from world governments, corporations and private 
donors. 60% of all food aid from the WFP is from the US and this is all food aid in 
kind, which critics argue is a result of subsidised US agricultural surpluses. It is, 
therefore, viewed as the dumping of subsidised food aid in kind and is overly 
influenced by the US. The other 40% comes from funds that are often earmarked for 
specific countries or operations, so this means the WFP cannot easily direct funds to 
where they are most needed. Criticisms of the inefficiencies of the WFP have not gone 
entirely unheeded and some donors have a clear policy of making food aid effective 
without disturbing local agriculture and trade policies. This so-called untied food aid 
is usually in the form of cash and the EU has the most progressive policies with regard 
to food aid and the WFP at this time.282 According to the WFP they are scaling up their 
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use of cash transfers and vouchers and have begun using innovative ways to deliver 
assistance such as scratch cards or e-vouchers delivered by text.283 Pilot schemes of the 
‘cash for change’ programme of the WFP have demonstrated that cash transfers make 
more sense on many levels. Burkina Faso was the first full-scale food voucher 
operation in Africa and there are now between 30-40 in operation across the continent. 
Whilst acknowledging that these changes do not represent a ‘silver bullet’ able to 
resolve the structural causes of famine that are central to this thesis they have proved 
to be more cost efficient than traditional methods of food aid.284 
The Consultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Disposal (CSSD) and the Food Aid 
Convention (FAC) are the two key institutions that govern food aid at the international 
level. The CSSD was established in 1954 under the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) to monitor donors’ disposal of agricultural surpluses. 
Comprised of 41 member states, including donor and recipient countries, its role is to 
monitor the adherence to a set of Principles of Surplus Disposal, a code of conduct for 
food aid transactions. The CSSD’s primary function is to ensure that food aid does not 
encroach on commercial imports and local production in recipient countries. The 
CSSD is based in Washington D.C. rather than at the FAO Headquarters in Rome. Its 
location, its name and its focus on surplus disposal clearly reflect the concerns of 
competing food exporting countries around the use of food aid in an open economy 
rather than on hunger in recipient countries. Critics point to the fact that its main 
function is to avoid the displacement of commercial imports by food aid and thus it 
does not constitute an instrument favouring an adequate use of food aid to fight 
hunger (Mousseau 2005:8). 
The Food Aid Convention (FAC) was established in 1967 under the auspices of the 
International Grain Council to improve the predictability of food aid flows. The FAC 
aims at ensuring a minimum availability of quality food aid to satisfy emergency 
requirements and development in the developing countries. This aid should be 
available on the basis of need, irrespective of fluctuations in world food prices and 
supply. Importantly, the FAC contains clauses on best practices and aims to provide 
food aid only when it is the most effective and appropriate type of assistance. 
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Furthermore, it targets women and children as the most needy in terms of hunger, and 
it attempts to avoid harmful effects on local production and the eating habits of the 
recipients. In 1999 FAC ‘value commitments’ rather than ‘volume commitments’ 
were introduced and this favours both cash and triangulation transactions (See above 
section on types of food aid).285 Critics argue that the current level set for food aid 
donors is too low to be meaningful and the FAC has no enforcement capacity to hold 
signatories accountable to their commitments. It is also argued that membership 
should be extended to include new critical actors in the global food system. 
(Mousseau 2005:8) This is of increasing relevance in a post SA context when so many 
more people are now famine vulnerable because of the fluctuation in global food 
prices (FAO 2011). 
In 2005 the UN General Assembly created the Central Emergency Response Fund 
(CERF) as a response to the lack of funding, slow delivery and uneven distribution of 
resources of hunger emergency relief. CERF aims to speed up delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and to make funding less dependent on donor’s strategic interests, 
as countries cannot tie their contributions to specific programmes. It should, in theory, 
be able to respond on a basis of need and no other factor. Some NGOs, however, 
complain that it has in fact not provided additional funding but diverted money away 
from existing humanitarian commitments.286 Furthermore it has created another level 
of bureaucracy within the UN system that has slowed downed and complicated the 
process of emergency relief. Whilst acknowledging these criticisms, it is argued here 
that the CERF provides a framework for developing a more flexible and proactive 
approach to food aid and one that would fit more closely within a Food Sovereignty 
framework. 
2. A brief history of food aid 
The current food aid system is not new but it evolved, principally, throughout the 
twentieth century. There is, however, an earlier well documented example of food aid 
from the early nineteenth century. It occurred in 1812 when the US congress approved 
a budget of $50,000 worth of food to help victims of an earthquake in Venezuela. 
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Rather than an act of charity, however, this aid to Venezuela has been understood as 
‘an economic instrument in the service of a political goal’ (George 1991: 192). In 
other words, it was an act driven by self-interested not humanitarian motives. In this 
instance, the aid was given as an act of covert support for an indigenous uprising 
against colonial Spain (which happened to fail). 
The relevance of this early example is that this first congressional act can be perceived 
as setting a pattern that has continued ever since; that is the US tying its food aid 
policy to further its own political agenda and/or expansion of its own commercial 
markets.287 There is an abundance of research to support this assertion tracing the 
development of aid back to the First World War (Barrett & Maxwell 2005; Cathie 
1982). War provided the US with the opportunity to export its surplus grain since 
most European farmers were actively involved in fighting. Its original neutrality meant 
that the US was happy to supply to all sides and it successfully bypassed Britain’s 
objections by supplying Germany through Belgium. Because of Herbert Hoover's 
previous experience with Germany at the end of World War I, in 1946 President Harry 
S. Truman selected the former president to tour Germany to ascertain the food status 
of the occupied nation As a result of this tour post Second World War, Hoover’s relief 
efforts substantially increased and included a widespread school meals programme. 
This food aid no doubt relieved the distress of a great many who were suffering the 
effects of war and all its associated deprivations. However, Hoover himself admitted 
that while the overt interest was relief of famine, the administration was also 
concerned about the forces moving in the world, especially communism and the 
possible impact upon the US (Hoover 1952). Clearly, famine relief was inextricably 
linked to the preservation of one political ideology, capitalism, and protection from its 
opposite, communism. Enormous amounts of US grain surpluses continued to be 
shipped to Europe until 1954 when reconstruction was largely completed and Europe 
was once again a viable trading partner for the US. 
Economic reality, however, meant that that new markets for US surpluses needed to 
be found. Up until this time US policy had been to sell surplus food in return for gold 
or hard currency, and the cash receipts were then used partly to provide for the 
destitute. However most of the world’s currencies could not be considered ‘hard’, 
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hence a new policy emerged which exchanged food for local, non-convertible 
currencies, which were then deposited in a US bank account in the relevant country’s 
central bank. This was the catalyst for Public Law 480 (PL480, also known as the 
Food for Peace law) passed by Congress in 1954. Its stated purposes were clear and as 
we will see they are now the focus of a growing movement calling for reforms of US 
food aid (McMichael 2008: Ch 3). 
PL480 was quite specifically an act to increase the consumption of US agricultural 
products abroad, improve foreign relations and US influence and to expand and 
develop export markets for other US products. By 1959 there were four major sections 
or ‘titles’ of PL480: Title I provided for the sale of agricultural surplus to ‘friendly 
nations’ paid for in local currency. Title II concerned urgent famine relief and 
donations to ‘friendly nations’. The common perception is that this is the basis of 
most modern food aid, i.e. that it is a gift, with no strings attached, whereas this is not 
in fact the case. Title III concerned the exchange of strategic raw materials for food. In 
its early days this mainly involved raw materials for the US atomic industry, though 
latterly, in countries such as Iraq (prior to the 2003 invasion) it was used in exchange 
for oil. Title IV (added in 1959) concerned long-term food supply contracts between 
the US and recipients to be paid in dollars over a period of up to twenty years, with 
interest. 
What is crucial to understand is that by 1971, all Title I sales had been switched to 
title IV sales, that is to say they had to be paid for in US dollars. Title I, somewhat 
confusingly, is still the term used and the term Title IV sales no longer exists. The 
economic logic of such a switch is fairly obvious: as the US commercial export 
markets expanded, the disposal of surplus food, in order to maintain high prices 
domestically, was no longer the main priority as the recipient countries were actually 
buying food. Thus the US moved, very successfully, from aid to trade, to its own 
economic advantage. In other words entering into the ‘grey area’ referred to in the 
definition of Shaw and Clay mentioned in the previous section. 
According to a report entitled ‘Strategic Plan for 2006-2010’ from the Food for Peace 
Office (May 2005),288 the 1990 Farm Bill made enhancing food security in the 
developing world the overriding objective for the PL480 food assistance programmes. 
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The Title II programme, i.e. emergency relief, now represents the largest single 
resource of the US government available to focus on food insecurity internationally. 
As its title suggests the 91-page document laid out the strategic plan for 2006-2010 
outlining the background and the changes to PL480 since 1990 and its new strategic 
direction and objectives.289 It is a comprehensive and wide ranging document, focusing 
on a single strategic objective to reduce food insecurity in vulnerable populations. The 
aim is to continue to use Title II food resources to contribute to its vision of ‘a world 
free of hunger and poverty, where people live in dignity, peace and security’ (Strategic 
Plan for 2006-2010: 2). 
However, this noble vision of the Food for Peace office is, by no means, universally 
accepted. Indeed one such report published in July 2005 from the Minnesota based 
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)290 is severely critical of current US 
policy and the authors call for a major overhaul of food aid programmes. Indeed the 
report endorses what some critics have argued for many years; that some donors are 
greater beneficiaries of food aid than the supposed recipients (Curtis 2003; George 
1996; Keen 1994a; McMichael 2008). 
Who benefits? Some motivations behind food aid 
The food aid debate has, traditionally, been understood in terms of a combination of 
the political and economic self-interest of governments, with a sprinkling of 
humanitarian goodwill gestures by individuals through charities and NGOs. A more 
recent perspective, gaining academic recognition, is the view that international 
security is the new rationale for food aid (Klare 2002). This indicates that, quite apart 
from humanitarian considerations, there are compelling strategic reasons, (oil, Islam 
and terrorism, for example) for preventing countries in Asia, the Middle-East and 
Africa from slipping into further poverty and conflict. This new security paradigm is 
perhaps most relevant to Kenya and Ethiopia as both countries are widely 
acknowledged as being important allies in the Western countries ‘War on Terror’. The 
implications that this policy context may have for the viability of developing a Food 
Sovereignty framework in these countries is an interesting and relevant one and will 
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be considered in the final chapter. In order to assess the relevance of this new security 
paradigm a brief elucidation of the three traditional motivating factors is helpful. 
Motivating factors have had a clear impact on the political analysis of food aid to date, 
in particular in the way some of these factors have supported food aid policies that do 
not advantage small-scale farmers or meet local needs. There has, however, over the 
last decade, been a fundamental development in aid programming which has seen a 
shift from food aid and “safety nets” to cash transfers and “social protection” 
(Devereuex 2009). This dramatic shift in emphasis will be discussed further on in this 
chapter. 
Economic self-interest 
From the 1970s onwards the vast majority of critical food aid literature cites economic 
self-interest as the primary objective of food aid and is manifested in two general 
ways. Firstly, there is the surplus disposal function, which both reduces storage costs 
and increases home market prices by removing stock that would have a depressing 
effect. Secondly, food aid has been shown to have long-term positive effects for 
commercial exports, because donated food can bring about a change in the tastes of 
recipients and thus opens up potential markets (Cathie 1989). The well-documented 
changes in diets in Southeast Asian countries such as South Korea, Thailand and the 
Philippines support this position, but it is less obvious in an African context. 
Politicians and policy makers regularly stress the effectiveness of the market creating 
function of food aid, hence food aid is often given a high priority by farmers’ unions 
and lobbyists and the ministries of agriculture in the donor States. Indeed Ronald 
Reagan on the anniversary of 40 years of PL480 stated that 
Eight of our top ten agricultural markets are former recipients of Food for 
Peace Aid…And this has not only been good for the American farmer and the 
American economy; it’s been good for our international relations (cited in 
Uvin, 1994: 297). 
Critics are quick to point out, however, the uneven effect of this kind of self-interested 
policy making. It has been calculated that for every dollar of aid given to one group of 
developing countries by the EU and the US, $2.75 of economic damage is done to 
others in the developing world (Benn 2004). For example the EU gave Mozambique 
£136 million in aid in 2004, which is far less than Mozambique could have made 
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through sugar production, if the EU reformed subsidies and opened its markets, fully, 
to developing countries.291 This structural inequity in the global food system is one of 
the key areas that the adoption of a Food Sovereignty framework would address, in 
part, through the principle of reorganising food trade.292 
Political self-interest (or the Kissinger doctrine) 
Historically, political self-interest is generally considered to be the second most 
important motive behind food aid and it can be used as both reward and punishment to 
induce recipient countries to comply with the foreign policy objectives of the donor 
country. Evidence for a political motivation over recent decades is fairly clear; at the 
end of the 1960s Vietnam, South Korea, Cambodia and Taiwan were the major 
recipients of US food aid, leading to many cynics referring to PL480 as ‘food for war’, 
rather than ‘food for peace’. Tensions caused by the Cold War and high oil prices 
during the 1970s resulted in much talk about ‘food power’ amongst policy makers in 
the US (George 1991). Thus, just as the Ministries of Agriculture are perceived to be 
pursuing the economic self-interest of the donors, the Foreign Ministries, through the 
promotion of food aid, are pursuing their political self-interest. Historically, the 
greatest recipients of aid were those with political regimes that were approved of by 
the donors. Changes in international aid to Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, over recent 
decades, are a more contemporary illustration of this politicisation of aid (Wallerstein 
2007). Food aid to support friendly countries during the Cold War was generally part 
of a larger package of assistance including direct financial assistance and other forms 
of aid, notably military aid, aimed at strengthening friendly governments. Somalia and 
Ethiopia, for example, have at varying times been on the receiving end of aid from 
both the US and the former USSR, with the super-powers switching support from one 
country to the other as the political climate changed. Since the elimination of the 
Eastern Block, the use of food aid in US foreign policy has evolved in certain 
countries. It is now more geared towards shorter-term objectives, for example, as a 
bargaining tool in negotiations as in the case of North Korea, or as a temporary 
support of political or military objectives in the ‘war against terror’ (Mousseau 2005). 
US support for the 2007 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia under President Zenawi is 
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illustrative here (Wallerstein 2007). The Ethiopian regime, certainly at present, is 
considered a key ally in the ‘war on terror’ whereas the failing and splintered political 
regime in Somalia is not. However, this is not set in stone and policy can change 
according to the changing political environment. . The political use of food aid has 
thus shifted in an interesting way. Formerly, food aid was provided as direct economic 
support to the governments of friendly states. It is now provided with new objectives 
to potentially ‘unfriendly’ countries or ‘rogue states,’ under the control of WFP and 
NGOs.293 
Humanitarianism 
Generally speaking, humanitarianism is the third preference in food aid donation, and 
one seen by most analysts as secondary in relation to the above realist or self-
interested motives. Public support for food aid is demonstrated both by responses to 
emergency appeals (Live Aid in 1984 and Live 8 in 2006, for example) and, at a 
policy making level, through governmental development departments and the 
numerous NGOs such as AAH, Oxfam, CAFOD, Care, Save the Children, and War 
on Want, which function both as active charities and effective lobby groups. Most 
importantly, from a political analysis, those driven by a humanitarian agenda have 
been portrayed in the past as the least powerful group (George 1996). This lack of 
political power is endorsed by Gallagher (2011) who argues that the Ethiopian 
famines of the 1980s attracted huge public sympathy but did not generate any real 
interest at state level. Wars and famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and Angola, for 
example, did nothing to change a realist approach to food aid policy. From a more 
radical perspective the perceived decline of state and national power over food issues 
have led to the voluntary ceding of governmental sovereignty and an increase in the 
power of MNCs and NGOs (Chandler 2006). The extent of food insecurity in the 
world legitimates NGOs’ calls for more food aid and increased support of their 
efforts. Their actions undoubtedly create positive results in the short term by 
providing immediate assistance to the most poor and the hungry. But NGO requests 
for more aid deepen the political role they play as an alternative to government 
involvement in the poorest countries. NGOs also ignore that the fight against food 
insecurity cannot be won by their actions alone. Success will also require fundamental 
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policy shifts, which to date, is only seriously advocated by members of the Food 
Sovereignty network. . This fundamental change in the role and remit of NGOs forms 
the basis of the following, nascent, perspective on the new motivating factors that 
drive food aid policy. 
Food aid and security: the new paradigm? 
This recent perspective on food aid, though also based on a notion of self-interest, is 
self-interest motivated by concerns for national security rather than boosting national 
economies or supporting a political ideology in the traditional sense of capitalism 
versus communism. It has been argued, for example, that the US has responded more 
favourably to food crises in Ethiopia than the Sudan, in the last few years because, 
strategically, US policy makers believe that Ethiopia is a more important ally in the 
‘war on terrorism’. Recent research indicates that vital strategic interests of donor 
countries are of paramount importance in determining their levels of response (Olsen 
et al 2003). From this standpoint NGOs, UN agencies and private companies are 
perceived as a new locus of power and authority, through which metropolitan states 
can assert their political influence (Duffield 2001). Documented changes in 
governance in what Duffield refers to as the ‘border lands’, defined as weak and 
contested states, are of great importance for a political analysis not least because of 
how they impact on the possibilities for democratisation. Indeed, how these changes 
are impacting on development within these states is important in general terms but 
within this discussion it is most important with regards to food insecurity and the 
democratic control of food systems. Of particular interest is the view that aid has 
evolved from being a quick fix, to having the appearance of permanence. Indeed one 
could argue that the complexity of modern famines and the deep-seated nature of the 
problems encountered have resulted in a growing tendency amongst international 
agencies to develop indefinite programmes (Chandler 2005). This relationship 
between security and the future of food provision is an important and powerful one, 
reflected in the growing discourse on networks of international aid and notions of 
global governance (Duffield 2001; Kaplan 2003).294 
However, this view of food aid, as a coalition of economic and foreign policy interests 
in the donor countries, aided and abetted by NGOs, is not universally accepted. The 
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different accounts of donor motivation illustrate, very clearly, how politicised this 
debate has become. It is fair to say that much of the criticism of food aid does not take 
into account the changes that have been made in recent years. Indeed almost two 
decades ago Peter Uvin argued against the ‘classical interpretation’ of political and 
economic self-interest of food aid because he believed both assumptions to be 
incomplete and counter-factual. He argued that food aid fulfils no surplus disposal 
function because the quantities donated are too small, between 5-10% of donating 
countries’ stock, and the costs are too high to have a significant effect on export 
stocks or budgets (Uvin 1994: 135). This change is mainly due to an increasing share 
of food aid now being given in the form of triangular aid, whereby food is acquired 
from another developing country and shipped to the beneficiary country, or local 
purchases where the donor acquires food commodities in the benefiting country itself. 
This practice is in fact very costly and thus casts some doubt, at least, on the purely 
self-interested elements of donor motives (Clay & Benson, 1991). According to the 
WFP, a growing proportion of food aid is now coming from developing and middle 
income countries and the WFP is actively encouraging this phenomenon.295 It may well 
be the case that the surplus disposal function held true in the first fifteen years of 
massive US food aid when it accounted for up to 25% of its agricultural exports. The 
same could be said in the early years of the EU when it was donating large surpluses 
of dairy produce. As mentioned earlier, however, fundamental developments in aid 
programming and the move from food aid and safety nets towards cash transfers and 
social protection indicates that this function is no longer the motivation behind food 
aid that it once was. 
Therefore whilst acknowledging that there is cooperation between US policy makers 
and private companies, particularly TNCs, to use food aid for the advantage of the 
latter, it is important that things should be kept in perspective and a balanced analysis 
of food aid pursued. As all political scientists know, any policy, whatever its raison 
d’être, is likely to be influenced by interest groups in an attempt to further their own 
perceived interests.296 What is crucial is the need for all parties involved in food aid to 
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identify which aspects of food aid are achieving the desired outcomes, because some 
clearly are,297 and which aspects are in need of major reforms. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the shift from a dominant paradigm of food security to one of Food 
Sovereignty could be the most appropriate vehicle for these reforms. 
The changing food aid regime. 
In the chief example of US food aid, referred to in this discussion, food aid was 
originally based on US preferences dominant at the time and these were clearly 
preferences of a commercial and foreign policy nature. It has been described as a 
marriage of convenience between food surpluses and foreign policy considerations, 
enshrined in 1954 by the PL480 (Cathie 1989: 19). However, international food policy 
has changed significantly over the last two decades and there is a broad consensus that 
it has become more developmental in nature. For example, the authors of the MDGs 
explicitly recognised the interdependence between hunger, poverty reduction, growth 
and long-term sustainable development. Furthermore, emphasis is now also on the 
concept that development (in a Western liberal context) is dependent on democratic 
governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights and security. Arguably food aid, 
now more than ever before, is viewed as an important element in a strategy of world 
security while the smaller but most visible part, emergency aid, has become more 
humanitarian in its nature.298 
This recent period could be considered a watershed in the history of food aid, and the 
evolution of a new model on which aid was based. Rather than aid being a convenient 
method of surplus disposal dominated by the US, as it had been at an earlier stage, an 
emerging consensus developed which recognised the need for forward planning of, 
and increased multilateral sharing of, total global food aid (Clay and Singer 1985; 
Shaw & Clay 1993; Riddell 2007).299 
This divergence between the dominant explanation of self-interest and the 
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contemporary food aid outcome can be partially explained by the fact that much of the 
influential literature was based on the position of the US before 1975. This is certainly 
true of one of the most influential books for development scholars, Susan George’s 
How the Other Half Dies first published in 1976. It has been argued that, until fairly 
recently, developments since this time have not been sufficiently analysed by political 
economists (Barrett & Maxwell 2005; Uvin 1996). This lack of analysis may well 
reflect the domination of a realist perspective in international relations or public 
choice theory in political science. A realist perspective accepts, without question, that 
self-interest is the driving force behind all state behaviour. Thus any other motive has, 
by and large, been dismissed or simply not pursued with sufficient rigour. 
The landscape, however, has changed and multilateral institutions, norms and 
procedures increasingly govern food aid. Certainly, on the face of it, the objectives of 
donor countries have changed from foreign policy interests to 
development/humanitarian preferences. This can be illustrated by the fact that 85% of 
food aid now goes to  Sub-Saharan Africa, where needs are high and donors’ 
economic interests are relatively low (SOFI 2005). What is infinitely more important 
than a philosophical debate on donor motivation is whether these changes in food aid 
policy have been effective in reducing the number of people affected by hunger. 
Empirically the answer is a definitive ‘no’ and it is for this reason that an alternative 
framework of food provision is imperative. 
To understand why famine vulnerability is increasing, and to direct policy towards a 
more successful outcome, two areas of contention are relevant: firstly the criticisms of 
U.S Food Aid in a contemporary context must be fully understood; and secondly, in 
what ways, specifically, can food aid actually do more harm than good. The question 
of whether food aid increases vulnerability to famine is a serious and important one; 
not least because of the way food aid could or should fit into a Food Sovereignty 
paradigm. These two areas of contention are considered in the next section of this 
chapter. 
3. How food aid increases vulnerability to famine 
Thirty years after Susan George first published How the Other Half Dies, her analysis 
is endorsed by some contemporary research. George claimed that the main 
beneficiaries of the US food aid system were: agribusiness companies bidding on food 
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aid contracts; US shipping companies transporting the food internationally; and 
private voluntary organisations (PVOs as they are called in the US) relying on the 
sales of food aid in developing countries to generate funds for other work (Barrett & 
Maxwell 2005; Murphy & McAfee 2005; Patel 2007).300 This tripartite system is 
referred to as an ‘iron triangle’ because of the perceived stranglehold it has on food 
aid reform and from its critics’ perspective it has hijacked the entire US system of 
food aid.301 
Empirically, it is difficult to disagree with the claim that the US practice of sending 
food for resale or distribution in countries facing hunger is inefficient, expensive and 
slow, not least because fifty cents of every dollar allocated by the US government is 
not spent on food but on getting the food to developing countries. Furthermore, these 
transactions occur mostly with a delay of five months (Murphy & McAfee 2005: 
10/31). It seems evident, therefore, that the US, in keeping with almost all other major 
food aid donors, should move towards aid programmes based on cash, which can then 
be used to buy food produced locally, The US has been heavily criticised by other 
countries within the WTO for the continuation of practices, which most others have 
abandoned.302 Reform of the monetization of food aid, which generates development 
dollars for PVOs, but at enormous expense to the detriment of local producers and 
traders, should be made a priority. The 2008 farm bill included a provision to use $25 
million as a pilot project for local and regional purchase. But this is only about 1 
percent of the U.S. food aid budget, far less than what is needed to demonstrably 
improve the efficiency of food aid. In addition, export credits provided to US 
agribusinesses result in the continuation food dumping (selling food overseas for less 
than the cost of production) albeit on a lesser scale than in the past. The ongoing result 
is a subsidised sale that creates unfair competition for local farmers and commercial 
traders.303 
The EU proposed at the WTO in Hong Kong in December 2005 that all food aid 
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should be cash based and untied from requests that originate from the donor country. 
However, large donors of in-kind food, notably the US, disagreed. Indeed currently 
fifty percent of all US food aid is still tied (World Hunger Report 2011).304 The politics 
of US food aid, particularly successive administrations’ reluctance to reform aid in 
line with internationally recognised best practices, relates to who benefits from the 
existing global food system.305 Although their goals and methods differ greatly, the 
three interest groups mentioned above cooperate to perpetuate food aid programmes 
and use the same ‘myths’ to rationalise current food aid policy (Barrett & Maxwell 
2005). 
In the US, agribusiness companies bid on food aid contracts offered by the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), Farm Service Agency (FSA), and US law 
requires that a minimum of 75% of US food aid be sourced, fortified, processed and 
packaged in the US.306 There are only a few firms allowed to bid on the procurement 
contracts and the arena is dominated by a very few, large corporations. This is 
illustrated by the fact that in 2003 one third of all US food aid shipments were 
awarded to just two companies, Cargill and Archer-Daniels Midland (ADM). 
Agribusiness in the US is tightly concentrated: three companies (Cargill, ADM and 
Zen Noh) export over 80% of US corn and 60% of US soybeans; three firms (Cargill, 
ADM and Conagra) virtually monopolise flour milling; three firms, (Bunge, Cargill 
and ADM) operate 71% of the US soybean crushing business; and three firms 
(Cargill, ADM and Cenex Harvest States) dominate the export facilities crucial to the 
shipping out of grain. The vested interests that these major players have in the 
continuation of current US food aid policy are self-evident (Murphy & McAfee 2005). 
The second group, and perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of the food aid status quo, 
are the shipping companies as US law states that ships bearing the US flag must 
transport 75% of all food aid. This percentage was increased from 50% in the 1985 
farm legislation, most tellingly, against the wishes of USDA, USAID and many farm 
groups. During the period 2000-2002, nearly 40% of total food aid program costs were 
paid to US shipping companies (Barrett & Maxwell 2005: 248). This statistic becomes 
more meaningful if one takes into account that during 1999-2000 US bulk carriers 
                                                          
304
 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/92495/icode/ Accessed 10/08/11. 
305
 See Chapter 2. 
306
 Statistics are all taken from the IATP report 2005 unless otherwise indicated. 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 5 
From Food Aid towards Food Sovereignty 
 Page 168 
 
cost 77.7% more than foreign bulk carriers, transporting the same commodities over 
the same routes (Ibid 2005: 95). 
The PVOs make up the third component of the ‘iron triangle’ and there are eight main 
players in the field: these are the Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
International; Africare; CARE; Catholic Relief Services (CRS); Food for the Hungry 
International; Project Concern International; Technoserve; and World Vision. 
Together these eight NGOs had almost $1.5 billion in gross revenues in 2001, and 
three of them (CARE, World Vision and CRS) account for almost four fifths of this 
total. It has been calculated that food aid was worth an average 30% of these 
organisations’ gross revenues in 2001 (Ibid 2005: 87). 
It must be said that the PVOs’ interest in protecting the status quo, is both less 
obvious than both that of agribusiness and shipping, and even seems counter-intuitive. 
After all, the credibility of PVOs is to a great extent based on the perception that they, 
unlike governments, deliver help directly to those in need, and they do so whilst 
keeping operational costs to a minimum. Agencies pride themselves on the fact that 
they make a real difference to those leading impoverished lives, and are publicly 
committed to the eradication of hunger and poverty. This therefore makes their active 
lobbying to preserve the food aid status quo much more difficult to explain and justify 
than the other private companies whose raison d’être is to maximise profits rather than 
eradicate world hunger. 
The ‘catch 22’ for these voluntary organisations may be their dependence on 
monetization, the relatively new, but rapidly expanding feature of project food aid.307 
Originally, limited monetization was allowed to enable NGOs to recoup the costs 
associated with food aid, transportation, storage and suchlike. Since 1990, however, 
monetization has become an increasingly important source of revenue for PVOs’ 
funding of their long-term development work. It must be emphasised here that this 
problem is uniquely American, since other aid donor governments provide much of 
their food aid in the form of cash aid in the first place. Non-American NGOs, 
therefore, do not have the same need to sell food aid simply to cover their costs. 
Consequently, PVOs do have an incentive to lobby for the status quo in US food aid. 
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Firstly, large sums of money are involved relative to NGO revenue from non-food aid 
sources. Secondly, food aid shipments can generate relatively large sums of money for 
relatively small administrative costs. Perhaps, most pertinently, the underlying motive 
is the fear that if the politically powerful players such as the agribusinesses and 
shipping companies lose their lucrative stake in the system, then perhaps US food aid 
will cease to exist at all (Wahlberg 2008a). Since the US contributes roughly 65% of 
the global total of food aid, the issue of how it conducts its business really does have 
an impact on the hungry (Murphy and McAfee 2005). It is imperative, therefore, that 
the US must cease spending vast amounts of money on an expensive, inefficient and 
often damaging type of food aid. From a utilitarian perspective, the US system of food 
aid would be easy to reform, without incurring huge costs to anyone but resulting in 
far greater benefits to those most in need.308 
The key question for this thesis is in what ways food insecurity can be overcome by 
adopting a framework of Food Sovereignty? Food Sovereignty would enable current 
recipient countries of food aid to become more self sufficient in matters relating to 
agricultural production, income generation, infrastructure, access to markets and so 
on. What remains important in food aid analysis is the recognition of the differences 
between the single project approach and a composite or holistic approach. The former 
has been likened to applying cream to a spot without asking what caused the spot in 
the first place (Singer, Wood & Jennings, 1987: 174), while the latter involves 
utilising a number of food aid tools that are applied collectively to the overall problem 
of powerlessness, poverty and malnutrition (Lautze & Maxwell 2007). 
 
The unintended consequences 
The unintended consequences of food aid have been identified in a variety of forms 
and have been understood for some time. Perhaps the most widely recognised, and 
therefore publicised, is the way in which ill-conceived food aid can adversely affect 
local markets and producers, rendering them unable to compete and totally dependent 
on food aid. Secondly, there is the issue of political corruption and the diverting of 
resources into offshore bank accounts rather than to the designated recipients (Collier 
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2007, Wrong 2009). Thirdly, and increasingly recognised over recent decades, is the 
negative and political role food aid can play in conflict and post-conflict situations. 
Countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo have all provided recent examples. As discussed in Chapter 6, during the 
1980s conflicts the Ethiopian government used the promise of food aid to encourage 
peasants from rebel held areas to cross military lines and enter towns under 
government control (Clay and Holcombe 1985). The subsequent, forced, resettlement 
programmes were presented to the international community as a means of responding 
to the famine in the North. Many Tigrayans, however, viewed it as political and a 
military operation aimed specifically at depopulating the countryside in order to 
weaken the support for the TPLF (REST 1985). 
The acts of the central Ethiopian Government were also influencing the strategic use 
of international relief. For example, it refused to guarantee safe passage of relief 
supplies to Tigray despite appeals from the UN and the ICRC. Such an agreement 
would have allowed relief transports to travel from towns across military lines to the 
worst affected rural areas. The Government’s refusal, however, avoided giving de 
facto recognition of the TPLF’s control of large parts of the countryside (Jansson et al 
1987). Instead, people from TPLF areas were expected to enter the government towns 
to receive dry ration distributions. As mentioned, however, fear and harassment from 
government soldiers effectively discouraged this option, allowing the government to 
deny food aid to rebel areas by restricting the geographic scope of the relief 
programme. Thus the case of Tigray offers a classic example of a government’s ability 
to control the flow of aid resources. 
Furthermore, empirical research by Collier and Hoeffler suggests that large amounts 
of aid, including food aid, increase the likelihood of coups in poorly governed 
countries (Collier 2007: 123). Even if the military does not mount a coup d’état, 
governments still increase their military budgets pre-emptively, and some of these 
funds come from aid. In other words ill-conceived or miss-directed aid can sustain or 
encourage undemocratic forms of government. As noted by Mousseau (2005) the loss 
of sovereignty over food and agriculture implies a democratic deficit, as citizens are 
not given a voice in the determination of the policies affecting their lives and their 
future. There are also serious issues of accountability: relief and development agencies 
are only accountable to their donors, and not to the beneficiaries of their interventions. 
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When governments hand over the responsibility for food and agriculture to foreign 
bodies, they cannot be held responsible for what the international organisations do or 
do not accomplish. Thus attempts to restructure and redirect food aid have been taking 
place for some time and useful lessons have been drawn, some of which are discussed 
in the next section. 
The move from dependency to independence. 
One of the most enduring criticisms of food aid, from across the political spectrum, is 
that it creates dependency, trapping the recipient country in a number of ways with no 
realistic chance of them ever gaining food self-sufficiency. This can affect the country 
as a whole, or particular vulnerable communities in certain regions. Food aid 
dependency acts as a disincentive to agricultural production; as a break on 
development; and discourages governments from investing in the necessary structural 
reforms. In the long term, dependency can lead to a distortion of both traditional tastes 
and food preparations and even to certain ways of life; that of nomadic groups or 
pastoralists for example. This is certainly in evidence in Northern Kenya particularly 
in the Turkana region. Activists from within the Turkana community argue that while 
emergency aid is needed in some parts of Kenya in a current context (2011) solutions 
that will allow the Turkana to better cope with recurrent drought are infinitely more 
desirable. Boreholes and irrigation projects, for example, which take into account the 
livelihoods and rights of pastoralists lend much needed support to these communities. 
Enlightened and inclusive resource management can help pave the way for sustainable 
development, without creating communities of total dependency.309 
Long-term dependency on food aid in kind, sold in local markets, presents different 
kinds of problems that lead to a downward spiral in a country’s fortunes. National 
prices collapse, local food production falls and incentives to improve local 
infrastructures are disrupted. Also, food in kind takes a long time to arrive (anything 
between 3-6 months) and often food aid becomes available just as local producers are 
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able to reap the current seasons harvest. 310 For instance, in southern Africa, several 
countries affected by a failed harvest in spring 2002 were forced to ban relief food 
distributions one year later when NGOs were still distributing food at the time of the 
following harvest, i.e. depressing local prices at a time local food was again available. 
Logistical constraints had seriously delayed the procurement of food by NGOs and 
WFP and large quantities of food were still undistributed in April 2003, when the 
intervention was scheduled to end (Mousseau 2005). This means that food aid was 
competing with local food after a period of severe hunger, inflicting price collapses on 
local produce. Local producers suffer, falling further back into poverty and long-term 
dependency on food aid. In addition, aid competes with exports in providing much-
needed foreign exchange and from a pro-free market perspective this worsens the very 
problem that the least developed countries need to put right. That is the creation of 
new, competitive, export activities. A study conducted by the Centre for Global 
Development, showed that aid had a zero effect on growth once it reached 8% of a 
recipient country’s GDP, and after that it had a negative effect on growth (Easterly 
2006: 44). This is potentially disastrous as there were already twenty-seven countries 
above this level in 2006, and if donors adopt the ‘big push’ proposals virtually all low- 
income countries will be above that level (ibid). These negative impacts of aid have 
directed the arguments for a rejection of the large-scale, top-down intervention that 
has dominated Western development aid for the last five decades. The alternative 
framework of Food Sovereignty promotes a series of smaller scale, localised 
interventions that may be subjected to rigorous evaluation (Riddell 2007). 
It is important to realise that the functioning of food aid is not as clear-cut as the 
dependency proposition implies. Early research demonstrated that food aid could, but 
need not create relations of dependency (Singer, Wood & Jennings 1987).311 
Comparison between food aid projects in refugee camps in Angola and Somalia 
demonstrated that it is not food aid, per se, that creates dependency, but rather the 
socio-economic constraints under which recipients have to operate.312 Although this 
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research was conducted in semi-permanent refugee camps, the findings could be 
scaled up to larger communities or indeed countries to demonstrate the importance of 
factors such as political context or land ownership. 
Therefore, understanding food aid dependency in camps set up for refugees and 
displaced persons can be crucial in effectively directing reforms on a larger scale. It 
has often been said that these camps become victims of their own success inasmuch as 
combined food aid projects can actually turn the camps into safer, more sanitised and 
productive places to live in than the surrounding villages or towns.313 Thus, phasing 
out of food aid becomes impossible and, in fact, demand for it grows. The Ugandan 
member of the Food Trade and Nutrition (FTN) coalition summed up this 
phenomenon in his statement at the World Food Day 2004:‘Food Aid is a necessary 
evil: it should only be given for short periods to overcome disasters’ (FTN coalition 
and Wemos April 2005: 5/31). He was referring to the situation in Northern Uganda 
where people have lived in refugee camps for more than eighteen years, dependent on 
food aid, without education and without the possibility of developing their own 
country and livelihoods. Quite clearly these life chances have been denied to a whole 
generation, albeit as an unintended consequence of food aid. 
From a political perspective, however, this situation cannot be understood in 
simplistic terms as the failure of a food aid system that creates dependency, but must 
also be understood as a failure of national governments to deal with the internal or 
external political problems that caused the influx of refugees in the first place. 
Although those involved in the delivery of aid are often loath to criticise national 
governments, for fairly obvious reasons, the failure of government policies to protect 
their own people needs to be addressed. The Sudan currently provides a tragic but 
classic example of this phenomenon, with millions either internally or externally 
displaced (Nilsson 2001). It is in this area that there is perhaps the greatest scope for 
national governments to be held accountable and the issue of political responsibility 
emphasised.314 
In addition, the changing natures of international agencies, during recent years, may be 
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seen as a desire to avoid accusations of paternalism and to work with, rather than on 
behalf of, those in need. This shift can be captured in what Anderson refers to as ‘the 
serial re-naming, over the past decade and a half, of the people for whom aid is 
intended, beginning with ‘victims’, then ‘recipients’, then ‘beneficiaries’, then 
‘counterparts’, and now with ‘participants’, or sometimes, ‘clients’ (Anderson 2001: 
292). Increasingly aid programmes are designed (at least in theory) to encourage local 
participation and build local capacity through all stages, from planning, delivery and 
the evaluation of aid. This is undoubtedly a desirable change in direction and one that 
could be reinforced by a strengthened commitment from international players such as 
the FAC, for example.315 Although at present, the FAC has no enforcement capacity to 
hold signatories accountable to their commitments, it could be given that capacity, and 
membership could also be extended to include new critical actors in the global food 
system (Mousseau 2005). This is a key area where actors can be identified and their 
duties clearly specified, and where possible, legally enforced through an international 
court. This of course demands a reform of constitutional rights with regard to food and 
is an issue central to a Food Sovereignty framework. 
From disincentives to incentives. 
Recent developments in approaches to food aid have also identified how food aid can 
act as a disincentive, not just for local producers but also for national governments in 
recipient countries. In numerous cases food aid has been used to maintain the status 
quo and thus remove the challenge for governments to address the structural problems 
that may have caused the need for food aid in the first place. For instance, a 
government may be well aware that certain structural reforms are necessary to remedy 
certain food shortages or inequitable access to food, through land reform, for example. 
They may be, however, reluctant to take the necessary steps to rectify the situation, 
because it would be unpalatable to certain sections of the community, perhaps those 
on whose support the government depends. Thus food aid becomes a means of 
avoiding difficult decision-making, whilst at the same time ensuring that there is no 
public discontent, such as riots, due to food shortages. This is especially relevant in 
urban areas and it has been noted that a food aid dominated international response is 
often just enough to prevent regime change (Charlton 1997). This situation highlights 
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the need for an increase in democratic control of food and most importantly agrarian 
reform, which is the second principle of Food Sovereignty.316 
On a practical and institutional level it has been noted that a dependence on aid 
reduces a governments need to obtain revenue via taxation from its own population 
(Collier 2007; Sachs 2005). This prevents a serious obstacle to one of the key criteria 
of democracy, that of accountability. Governments that do not rely on their people for 
much of their funding can more easily renege on fulfilling their duties to provide for 
them. Somalia with its powerless central government that has existed on paper since 
2004 offers a contemporary example here. Ways of decreasing both national and 
international obstacles to the process of democratisation are central to the Food 
Sovereignty basic principles and the seventh principle calls explicitly for democratic 
control of agricultural policies at all levels. 
What is of great importance in the ongoing debate about the disincentives of food aid 
is that it increases awareness, amongst donors and recipients alike, of the need to 
avoid undesirable effects. The problems and limitations of aid can at least be exposed, 
and once understood, policies can be improved. The recent evidence that the growth 
of triangular aid directly supports farming in the developing world is one such policy 
area, which can be emphasised and expanded. The move towards cash transfers too, as 
a more effective and enabling policy development is to be welcomed and more fully 
adopted. For example the Productive Safety Net Programme, introduced in 2005, is 
delivering cash transfers to 8 million Ethiopians every month on a multi-annual basis, 
with the specific objective of breaking Ethiopia’s dependence on food aid and 
vulnerability to famine by stimulating markets, savings and investment. Elsewhere in 
Africa, cash aid is displacing or complementing food aid, even in emergencies, and 
bringing fresh insights (and fresh challenges) into the aid debate (Devereux & White 
2010). 
It is also important to recognise the part played by African social/political movements. 
On the face of things, it would seem that much of the current interest in the subject of 
food aid reforms and governance emanates from the international donor agencies 
active in Africa. However, long before the donor community turned its attention to 
this question, numerous African groups and social forces had been involved in 
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struggles for the expansion of the political space on the continent as well as for the 
creation of structures of governance that would permit the will of the majority of the 
people to prevail (Mousseau 2005). Judging by its geographical expansion and the 
increasing awareness of at least the ‘concept’ of an alternative agricultural framework, 
the Food Sovereignty movement appears to be a fairly effective vehicle for bringing 
together these social and political movements concerned with issues of food. 
4. From food aid to Food Sovereignty. 
It is acknowledged from across the political spectrum that food aid must be refocused 
to play a more effective role if famine is to be eradicated in any permanent sense. 
Current debates primarily question not whether or not the developed world should 
give but how food aid could be more justly and effectively constituted. Indeed Peter 
Uvin made this observation more than two decades ago by suggesting that a strong 
anti-starvation regime exists, which is "quite universally shared" and is a "rare 
example of a consensual norm” (Uvin 1994:184). As stated, a key criticism remains 
against the inefficiency and poor cost effectiveness of a food aid system that largely 
uses food aid produced in the US and transported at high cost by US vessels. Critics of 
US policy are generally supportive of European policy that has moved towards 
providing cash for local purchases rather than food in kind essentially because this 
method leads to feeding more people at less cost (Lautze & Maxwell 2007). 
However, the danger of focusing on the question of procurement alone runs the risk of 
overlooking the broader issue, which is the inadequate function of the food aid 
system. Prioritising local and triangular food purchases is a positive step towards 
helping the food insecure countries and their farmers but it does not address the fact 
that local procurement may benefit wealthier countries and international agribusiness 
firms. Further, it does not address the fact that procurement procedures with high-
standards used by WFP, NGOs and donor countries tend to exclude small-scale 
farmers from agricultural business. It is worth noting here that marketing boards, 
before they were dismantled under structural adjustment, had the critical function of 
buying food products from all farmers, including small local ones (Moussaeu 2005, 
2009). The fact remains, then, that despite more sensitive policy making in some 
quarters, various donor interests still, by and large, drive food aid policy. This chapter 
ends by introducing an area of institutional reform that has been occupying the food 
Michelle Springfield  Chapter 5 
From Food Aid towards Food Sovereignty 
 Page 177 
 
aid debate for some time and might go some way towards making food aid more 
effective. 
The potential of the FAO 
There is a significant amount of research, which continues to suggest that the food aid 
system, as it is currently constituted, is not designed for the permanent eradication of 
hunger but to serve the interests of exporting countries (Barrett & Maxwell 2005). 
Therefore, organisations such as the EU and the Cairns group317 have supported the 
proposal for the WTO to oversee food aid. The rationale is that the WTO could 
impose rules to overcome the hidden subsidies and distortion to free trade caused by 
US food aid. As mentioned earlier the Food Aid Convention (FAC) currently lacks the 
means to force donors to meet their commitments or make them adhere to agreed 
guidelines, like not dumping subsidised food. The WTO therefore has been proposed 
as an effective and established forum to resolve these kinds of disputes. The essential 
problem, however, is that the WTO, by its very nature is driven and motivated by 
trade interests and competition. It is manifestly not driven by protecting rights to food 
or humanitarian concerns. Indeed organisations such as Oxfam and Save the Children 
echoed these sentiments and actively sought the WTO to enforce food aid practices, 
which avoided dumping, and displacement of commercial imports by food aid.318 
Although these aid agencies are clearly motivated by the belief that ‘fairer free trade’ 
will benefit the poorest farmers in developing countries, they, along with the afore 
mentioned regional organisations, are overlooking three fundamental issues. 
1. Many of the most food insecure countries are not food exporters and actually 
spend a large share of their funds on importing food.319 
2. The food trade within the GFS is dominated by developed countries and only a 
few large developing countries such as South Africa and Brazil. Therefore it is 
these countries that are most affected by the displacement of commercial 
crops, not the most food insecure countries in Africa. 
3. In both developed and developing countries the food trade is dominated by 
large international corporations and large-scale farmers More food trade 
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between developing countries may well benefit these corporations but will not 
necessarily benefit small–scale farmers who produce half of the world’s food 
but are often the most food insecure. 
Because of these factors, it seems unlikely that the most food insecure countries would 
benefit from WTO regulation of food aid. It would more likely benefit business 
interests than lead to investment in small farms and development projects (Yego 
2011).320 The inequity of the global trading system is obviously not new and we can 
observe that this pattern of inequity has been repeated over recent decades. According 
to the UNDP Human Development Report the results of the 1986 Uruguay round of 
trade negotiations left  Sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region, $1.2 billion a year 
worse off, with 70% of benefits going to the most developed countries (UNDP, 1997: 
Human Development to Eradicate Poverty). The consensus seems to be that the trade 
negotiations, which began in Uruguay in 1986 and ended in Marrakech in 1994, made 
an already unlevel playing field, even more so.321 What the most food insecure people 
really need is an enforcement mechanism that ensures the right to food coupled with 
assistance to take democratic control of their own food systems as per principle 1 and 
7 of Food Sovereignty.322 
The Consultative sub-Committee on surplus disposal (CSSD) based in Washington 
D.C and designed to oversee surplus disposal is accused of being outdated and 
ineffective (Mousseau 2005). The FAC is embedded in the International Grain 
Council, which only represents the food exporting countries. Given their design, focus 
and functioning it would make sense to design institutions, which would better serve 
the needs of the worlds’ food insecure. Accordingly there are calls for their 
replacement by an FAO body that would integrate food aid into a broader, 
development orientated food and agricultural programme. It is certainly the case that 
the FAO has not been a priority agency for donor countries over recent decades. By 
way of illustration the WFP has received ten times more financial support than the 
FAO. This, despite the fact that most analysts from the World Bank to Food 
Sovereignty activists now acknowledge what many farmers in the developing 
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countries have been saying for years. Agriculture, particularly support for small 
farmers who continue to feed the majority of the population in the developing world 
must be placed at the centre of any solution to food insecurity and famine (Yego 
2011).323 Given the well-documented negative effects of food aid on local agriculture it 
does not make sense that they should be managed separately. An alternative 
framework for agriculture demands that local procurement of food aid must prioritise 
small-scale farmers. Thus the argument that has been developed throughout this thesis 
is that the eradication of famine requires not just the reform of food aid procurement 
policies but also a reform of the entire food system.324 
The emergence of ‘social protection’ in the early 2000s as an arena within 
development policy can be considered as a positive step in this direction and one that 
is more in keeping with a Food Sovereignty framework than the food aid regime of the 
past. Whereas social safety nets have been dismissed as ‘residualist’ (providing last 
resort assistance for people left out of growth processes), social protection is a more 
holistic approach that could and should be mainstreamed into development policy 
(Devereux 2009a). As previously discussed, ‘safety nets’ are often implemented in 
paternalistic and stigmatising ways, whereas social protection can better respond to 
food needs. They do so by involving participating communities in the design, 
targeting and monitoring of social transfer programmes. In other words increasing the 
localised and democratic components of food aid. Furthermore ‘transformative social 
protection’ aims to empower poor and vulnerable people by adding rights and social 
justice to the agenda, in addition to social transfers (Devereux et al 2006). Most 
importantly, for this thesis, the concept of social protection can be politically 
challenging or even radical (since, like Food Sovereignty, it implies empowering 
citizens to claim their entitlements from the state), in contrast to the critique of social 
safety nets that they are politically conservative. Safety nets have been characterised 
as supporting a neo-liberal economic liberalisation agenda since they have been used 
to compensate for food insecurities that arose from structural adjustment reforms.325 
Indeed dependency on food aid or international safety nets brings into question the 
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reality of the state in the empirical sense of the word326 and will be examined in the 
context of Kenya and Ethiopia in the following chapter. 
Concluding comments 
Despite decades of food aid from donor countries famine, or vulnerability to famine, 
in parts of East Africa have not been eradicated in any permanent sense. Critics have 
therefore concluded that it is, by and large, a waste of money. But this overlooks the 
important fact that food aid is clearly not always aimed at reducing hunger. Thus, 
rather than being a waste of money, it represents a failure to provide food as a matter 
of right or even to target those most in need. In addition, some donor countries 
(particularly the US) continue to use food aid to promote their own commercial and 
national strategic interests (Barrett & Maxwell 2005; Melito 2009). Indeed those who 
advocate a ‘new security paradigm’ argue there is a growing tendency to concentrate 
bilateral assistance on those believed to reflect liberal values and practices or those 
who should be encouraged to do so, a kind of ‘neo-liberal project’ (Chandler 2006; 
Duffield 2001).327 It would follow, from this argument that we are moving further 
away from a deontological ethical basis (rights or duty based) in the fight against 
famine to one of considered consequences, which include areas of economic, foreign 
and security policy. In these circumstances, food aid is unlikely to reduce hunger and 
may even increase food insecurity in recipient countries. 
One of the key characteristics of the Food Sovereignty model is that it fundamentally 
matters who provides food, not simply that food is provided. This is of enormous 
importance in the way that the system of food aid needs to be restructured to fit more 
closely within a Food Sovereignty framework. For the remainder of this discussion on 
the potential of adopting a Food Sovereignty model for East Africa, three areas are 
given particular attention. Firstly there is the scope for institutional changes to 
promote Food Sovereignty; secondly there are calls for an increase in state control and 
a decrease in harmful foreign policies in food and agricultural issues; and thirdly the 
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development of democratic controls both within national governments and in civil 
society with regard to food production and consumption. The refocusing of food aid 
policy to effectively combat famine and famine vulnerability through a framework of 
Food Sovereignty is a theme continued in the following two chapters of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6 – THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF FOOD 
INSECURITY 
Democratic control – Smallholder farmers must have direct input into 
formulating agricultural policies at all levels. The United Nations and related 
organizations will have to undergo a process of democratization to enable 
this to become a reality. Everyone has the right to honest, accurate 
information and open and democratic decision-making. These rights form the 
basis of good governance, accountability and equal participation in economic, 
political and social life, free from all forms of discrimination. Rural women, 
in particular, must be granted direct and active decision-making on food and 
rural issues (Principle 7 of Food Sovereignty). 
The purpose of this chapter is to situate food insecurity within the realm of politics 
and power and how it relates, explicitly, to principle 7 of Food Sovereignty, which 
demands democratic control of food systems. The absence of democratic control of 
food is partially a result of ‘external’ effects of the global food system as discussed in 
Chapter 2 or food aid dependency discussed in Chapter 5. It can also be conceived as 
deriving from ‘internal’ effects as a result of national government structures and 
policies. This chapter advances the argument by focusing on the internal aspects of 
food insecurity. The discussion starts from the premise that famine prevention should 
be a core function of all governments.328 This premise is based on the notion that food 
is (1) a fundamental human right as discussed in Chapter3 ; (2) famine prevention is a 
fundamental condition of ‘good governance’ and this is understood in an internal and 
external context. The unfortunate reality, however, is that many governments are too 
poorly organised, politically, economically and socially, to deliver comprehensive 
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 This is best articulated as by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights as ‘The 
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social protection or basic services, and therefore do not, or cannot, guarantee a right to 
food for all citizens. It is also the case that some governments are selective in how 
they provide protection from famine conditions. It is widely recognised, therefore, that 
weak public institutions, limited state political capacity329 and unstable political 
arrangements increase vulnerability to famine. This chapter considers the political 
context in Kenya and Ethiopia and questions whether democracy and governance 
work differently in an African context. This is an important point in terms of the 
suitability of these countries as places where Food Sovereignty could develop as an 
alternative agricultural framework. It is understood that an enhanced role for civil 
society is crucial for the development of Food Sovereignty but this may prove to be 
problematic in an African context (Chabal & Daloz 1999). Theories of ‘neo-
patrimonialism’ and the separation of the empirical and juridical interpretation of the 
state, in African context, are highly relevant to this discussion (Chabal & Daloz 1999; 
Jackson & Rosberg 1986). 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Part 1 looks at the democratic state and its 
role in famine prevention. This includes a brief elucidation of how democracy is 
defined and conceptualised in this discussion and identifies its protective role against 
famine.330 This is followed by a general discussion on the role of the state both in the 
instigation and amelioration of famines in the past before moving on to considering 
the African state in a contemporary context. This includes a discussion on both 
political culture and civil society. Amartya Sen claimed that famines do not occur in 
fully functioning democracies, because of the protection and guarantees that are built 
in to them (Sen 2001).331 Whilst broadly accepting this claim, this chapter also takes 
account of the wider international context and non-state actors that underlie modern 
conditions of famine and food insecurity in East Africa. If democracy and governance 
do work differently in Africa, then it may be the case that Sen’s model does not quite 
grasp the African situation in a way that a Food Sovereignty model might. 
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 The seventh principle of Food Sovereignty relates to the democratic control of food systems which 
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Part 2 looks at the role of national government in food provision in Kenya. 
Government failures are specifically linked to both the implementation of structural 
adjustment programmes, as discussed in chapter 4, and what is frequently understood 
as the endemic problem of corruption of Kenyan political elites and personalised 
politics. 
Part 3 considers the Ethiopian case, where the political context differs significantly 
from Kenya and government failures are linked specifically to the internal conflicts 
that have beset this country for decades. There is considerable evidence to show how 
the Ethiopian government used food as a political weapon of war and discriminated 
against certain sectors of the population. The concept of responsibility a theme central 
to this chapter. In theories of causation, it is a concept that has, thus far, been 
misplaced (demographic theories) or seriously underplayed (economic theories). The 
emphasis is on a need to challenge ‘politics as usual’ and establish government 
responsibility through political accountability. The conclusion reached is that 
democracy, per se, is only a partial protection from food insecurity and what is more, 
democracy in a Western-liberal context may never be the most suitable political 
system for East Africa (Chabal & Daloz 1999). What is really required is an increase 
in the democratic control of food systems and Food Sovereignty could provide a 
suitable framework. 
1. Democratic protection from famine. 
In the early 1980s Sen asserted in his ‘democracy prevents famine’ thesis that the 
diverse set of freedoms available in a democratic state, including political rights such 
as the right to vote and regular elections together with civil liberties such as a free 
press and freedom of speech, combine to become the real force in eradicating famine. 
It was Sen who first articulated the idea that it is one set of freedoms, i.e. to vote, to 
demonstrate and to publish that are inextricably linked with other types of freedom, 
i.e. freedom from hunger or death by starvation. Variations of this approach continued 
throughout the 1990s most notably from writers such as de Waal (2000, 2006), and 
Devereux (1993, 2000). 
However, the early optimism that the triumph of liberal democracy, the so-called ‘end 
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of history thesis’,332 would lead to an extension of prosperity and an end to absolute 
poverty was premature.333 The continuation, indeed worsening, of food insecurity in 
many parts of Africa offers a stark challenge to the very idea that the spread of liberal 
democracy was inevitable, and would, per se, become an effective solution. In fact the 
argument developed here is that liberal democracy is not a natural or inevitable 
political model and African states may simply not democratise along the same lines as 
the West. This fact needs to be more clearly understood and factored into the 
expectations of a Food Sovereignty model. Therefore, the fact that some political 
systems have delivered but many have not means that Sen’s analysis, although 
intuitively powerful, is not in practice sufficient, it is descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive.334 It is worth noting that Sen’s perception of democracy is essentially a 
liberal one based on the belief that opposition parties and a free press are consistently 
interested in promoting the poor and vulnerable in society.335 Superficially, the 
desirability of democratic systems can be demonstrated by the fact that they have 
greater respect for human rights and have lower incidences of hunger than 
authoritarian ones.336 On deeper inspection though, the links between democracy and 
protection from hunger are more tenuous and more specific than suggested by Sen’s 
hypothesis. For example, a free press and an independent judiciary (i.e. rule of law) 
may offer greater protection from hunger for minorities than the right to vote or 
competitive political parties.337 
Thus, it can be argued in order for Sen’s linking of rights and freedoms to become 
really meaningful a more robust political contract is required. Within a Food 
Sovereignty paradigm this could be conceived of as an enforceable contract between 
governments and their people based on inalienable rights. It is of great importance that 
this contract would need to be legally or constitutionally protected. There are already 
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 This optimism should be viewed within an historical context. Many believed that the end of the ‘cold 
war’ would lead to an end of proxy wars and externally sponsored dictatorial governments, both of 
which have been shown to be key factors in famine vulnerability. 
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 India is often cited as an example where chronic under-nutrition, thus vulnerability to famine, is 
endemic despite it being the world’s largest functioning democracy. See Banik 2007; Sainath 1996. 
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 See Wrong 2008 for a critical account of power elites in Kenya acting in their own interest, rather 
than on behalf of the most impoverished.  
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 For example, Purulia district in West Bengal has had 25 years of the same party in power but a far 
better record on preventing starvation deaths than Kalahandi, a district with intense electoral 
competition and frequent changes of the party in power. See Banik, 2007: Ch 13. 
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examples of these types of legal guarantees in parts of Latin America and India and 
initiatives such as the 2005 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) 
have been shown to be very effective. 
David Held claims, ‘Democracy seems to bestow an ‘aura of legitimacy’ on modern 
political life: rules, laws, policies and decisions appear justified and appropriate when 
they are democratic’ (Held 1987: 1). However, the absence, or prevention, of famine 
or chronic food insecurity from some undemocratic countries is also relevant in this 
analysis particularly in understanding which types of political system lend themselves 
more readily to the adoption of a Food Sovereignty framework. Some countries have 
more equitable land allocation and fulfil a responsibility to ensure their citizens are 
fed, but may deny them other political and civil rights. Cuba, under Fidel Castro, is 
perhaps one of the best-known examples of a country placing higher value on the 
provision of certain social rights over and above political freedoms. Indeed it has been 
argued that Cuba, for a variety of reasons, may be the best example of a food 
sovereign country to date (Caballero 2011). China, too, has made enormous progress 
in reducing vulnerability to hunger and famine, although it presents an alternative 
political-economic model to Western liberal democracies. It is clear that the mere 
existence of democratic institutions does not guarantee equality of treatment of all 
citizens or comprehensive protection from hunger. Indeed governments, albeit elected 
ones, in majoritarian systems can quite easily discriminate against minority sectors of 
the population. Case studies have repeatedly shown that those most at risk of famine 
are inevitably the poorest and most marginalised citizens whose rights and welfare are 
most easily ignored (de Waal 1989, 2006).338 Malawi, for example, has shifted from an 
authoritarian but effective regime to a multi party democracy that is only marginally 
accountable to vulnerable members of its society (Devereux (ed) 2007: Ch 7). 
Likewise, Kenya has moved from a one-party to a multi-party state and yet sections of 
Kenyan society remain marginalised and lack political representation.339 Democracy 
therefore has many related features, including the voting aspect, elections, a 
competitive party system, open public deliberation and accountability. It is clear, 
however, that some of these aspects serve as a greater protection against famine than 
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others. For those advocating a Food Sovereignty model it is vital to identify which 
specific democratic criteria are most important for a Food Sovereignty model to 
flourish. 
By looking at famines, in a general context, and over time, it becomes evident that 
some aspects of democracy, such as government transparency, accountability and 
responsiveness (or rather a lack of) are most relevant to famine situations. This is 
more than simply stating the obvious because it points to a way that this lack of 
democratic criteria could be overcome by the instrumentalisation of a political 
contract between the government and the people. The need for a political contract is 
emphasised by the fact that although famine is self-evidently wrong and can be 
conceived of as a political issue, its occurrence in an East African context has not yet 
brought about a lasting coalition that can enforce long-term change.340 By way of a 
political contract, the government agrees to fulfil its duty to prevent famine and the 
people, in return, meet their civic duty to support the government (De Waal 2006).341 
Most importantly, for the analysis of famine in this thesis, it would need to be a 
political contract with both national and international safeguards. This perspective 
emphasises the need to concentrate on the roles and interconnections between certain 
fundamental freedoms that, as already stated, we associate with democracy: political 
freedoms; economic opportunities; recognition of individual rights; social facilities; 
protective securities and so forth. The reality of achieving this ideal, however, is 
fraught with difficulties and parts two and three of this chapter consider some of the 
obstacles, both internal and external, which may stand in the way of achieving the 
necessary political changes and safeguards in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
Development of the ideal: the State as provider 
Throughout history one can draw close relationships between famine and the fortunes 
of a particular state, whether that state is in Africa, Asia or Europe. Containing or 
preventing famine has, for centuries, been one of the primary functions of rulers and 
governments and one of the primary expectations that the people have of their rulers. 
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According to social contract theory, protection from hunger, during times of dearth, 
would be one of the benefits for which people would be willing to sacrifice some of 
their freedom.342 Regimes that have ignored the basic needs of its people have often 
lost their legitimacy and thus, historically, states have often responded by creating 
institutions and policies to try and meet the needs of its people during times of hunger. 
The English Poor Law, established during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603), and 
the Corn Laws, from their origins in the 13th Century to their restoration in the 17th 
century, are examples of early state responses to food crises (Thompson 1971). 
Indeed, the Indian Famine Codes of 1880 were a significant feature of British rule in 
India, driven in all probability by self-interest but, nonetheless, aimed at preventing a 
repeat of the famines that occurred in India during the 1870s. In a modern context, one 
of the obvious and most basic functions of state social security, in the developed 
world, is to protect people from starvation. From this perspective, the duty of the state 
with regards to famine and hunger can be seen as fostering a growth in governmental 
power and influence, and a key feature in the process of democratisation and good 
governance as we understand them today.343 
Famine and its associated ills have always had repercussions for the stability of any 
regime since its very basis of wealth and power is, to a great extent, dependent on the 
well-being of those who are ruled. Therefore promoting the idea of the state as 
protector and provider clearly had its political advantages. In pre-modern times this 
role provided a balance between the need for coercion and the willingness of the 
populace to submit to the hegemony of the monarch and the ruling classes. By 
acknowledging responsibility for the subsistence needs of their people, rulers could 
achieve a moral standing that went beyond self-interest and greed. Thus, a 
paternalistic approach, encapsulated in the feudal doctrine of ‘noblese oblige’ in 
which rank imposed obligations, gave a certain authority and legitimacy to many 
regimes. 
Early interventions included the attempts to prohibit the export or hoarding of grain, 
and to oblige butchers and bakers to sell at fixed prices and standard measures, thus 
                                                          
342
 A highly influential theory most associated in modern times with the philosophers Thomas Hobbes, 
John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See Hampton 1986. 
343
 See David Williams (2000) on quasi-states, sovereignty and Africa - he discusses the way in which 
the concept of sovereignty has shifted and provides a helpful framework for thinking about how 
sovereignty came to mean what governments could and should do, rather than simply autonomy. 
Michelle Springfield    Chapter 6 
The Political Context of Food Insecurity 
 Page 189 
 
displaying early notions of the ‘just price’.344 As Europe crossed from medieval into 
modern times, nation states redrew their boundaries and cities and populations 
expanded; food provision, therefore, became a high priority. Bureaucracies, armies 
and populations need to be fed; hence, laws were introduced to ease the flow of food 
from countryside to city. A key, political, incentive for state intervention was to 
maintain order and stability and this remains the case today; the Tudor state in 
England, for example, responded with the Poor Laws to tackle rising vagrancy and 
destitution (Charlesworth 1999). However, for a variety of reasons discussed in this 
thesis, the European experience of state intervention to combat hunger has not been 
successfully repeated or maintained in much of post-colonial Africa.345 
China, throughout its imperial dynastic history, offers an illuminating example of how 
once every few hundred years widespread famines triggered revolts that led to the 
downfall of once flourishing dynasties (Arnold 1988: 100-104). Elite self-interest and 
lessons learnt from previous dynasties led the Manchus, once they were in power, to 
establish and maintain public granaries across China. Grains were provided and 
replenished by imperial quotas, local taxes and voluntary contributions. 
However, the more famine came to be viewed as something other than the 
consequences of natural causes, but something potentially man made and therefore 
amenable to human intervention, the more its occurrence became part of a developing 
critique of state power. This was especially true in colonial territories like Ireland and 
India, as well as much of Africa, where famine gained a prominent place in the 
emerging ideas of nationalism. In Europe, the French revolution of 1789 demonstrated 
the political significance of food; though it was clearly not just about the price of 
bread, it was obviously a culmination of social and political frustration, the dwindling 
authority of the monarch and an increasing criticism of absolutism. But the fear of 
hunger that had plagued France (and most other countries in Europe at the time) 
brought together elements of society against the merchants, landlords and nobles, who 
were perceived as being responsible for shortages and spiralling costs. In other words, 
certain sectors of society were deemed to be accountable to the hungry. A more recent 
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example occurred in 1974, when Emperor Haile Selassie's regime lost public 
confidence within Ethiopia following a famine in Wello province, ultimately leading 
to the Ethiopian revolution. Indeed, the peasants’ revolts of the twentieth century, in 
places as diverse as Algeria, Mexico and Russia, were mostly triggered by subsistence 
crises. The evolution of Food Sovereignty, championed by the farming and peasant 
movement la Via Campesina, shares these same roots. 
The malevolent State 
In addition to this somewhat benign image of the state as the provider of food in times 
of dire need, there is the very negative side of state involvement when, far from 
preventing famine, states have been responsible for perpetuating them. This may be as 
a result of policy, punishment, ignorance or wilful neglect. Very often, the ‘legitimate 
violence’ of the state has been used to uphold the ownership rights of certain sectors 
of the community, while others have starved (Edkins 2002). This negative role of the 
state can be linked to the reality in parts of Africa. 
State involvement in famine causation has most commonly arisen as a result of war, 
either within or beyond a state’s boundary. Civil wars, in particular, provide the most 
disturbing examples of food being used as a political motivator. In the late 1960s the 
government of Nigeria notoriously used hunger to defeat the attempted secession of 
Biafra and forced the rebellious Igbo people into submission. The more recent 
situation in Sudan has very similar overtones, with the Sudanese government-backed 
Janjaweed adopting a scorched earth policy. They have destroyed crops and villages 
and driven the black African Sudanese (from the Fur, Massaleet and Zagawa ethnic 
groups) off their lands (de Waal 2008).346 Hunger, it seems, has always been used as a 
way of bringing the rebellious to heel; the history of warfare is replete with examples 
of pillaging, crop destruction and city sieges aimed at starving the opposition into 
surrender. Examples are universal and include the German rulers in East Africa in the 
early twentieth century.347 When faced with revolt from the indigenous resistance 
movements during the ‘Maji-Maji’, the colonisers retaliated not just with arms but 
also with a ‘scorched earth policy’ that destroyed the crops and food reserves of 
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hundreds of villages. The starvation that followed was considered by the colonial 
regime to be a necessary part of the ‘process of pacification’ (Arnold 1998: 121). 
Less common, perhaps, than open warfare, but evident throughout history, is the 
situation where states have pursued a policy of famine, either for ideological 
objectives, such as China and the Soviet Union during the twentieth century, or in 
order for certain groups or ‘power elites’ to remain in power. 
In contrast to Sen’s economic analysis of the Bengal famine in 1943 (Sen 1981), there 
is good reason to place a greater political emphasis on its causation. The fear of an 
invasion from Japan led to the colonial powers taking action that, albeit 
unintentionally, precipitated famine amongst the local population.348 Though Sen’s 
entitlement theory explains why famine occurred to certain people in certain areas, it 
clearly does not address the wider political environment in which this famine 
occurred. This includes government mismanagement of a vulnerable economy, the 
suspension of normal movement of food into grain deficient areas, and, perhaps the 
most important for any rights based analysis, a government’s willingness to sacrifice 
rural needs to those of the city. 
Russia also provides examples of famines that were as much, if not more, political as 
they were climatic, demographic or economic in origin. The famine of 1932-34, the 
death toll of which Devereux estimates as 7-8 million (Devereux 2000: 6), can be 
directly attributed to malevolent government policy of the soviet state towards a 
particular section of the peasant class. The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 drew its main 
support from the cities rather than the rural areas and what resulted was a virtual civil 
war against the wealthier peasants or kulaks.349 Through a combination of policies, 
introduced first by Lenin and followed by Stalin, that included forced collectivisation, 
food confiscation and the requisitioning of food from rural to urban workers, millions 
of peasants starved to death. The ideological drive of the communist party officials 
and the belief that the kulaks were not committed to the goals of the new political 
order resulted in disastrous consequences for millions from the Ukraine to 
Kazakhstan. Thus, as the example of Russia’s 1932-1934 famines illustrates only too 
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clearly, it is not just governments that adhere to the political ideology of the capitalist 
free market that have been responsible for famines (or at least not preventing them), 
but equally those that espouse the political opposite of state controlled communism. 
The modern African context: rolling back the state 
Returning to Sen’s assertion that famines do not occur in fully functioning 
democracies (Sen 2001), it is certainly the case that traditionally, famines are related 
to political systems as most twentieth century famines occurred in authoritarian, 
undemocratic and unaccountable regimes (Devereux 2000). To offer even a brief 
summary of the political systems in operation in any African country, without 
reference to history is wholly inadequate but an in-depth analysis of the political 
evolution in Africa, particularly since post-colonial independence, is beyond the scope 
of this discussion.350 However, two key factors have been are singled out as having 
facilitated poor governance in Africa and will be considered in some detail in this 
section. First is obviously the colonial pedigree. There is a strong linkage between the 
absence of good governance in the colonial era and that of the post-colonial period 
(McMichael 2008). It can be said that the political structures and values, economic 
base and social orientations promoted in the colonial era were antithetical to the 
evolution of what is understood in this thesis as good governance and democracy. 
However, once implanted these structures and processes, took on new manifestations, 
both internal and external in the neo-colonial era (Ki-Zerbo 1990; Chabal 1992). 
Secondly, in the post-colonial period in Africa, the initial emphasis of the political 
rulers was on national integration, unity and development. Thus the dominant doctrine 
can be thought of as a ‘dictatorship of development’, rather than the ‘democracy of 
development’ (Adejumobi 2000). However, given the fragmentation of the African 
state, the paucity of resources of the ruling class and its lack of hegemony, the 
tendency was that governance degenerated significantly, as the state became an arena 
of struggles for primitive accumulation and power control. The net effect was that 
political alienation and de-participation and increasing material poverty became the 
norms of political governance in Africa. Empirical research shows that post-colonial 
Africa has, in general, seen political instability increase and some parts have 
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experienced prolonged periods of war related famines (Collier 2007).351 What is not in 
doubt is that countries currently experiencing the worst incidence of acute hunger are 
seriously lacking certain democratic criteria and protection of fundamental freedoms352 
and this situation can been linked to the withdrawal of state involvement in food 
systems as outlined below. 
During brief periods in the 1970s, all countries in the horn of Africa possessed some 
of the most ambitious participatory and professional anti-famine institutions on the 
continent. Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, for example, all had successes with 
introducing radical social and economic reforms aimed at confining famine to the 
pages of history but they have all since suffered exceptionally severe famines 
(Wallerstein 1993).353 As was discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 5 this increased 
vulnerability to famine can be located, in no small part, in the organisation of the 
global food system, the imposition of liberal economic reforms and the growth in 
dependency on food aid. The most important political impact of structural adjustment 
in the 1980s and 1990s was the introduction of an unprecedented level of involvement 
in African economic planning by the international financial institutions (IFI). From a 
critical perspective the IFIs subsequently became a vehicle for donors (mainly 
Western governments) to impose their political conditionality on recipients 
(Mkandawire & Olukoshi 1995). Ironically, by encouraging democracy, but insisting 
that economic policy remained outside the domain of democratic decision-making, SA 
made many African governments more externally accountable but less accountable to 
their own people. This shift in accountability is often framed in terms of a ‘crisis of 
governance in Africa’. Critics argue that the adjustment years have been characterised 
by an erosion of the legitimacy of the post-colonial African state, with implications for 
its political capacity to implement policies. Thus the efforts at rolling-back the state 
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 It has often been noted that Botswana is an anomaly in Sub-Saharan Africa (Collier 2007; Sachs 
2005; Sen 2003). It is a country that has maintained a functioning multi-party political system since 
independence, has a chronic food deficit and propensity to severe drought and yet it has averted major 
famine. Botswana’s multi- party system, high levels of accountability, professional civil service, and its 
success in averting famine have been closely linked. Thus Botswana is often cited as a classic example 
of how democratic accountability is at the centre of famine prevention. It also happens to be wealthy 
with most of its GDP coming from diamond mines and benefits from an enlightened commercial 
contract with de Beers. 
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 Malawi is considered an exception in as much as its first famine occurred (2001-2002) in a 
functioning, albeit nascent, democracy. Several factors, including structural adjustment, combined to 
make Malawi more vulnerable to famine than in the past. See Devereux 2007 (ed):Ch 7. 
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 It is acknowledged throughout this thesis that the reasons are however, varied and complex. 
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not only helped to curb its social reach but also further undermined the post-colonial 
social contract on the basis of which the state sought to build legitimacy, forge 
political alliances and relate with the opposition, (Olukoshi & Laakso 1996). 
Furthermore, the adjustment years have been associated with the collapse of a pattern 
of expectations, in specific group and community demands, focused on what the role 
of the state is understood as being. This collapse of expectations is reinforced by the 
widespread awareness that structural adjustment came to Africa as an external 
imposition. In the search for alternatives, it has been suggested that individuals and 
groups were driven into ethno-political and religious organisational frameworks that 
pose direct challenges to the post-colonial secular, national-territorial nation-state 
project.354 That is why some commentators have argued that the crisis of governance in 
Africa is also, in essence, a crisis of structural adjustment (Beckman 1992; Olukoshi 
& Laakso 1996). 
From an historical perspective it is difficult not to question the overt anti-statism that 
underlies much of the neo-liberal political economy approach. When most African 
countries attained independence the developed world had clearly been in favour of 
state interventionism in their own development process (Chaudry 1993; Mkandawire 
1998; Olukoshi 1996). By and large this was as true for the centrally-planned 
economies of the Eastern bloc as for their capitalist rivals in the West. It was as true 
for the developing as for the developed countries. As it pertained to the developing 
countries, including those of Africa, a variety of theories, ranging from the ‘big push’ 
approach to the ‘Gerschenkron thesis’, were developed and popularised in support of 
an interventionist role for the state in the struggle against underdevelopment.355 
From the late 1970s, however, as the neo-liberal ideology gained in ascendancy, the 
interventionist role of the state, in the development process, came under severe attack. 
From being the cornerstone of development, the state now came to be seen as the 
millstone holding back a system of market-led development (Olukoshi 1996). In a 
modern context, theories of the state and how they relate to famine vulnerability in an 
African context have taken on a specific theoretical position commonly referred to as 
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 Gerschenkron’s thesis (1962) on economic ‘backwardness’ stressed the key developmental role of 
the state in mobilising the necessary resources to reduce the techno-industrial gap between late 
industrialisers and advanced industrial powers. The theory advances that the greater the gap, the greater 
the need for state intervention. This has, somewhat belatedly, now been recognised by the World Bank.  
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‘neo-patrimonialism’. These theories have come to dominate the analysis of African 
states and polities from a Western or First World perspective. In essence neo-
patrimonialism is a term used for patrons using state resources in order to secure the 
loyalty of clients in the general population, it includes informal patron-client 
relationships that reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals at the 
village level. This label is often used to describe African states, specifically as a way 
of explaining why they have ‘failed’ to effect neoliberal market reforms. Indeed the 
formal state in Africa has been described as ‘vacuous and ineffectual’ (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999:14). Specifically, the African states have been described as ‘ramshackle 
regimes of highly personalised rule that are severely deficient in institutional authority 
and organisational capability’ (Jackson & Rosberg 1986:1). This position is highly 
controversial, with some arguing that the term neo-patrimonialism is too vague. For 
example, Mkandawire has argued that in an African context neo-patrimonialism has 
been used to explain import substitution, export orientation, parastatals (state–owned 
enterprise), privatisation, the informal sector development, and so on. In other words 
by seeking to explain everything, it explains nothing except perhaps that capitalist 
relations in their idealised form are not typical in Africa (Mkandawire 1998). 
In keeping with the global analysis of this thesis, it is argued here that neo-patrimonial 
theory fails to take into account the politics of non-African states. However the World 
Bank embraced the theory of neo-patrimonialism as it developed its political economy 
of African development or a ‘political economy of disorder’ as Chabal and Daloz put 
it (1999: xviv). The neo-liberal political economy school rests on the assumption, 
whether explicitly stated or not, that democracy and economic liberalisation are two 
sides of the same coin (Olukoshi 1999). It takes as its starting point, the view that the 
postcolonial African state, by its very nature and, therefore, by definition, is at the 
heart of the economic and governance crises pervading the continent (Bayart 2000). 
To paraphrase Olukoshi’s take on the World Bank’s position, the African state, 
stripped of the most basic checks and balances of the (late) colonial period, has failed 
in its developmental mission on account of various inter-related factors: 
• its excessive and counterproductive intervention in domestic economic 
processes to the detriment of market forces and the private sector; 
• its over-bureaucratisation and bloated size; 
• the domination of its apparatuses by clientelist networks and an urban coalition 
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that orients it against the rural (productive) sector and ‘rational’ macro-
economic policies; 
• its submission to ‘rampant/macro populism’ as it prioritises a politically 
powerful ‘urban coalition’; 
• its monopolisation of the main economic levers in society with the resultant 
proliferation of rent-generating/seeking niches/activities; 
• its over-centralisation of development which has discouraged local (private) 
initiative (Olukoshi 1999). 
Underpinning the failure of the post-colonial African state, making it an almost 
inevitable outcome, is its essentially neo-patrimonial nature and the rent-
generating/seeking motivation of African policy makers. Or so the dominant 
theoretical approach would have it. Thus neo-patrimonialism has been central to the 
adoption by the state of policies that distort markets through protectionist tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, overvalued exchange rates, a host of subsidies, and the preference 
for state monopolies. In extending its reach as part of its goal of achieving short-term 
political order, the state has encouraged the proliferation of patronage institutions and 
networks. These help to consolidate the position of a legitimacy-hungry elite by 
enabling it, in part, to buy the support and acquiescence of certain groups and the 
silence of others whilst helping itself from the public purse. 
From this perspective, given the domination of the economy by the neo-patrimonial 
state or at least by a neo-patrimonial state logic, it is not surprising that the failure of 
the state easily translates into the failure of the economy. (Bayart 1993, 2000, 2009; 
Chabal and Daloz 1999).356 The centrality of the neo-patrimonial/rent-seeking thesis as 
the source of the failure of the post-colonial African states is evident in the 
proliferation of adjectives that were used to describe its nature and modus operandi. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the post-colonial state was variously 
characterised as ‘parasitic’, ‘personalistic’, ‘clientelist’, ‘kleptocratic’, ‘over-
extended’, ‘predatory’, ‘crony’, ‘weak’, ‘lame’,’ ‘rentier’ ‘sultanist’, and, ultimately 
‘neo-patrimonial’ (Olukoshi 1999). In essence these descriptions served to underline 
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the perceived negative role of the state in the economy and society. In so doing, they 
reinforced the World Bank’s theoretical position on the African state as both 
inherently ineffective and illegitimate. 
Precisely because of the attempt to transpose the categories of neo-classical economics 
to the political arena and to use these to designate social institutions and actors, the 
neo-liberal political economy school produced a set of rigid dichotomies opposing the 
state to the market, the rural to the urban, the formal to the informal, agriculture to 
industry, and civil society to the state. Yet this approach to understanding the African 
reality overlooks the fact that most of the relations designated by these categories 
systematically interpenetrate and overlap one another (Gibbon et al 1992, Meagher 
2006). A key characteristic of African economies and societies is the prevalence of 
‘grey’ areas, which blur, and sometimes blend, the dichotomies that are central to the 
arguments of the neo-liberal political economy approach. Therefore it is argued here 
that a helpful understanding of the politics of reform in Africa cannot be gained from 
the kinds of rigid dichotomies that are integral to a neo-liberal or public choice 
analysis. This is of particular importance in efforts to establish a realistic basis from 
which to develop a Food Sovereignty model. The reductionism that pervades the neo-
patrimonial approach perhaps explains why the World Bank and its sympathetic 
critics have repeatedly and systematically misjudged and misread the effects of 
structural adjustment in Africa (Bayart 2000; Gibbon et al 1992).357 
Also problematic is the focus on neo-patrimonialism and rent seeking, which does not 
allow for the validity of other motivations for the actions of social or political actors, 
including the state (Bayart 2000). As noted by Andrew Williams 
‘policy-makers…are motivated by instincts other than national interest. To 
assume otherwise is to assume that policy-makers are not moral beings, a 
curious position to take, or that national interest does not have a moral 
component’ (Williams 2006:12). 
Being more sensitive to issues that could or should drive national and international 
policy–making is central to a Food Sovereignty framework. 
Finally, and most importantly, it is not self-evident that the creation/existence of a 
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private capitalist class autonomous of the state will necessarily be supportive of 
democracy in Africa. Numerous empirical studies on the politics of the private 
capitalist class and its organisations in various African countries suggest, in fact, that 
they could, and do, have strong anti-democratic tendencies.358 (Adejumobi 2000; 
Chabal & Daloz 1999; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995; Mkandawire 1998). 
As stated earlier, democracy is not just a question of multiparty politics and 
electioneering even if the right of the people to freely elect their leaders is recognised 
as non-negotiable; it includes a vast array of social and economic reforms whose 
adoption are widely perceived as being necessary for the establishment of a more just 
social order. This understanding of democracy is more compatible with a model of 
Food Sovereignty. It is a definition of democracy that necessarily calls for an 
interventionist, developmentalist state and not for the unbridled retrenchment of the 
state. A Food Sovereignty model calls for the reforming of the state and its broad-
ranging restructuring in order to tackle the problem of state failure but it also firmly 
rejects the World Bank/IMF re-definition of the role of the state. The early post-
colonial period, characterised by the abandonment, in many cases, of the African anti-
colonial nationalist project, also witnessed spirited struggles against the imposition of 
one party and military rule, the institution of personal rule with all of the clientelist 
networks woven around it, the proliferation of corruption and bureaucratic red-tape, 
and the efforts at various levels aimed at the de-politicisation of the people (Anyang’ 
Nyongo 1987; Mamdani et al. 1987; Mamdani and Wamba-dia-Wamba 1995). 
The withdrawal of government intervention in agricultural and food sectors, however, 
jeopardises developing countries’ ability to effectively fight hunger and poverty as it 
conflicts with several basic principles of good governance such as: 
• Sovereignty and democracy: The loss of sovereignty over food and agriculture 
implies a democratic deficit, as citizens are not given a voice in the 
determination of the policies affecting their lives and their future. 
• Accountability: Relief and development agencies are only accountable to their 
donors, and not to the beneficiaries of their interventions. When governments 
hand over the responsibility for food and agriculture to foreign bodies, they 
cannot be held responsible for what the international organizations do or do 
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not accomplish. 
• Effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability: Welfare systems and agricultural 
services with permanent staff and resources are more efficient, flexible and 
able to react quickly than international organizations that have to bring in 
international staff, recruit local personnel, call for international funding, set up 
offices and so forth. Moreover, food interventions run by relief agencies are 
geared towards short-term objectives and are not integrated into 
comprehensive strategies aimed at reducing food insecurity in the long run. 
Civil society. 
So strong were the domestic pressures for political and economic reforms in Africa 
towards the end of the 1980s, and so massive was the level of popular participation in 
the struggle for change that some commentators were to remark, rather hastily, that 
Africa was on the threshold of a “second liberation” (Legum 1992). Whereas the first 
liberation resulted in the end of colonialism, the “second liberation” was leading to the 
defeat of personal, autocratic rule within the framework of a system of political 
monopoly either by a single party or by the military. It was expected that this “second 
liberation” would result in the emergence of an era of democratic governments that 
promote rational economic policies. Yet many of those who popularised this view, 
failed to take full account of the democratic content of the political reforms and the 
sustainability of democratic change in the context of deepening economic crises, 
prolonged structural adjustment and the resurgence of competing ethnicities 
(Mkandawire & Olukoshi 1995). 
Thus it is not only institutional democracy that is essential in the development of Food 
Sovereignty, particularly the seventh principle of democratic control of food systems, 
in many respects the role of civil society is just as salient. Civil can be understood 
here as a combination of properly organised and distinct political interests groups and 
social networks distinct from the state. The distinction made by Peter Gibbon (1997) 
between the “deepening” and the “politicisation” of civil society is instructive here. 
Gibbon argues that the deepening of civil society does not impact too positively on the 
course of democratisation, it is the latter, that is its politicisation, which does. 
Politicisation involves the ability of the civil associations and groups to transcend 
their parochial group interests and articulate demands, which could overcome their 
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individual and group differences. It is in this context that civil society can act as a 
potent force and form a viable platform for political change. While the politicisation 
of the civil society is important as Gibbon insists, equally the deepening of the civil 
society is also very relevant. The deepening of the civil society is crucial to its strength 
and vitality, as it reinforces its capacity for self-organisation and development, without 
which its politicisation will be hollow. From this perspective Food Sovereignty cannot 
be thought of as a state centric approach but rather as a civil society response that in 
places like east Africa would transcend kinship and ethnic ties. It is not about 
reasserting the power of the state but reasserting the power of the people and the 
building of international networks. The challenge of enhancing democracy in Africa 
therefore includes the strengthening of the civil society through both its deepening and 
politicisation. 
However, it should be noted that the neo-liberal identification of power and 
exploitation exclusively with the state has been criticised for failing to acknowledge 
that power relations and exploitation can also be found in civil society (Olukoshi 
1996; Adejumobi 2000). In other words, like the state, civil society also embodies 
contradictory tendencies and processes which the neo-liberal political economy 
theorists’ uncritical equation of civil society with democracy sometimes conceals. 
Thus civil society is not, exclusively, a domain of liberty and democracy (Chandler 
2005) and the tendency to oppose it to the state in a one-sided manner does not 
illuminate the ways in which the two inter-penetrate. It could, however, become more 
democratic. Indeed it has been suggested the most effective way to increase 
democratic potential is the support of a revival of ‘peasant culture’. This does not just 
apply to the global South but the North as well. From a radical perspective, 
‘peasantry’ is considered the most effective and enabling class of the future, not of the 
past.359 There is good reason to promote Food Sovereignty as a vehicle for this 
transformation. We now turn our attention to this possibility, specifically in an East 
African context. 
2. The role of government in Kenya 
Predictably the IMF and World Bank, and the government of Kenya, have criticised 
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one another on the nature of structural adjustment programmes and the extent of their 
negative impact on food security. The international financial institutions have 
criticised the Kenyan government for systematically undermining the implementation 
process. Their criticisms include lack of government transparency and financial 
discipline, lack of trade reforms and an inconsistent commitment on behalf of the top 
officials (Swamy 1994). In other words lack of government transparency and 
discipline weakened or nullified the intended structural reforms. It has been said of 
Kenya that ‘one could at best talk of a "facade" democracy in which massaged 
elections were grudgingly arranged, with the perpetuation of civil political autocracy 
under the guise of democratic rule’ (Luckham, 1995: 49-50). Other less diplomatic 
criticisms of Kenyan government performances are much clearer in laying the blame 
on a political system where corruption is endemic and development funds have been 
routinely misappropriated, both to reward political supporters and to private off shore 
bank accounts (Chabal & Daloz 1999;Wrong 2009). The spectacular fortune illicitly 
amassed by Nicholas Biwot, once a pillar of the ruling Kenyan African National 
Union and close confidant of President Daniel Arap Moi, was allegedly built on a 
systematic manipulation of the structures and processes of adjustment-related 
deregulation. Land-related scandals deriving from attempts at privatising what is, for a 
Food Sovereignty model, Africa’s most important resource have been reported, not 
just in Kenya, but also in all corners of the continent. (Chabal & Daloz 1999;Olukoshi 
1996). 
Within the Kenyan government, however, the impact of these structural adjustment 
programmes continues to be a matter of controversy. Whilst essentially supporting the 
reform process aimed at economic development its application quite quickly became a 
cause for concern. Most frequently, the official stance has been that the harsh and 
rapid conditionalities of SA were based on an economic model that did not fit the 
Kenyan political and social structures and conditions (Rono 2002). From a Kenyan 
perspective one of the most common criticisms is that the original emphasis of these 
programmes was on economic issues but their objectives shifted to political issues 
based on Western political models. In order ‘to free’ African economies more external 
controls and intrusive monitoring required national governments to stick to the 
conditions imposed to the point of becoming authoritarian. This accusation can be 
substantiated with evidence that World Bank Reports, for example, moved from a 
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traditional focus on economic matters to political issues such as pluralism, 
decentralisation of power structures, accountability and, most importantly, the reduced 
role of government in the state economy. The logic of conditionality, donor co-
ordination and the stance that ‘there is no alternative’ compel adjusting governments 
to embrace a reform project which they may not necessarily believe in and strive to 
implement it in the face of domestic opposition, popular disaffection and limited 
results. It also sidesteps the domestic policy process, further erodes national 
sovereignty over basic economic policy decision-making, and undermines local 
policy-making capacity (Beckman 1992; Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996; Gibbon and 
Olukoshi 1996; Mkandawire 1998; Mohan 2000). 
The Kenyan government argued that the IMF and World Bank reforms addressed only 
the long-term implications of the economy while in the short-term they caused 
increased hardship, especially among the most vulnerable. This is particularly 
pertinent to Kenyan food security. According to the Kenyan government, between 
1963 and 1982, agriculture GDP recorded high growth rates of 4% and above per 
annum but declined significantly thereafter to reach around 1% in the last two 
decades. From the government’s perspective the factors that impacted negatively on 
agricultural growth included: 
• mismanagement of farmer support institutions that affected the areas of 
marketing, credit, seeds and farm inputs; 
• dumping of agricultural commodities from the developed countries, such as 
dairy, maize and sugar in the local market; 
• depreciation of the Kenya shilling (a policy integral to SA) resulting in large 
increases in the cost of imported agricultural inputs; 
• reduction in donor support reduced resources available for investment in 
agriculture; 
• decline in budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector.360 
These factors all relate to reforms imposed as a direct result of SA and included a 
reduction of government expenditure on subsidies and public services, removal of 
price controls, easing of export licensing and foreign exchange controls and improved 
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incentives for exports. These all had serious implications for the security of food 
provision as did the requirement that grain-marketing boards (GMBs) must not run at 
a loss.361 As a result Kenyan grain reserves were wound down leading to increased 
vulnerability in times of poor harvests. 
The real impact of this loss of government control of food stores can be illustrated by 
two episodes of food shortfall in Kenya before and after structural adjustment. In 
1984-85 Kenya suffered a serious national food deficit that was a greater per capita 
grain shortfall than that experienced at the same time in Ethiopia. Kenya, however did 
not suffer a devastating famine. The Government’s success in averting widespread 
famine has been attributed to President Daniel Arap Moi’s political astuteness 
(Ng’weno 2006), but can also be attributed to the governments pre-structural 
adjustment position in the food industry.362 During the drought Moi’s government 
supplied food to the central highlands and cities (the politically powerful) but also the 
state owned Kenya Meat Commission bought up cattle, even in poor condition, to 
support pastoralists (the politically marginalised) which prevented mass starvation.363 
The drought following failed rains in October-November 2005, however, caused a 
great deal more suffering. The 2005–2006 drought in Kenya occurred after five 
consecutive failed or poor seasons, when the coping strategies of vulnerable 
populations were already stretched to their limit. The impact was both widespread and 
severe. Nearly 3.5 million rural pastoral and farming people in 26 districts were 
affected. Rates of acute malnutrition rose steeply in the north east of the country, to 
between 18% and 30%, significantly higher than the World Health Organisation 
threshold (15%) indicating a critical situation. Thousands of head of livestock died, 
with 30–40% livestock losses (Grünewald et al 2006). The structural adjustment 
policy of reduced emergency food storage, and liberalised grain markets meant that 
some pastoralists lost as much as 80% of their herds (Ng’weno 2006). Unable to grow 
crops or feed or sell their cattle these communities were faced with famine. The irony 
is that in the Western highlands there had been bumper grain harvests whilst in 
northern and eastern Kenya, famine loomed. The government had neither emergency 
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food reserves, nor a mechanism to ensure that grain needed at home could be 
purchased and distributed where needed. The free market doctrine that grain can be 
sold to those who can pay the highest price meant that Kenyan grain was indeed sold 
on the international market. In addition, the Kenya Meat Commission was abolished 
during the structural adjustment programmes, removing another crucial safety net for 
the pastoralists in times of drought.364 
It is widely recognised that the WTO institutionalised the private form of food security 
through the 1995 agreement on agriculture (AOA). In essence, this means that states 
no longer have the right to food self-sufficiency as a national strategy. Rather, the 
minimum market access rule guarantees the right to export, even under conditions of 
subsidised exports. In Kenya, local products were subjected to serious competition 
from imported, often subsidised commodities. This inequity was highlighted in 2000 
when Oxfam posed the question “How can a farmer earning US$230 a year (average 
per capita income in least developed countries) compete with a farmer who enjoys a 
subsidy of US$20,000 a year (average subsidy in OECD countries)?” (Cited in 
McMichael 2008:171). As a result of inequitable trading conditions it seems 
indisputable that the Kenyan poor have become increasingly exposed to serious risks 
such as hunger and unemployment. Thus a result of SA is that ‘food security’, has 
become not self-reliance but rather food import dependency for a large number of 
developing countries including Kenya. 
One of the most important economic objectives of SA in Kenya was to reduce the 
budget deficit. The servicing of the domestic debt created an unsustainable burden on 
the budget during the 1991-1996 development plan period. Interest payments on 
domestic and foreign debt took up 23% of the budget in 1995/1996 and by April 1998 
interest payments on domestic debt, alone, absorbed 15% of total government 
expenditure (Central Bureau of Statistics 1999).365 These high levels of debt, coupled 
with high interest rates had a negative effect on the economy as debt payments 
claimed a disproportionate share of government expenditure. This both increased the 
government deficit and shifted expenditure away from development projects to 
repayment of loans (Rono 2002:87). In general terms the SA programme in Kenya 
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reduced relative government expenditures on basic needs and social services and 
specifically on education and health services.366 Research by Rono (2002) provides 
evidence to show that SA increased the gap between the rich and the poor as well as 
the income gap between the rural and urban populations in Kenya, thus increasing 
poverty levels in absolute and relative terms. Increasing poverty, has been linked to 
increasing crime rates and prisoner populations and is associated with the upsurge of 
the ‘culture of violence’ now considered a feature of Kenyan urban society.367 Negative 
impacts have been observed in declining employment opportunities in general and an 
ongoing decline in the growth of the agricultural sector since the implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes. Kenya has, since independence, relied on the 
agricultural sector as the basis for economic growth, employment creation and foreign 
exchange generation. The fact that this sector is a major source of food security in 
Kenya means it has become a primary concern for the Kenyan government. Responses 
from subsequent governments, however, have been deeply uneven and as we will see 
in the following chapter recent developments in policies and investment in Kenyan 
agriculture are giving cause for even greater concern. 
Regional disparities 
It is understood that structural adjustment programmes have had both direct and 
indirect effects on the political structures of adjusting countries. This is because they 
have an effect on the political attitudes and behaviour of those who gain or lose as a 
result of the adjustments. In the early years of adjustment the main losers in Kenya 
were the urban poor such as those working in the informal sector. This constituency 
blamed the government, and by inference the ruling Kenyan African National Union 
party (KANU), for their economic hardship. The result was a movement in support for 
more radical parties especially the militant ones such as the Islamic party of Kenya 
(IPK) and the National Democratic Party (NDP) (Manundu 1997). It has been argued 
that the immediate post-independence emphasis on ‘development’ became a pretext 
for disallowing political pluralism in Kenya.368 To address this democratic deficit the 
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SA programmes in Kenya included the move towards political pluralism, greater 
democracy, accountability and human rights. The political reality however, has been 
heightened ethnic tensions, polarised communities and increased violent political and 
ethnic clashes. The violence after the contested 2007 Kenyan elections illustrates these 
tensions only too well. More than 1,200 people were killed and 600,000 fled their 
homes in weeks of unrest after the 2007 election.369 The violence began as clashes 
between supporters of the two rival presidential candidates, Raila Odinga and Mwai 
Kibaki but it snowballed into a bloody round of score settling and communal violence. 
The unintended consequence of political pluralism in Kenya is that the principal 
beneficiaries of the imposed political liberalisation (i.e. multi-party elections) were 
well-connected urban interest groups. In addition the evidence that consecutive 
Kenyan presidents favoured their own region and ethnic grouping whilst 
implementing structural adjustment programmes is widespread (Wrong 2009). Not 
only did structural adjustment fail to undermine the clientelist nature of power in 
countries such as Kenya, more critically, it has been said that structural adjustment 
‘has saved the patrimonial African state from complete economic ruin’ (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999:120). Indeed much continues to be written about a new breed of 
independent African rulers who are more in the business of political opportunism and 
maintaining their power bases than accountability and responsiveness to the needs of 
their constituents (Hanson 2009; Kaplan 2003).370 Elaborating on the World Bank’s 
perspective on the crisis of governance in Africa and the ways in which it has stifled 
development generally (World Bank report 1989), its then President, Barber Conable 
noted that 
‘Open political participation has been restricted and even condemned, and 
those brave enough to speak their minds have too frequently taken grave 
personal risks. I fear that many of Africa’s leaders have been more concerned 
about retaining power than about the long-term interests of their people’ 
(Conable 1991:3). 
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Indeed it has been argued, with compelling evidence, that the political effects of SA 
disparities in regions in Kenya reflect earlier patterns of inequality that were 
established during the colonial period (Ng’weno 2006). A report by the Ndung’ 
Commission to investigate patterns of illegal and irregular allocation of public land 
revealed that ‘most illegal allocations of public land took place before or soon after 
the multiparty general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002’371 The so-called democracy 
wave did not build new inclusive political contracts but conversely there is evidence 
that it may have even intensified the urban bias of African politics (Rono 2002; 
Manunda 1997; de Waal 2006).372 The semi-nomads, or Turkana, of northern and 
north-eastern Kenya, have suffered famine for decades. Though various governments 
have blamed this on drought and the backward culture of these ethnic groups a 
political explanation of the regional disparities appears far more convincing. 
The continued repression and restriction of movement enforced on nomads has had 
devastating consequences for their pastoral way of life and by 1980 nomadic herders 
were covering only a tiny fraction of the areas covered by their fathers and 
grandfathers (Sobiana 1988: 221). The result of government policy has been the 
creation of an entire group of welfare recipients and so Kenya, in many ways, offers a 
classic example of a continuation of colonial and post-colonial structural inequalities. 
The contemporary hunger and hardship of mainly Kenyan pastoralists has, if anything 
intensified since the end of colonialism. It has been argued that the ethnic Somali 
pastoralists of Northern Kenya provide a textbook case of ‘a human rights violations 
account of vulnerability to famine’ (de Waal 2006: 40). Successive governments have 
diverted most development resources to urban centres and agricultural projects, 
neither of which benefits pastoralists.373 KANU made certain compromises at 
independence, including safeguarding white settlers commercial and property interests 
and so the exploitation of the African majority continued. It is well documented that 
Kenya pursued a pro-Western capitalist path of development which explicitly sought, 
and received, Western investment. The new African Kenyan governing class joined 
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the landowning (ex-patriot) class, thus perpetuating the same structural causes of rural 
poverty and landlessness. The rural poor are easier to suppress, thus it seems, to date, 
that perpetual oligarchy is more likely to persist in Kenya, until a viable and 
coordinated grassroots political movement gains ground. This is the political space 
that the Food Sovereignty movement seeks to occupy and the pastoral way of life 
would be promoted and protected over and above any industrial food system. 
The distance between the ruler and the ruled, the idea of ‘them and us’ appears to be a 
crucial and ongoing feature of contemporary famine.374 As the example of Kenya 
makes clear, to really understand vulnerability to famine in Africa and develop robust 
systems of prevention, one must focus on the political accountability of those in 
power, not just on elections, party systems and voting rights which have been the 
focus of adjustment programmes.375 This has of course been recognised by the Food 
Sovereignty movement and articulated in its principle 7, which demands democratic 
control.376 
Government attempts to reverse the impact of SA 
In recent years the Kenyan government have formulated two strategy papers relevant 
to food insecurity, the Economic recovery strategy (ERS) and the Strategy for 
Revitalization of Agriculture (SRA) 2004-2014. The ERS presents a broad 
development framework for reviving the economy, creating jobs and reducing 
poverty. Most importantly the ERS recognises agriculture as the critical sector that 
must be revitalised if the economic recovery objective is to be achieved. The SRA is 
expected to contribute significantly towards attainment of the following ERS targets: 
(a) reducing the proportion of the population below the poverty line from 56% in 2000 
to 28% by 2010, 10% by 2015 and 0% by 2020; and (b) reducing the proportion of 
food poor from 48.4% in 2000 to 23.5% in 2010, to 10% in 2015, and be eliminated 
altogether by 2020. By setting theses targets the Kenyan government actually intends 
to reduce hunger faster than envisaged in the Hunger MDG. 
The main national development objectives of the agricultural sector include ensuring 
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food security (access to adequate and balanced food), increasing rural incomes, 
creating employment (on-farm and off-farm), support to agro-industries (supply of 
raw materials to local industries), promoting exports (increasing production, 
diversification and value-adding), and conservation (natural resource management). 
The main service delivery systems to the agricultural sector include technology 
generation (research), technology transfer (extension), facilitating access to credit, 
facilitating access to inputs and development of markets. The food security objective 
aims at ensuring that as far as possible farm households produce sufficient quantities 
of food to meet family nutritional requirements and also produce excess foodstuffs to 
feed non-producers. Increasing rural incomes through production of cash crops, 
livestock products, raw materials for local agro industries and export commodities 
generates cash to raise the quality of life in rural areas (MDGs in Kenya 2005:52). 
Though these government initiatives are, on the face of it, both timely and well 
intentioned, the essential problem lies in the fact that they are still based on market 
solutions. This is problematic because it is the widespread recognition of the failure of 
market solutions to issues of hunger and famine vulnerability that has generated calls 
for an alternative framework in the first place. The question of how current Kenyan 
government policy on food and agriculture can be refocused and reconciled with the 
concept of Food Sovereignty is explored in more depth in the following chapter 7. 
3. The role of government in Ethiopia. 
The fact that Ethiopia was not colonised has meant that it has had a different political 
experience and goes some way towards explaining why the neo-patrimonial model 
cannot be applied to Ethiopian polities in the way it can be said to apply to Kenya. 
However, the role of the government with regard to Ethiopian food insecurity is just 
as salient. Essentially, the role of the Ethiopian government during and after SA 
differs from Kenya in two important ways. First, conflict has been a major factor in 
recent Ethiopian famines and food has been used as a weapon of war. Secondly, 
because its political system has been based more on a Marxist rather than a liberal 
economic model the government has made greater attempts to ensure food security 
through the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP).377 This programme provides cash 
in return for labour on community projects, or food for those unable to work over a 
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five year period. International donors substantially fund both emergency food aid and 
the PSNP in Ethiopia. Indeed the fact that Ethiopia, despite suffering more adverse 
drought conditions, has fared better than Somalia in the current crisis in the horn of 
Africa (2011), is largely attributed to the success of these government programmes. It 
is also acknowledged that Ethiopia is less conflict ridden than in the past whereas 
Somalia continues to be beset by complex obstacles to stability and security.378 The 
role of conflict in famine vulnerability continues to be an important one and has been 
recognised by advocates of Food Sovereignty as an ongoing obstacle. It has thus been 
incorporated as the sixth principle of Food Sovereignty, which demands social 
peace.379 This principle enshrines and emphasises the right to be free from violence 
and the outlawing of the use of food as a weapon of war. The Statute of Rome, which 
provides the framework for the International Criminal Court (ICC), is quite explicit 
with regard to mass starvation on three dimensions. It is a war crime, if used as a 
weapon of war; a crime against humanity, if it is the deliberate extermination of a 
civilian population; and genocide if the whole, or part of a national, ethnic, religious 
or racial group is singled out for starvation. 
Conflict. 
It is impossible to discuss recent conflicts in Ethiopia without acknowledging the 
presence of certain political factors both internal and external. The competing 
ideologies of the cold war coupled with an abundance of natural resources spawned a 
diverse range of conflicts across the whole continent of Africa, in some cases leading 
governments to mount violent counter insurgency campaigns among their own 
populations. The United States, for example, twice helped President Mobutu crush 
separatist movements in the Congo’s mineral rich Katanga province, while the Soviet 
Union helped Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia defeat similar efforts in Eritrea and 
the Ogaden region (Klare 2002). Counter-insurgency wars, by their very nature, seek 
not only to inflict a military defeat but also to disempower the opposition, deny them 
an identity and undermine their ability to maintain political and economic integrity. 
However, the common assertion that war creates famine does not always illuminate 
the complex relationship between, the sometimes discrete but more often overlapping, 
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political, economic and military purposes. 
Undermining the ability of communities to produce or obtain food, which renders 
them destitute, dependent on aid, and thus politically compliant, is illustrative of the 
political function. For example, the seizure of Dinka resources such as land, livestock 
and access to oil by government-supported militias in Sudan reduced the Dinka to 
destitution and removed them as a political threat (Keen 1994b). Conversely, 
providing food, especially in times of scarcity and disruption, places the benefactors in 
a powerful position to win the hearts and minds of a particular section of the 
population and thus secure their support. The federal Ethiopian government has been 
accused of ignoring the desperate food situation in the Somali region, 1999-2000, 
whilst responding effectively to the Prime Minister’s home region of Tigray 
(Devereux 2009a). In this sense, food is very much a political motivator in the present 
context, just as it has always been in the past. 
Many categories have been used in the analysis of food as a weapon of war, but those 
of omission, commission and provision (Macrae and Zwi 1994) work particularly well 
in a political context. This first category covers instances where governments fail to 
adequately monitor and plan for food security in some, or all, sections of a country. 
For example the failure to prevent the serious food crisis in 2008, despite the 
existence of the PSNP led to serious criticisms of the Ethiopian government response 
(Lefort 2009). Omission includes failure to manage food reserves380 and organise and 
implement appropriate emergency measures. The UN resolution 43/131, passed in 
1988, urged governments to enable the delivery of humanitarian assistance to victims 
of disasters and take advantage of the international community’s ability to provide aid 
and assistance.381 However the UN’s ability to intervene remained seriously 
compromised by the continued supremacy of national sovereignty and the requirement 
of government permission to mobilise aid. Government unwillingness to protect the 
interests of the people, or worse, to actively oppress or discriminate against them, 
creates significant problems in making relief available. Among the well-documented 
examples is the refusal of Ethiopian president Mengistu to allow aid into rebel held 
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areas of Tigray and Eritrea during the 1984 famine (Clay & Holcombe 1985).382 
This example raises a whole set of questions about what ‘sovereignty’ actually means 
and whether or not it is particularly problematic in an African context.383 Furthermore 
the fact that ‘sovereignty’ in the context of Food Sovereignty does not primarily refer 
to nation-state sovereignty is an important development in terms of food insecurities 
and one with great potential.384 
As stated, Ethiopia has been beset by conflict for decades and the Tigray region in 
Northern Ethiopia has been caught up in what may be described as a complex 
emergency of the worst kind since the mid 1970s.385 Multiple factors have brought 
disaster to this area but, in particular, a drought in a region heavily dependent on rain- 
fed crops, and an internal conflict between the central Ethiopian government of 
Mengistu and the then rebel movement, The Tigray Peoples’ Liberation Front 
(TPLF).386 The much-publicised famine of 1984/85, in Tigray, was the combined effect 
of these two factors at their peak. The conflict destroyed or reduced the people’s 
options for physical survival in the way that it denied them access to all their usual 
coping strategies (Homer-Dixon 1999).387 After 1985, localised famines continued 
until the end of the war when coalition forces led by the TPLF took the capital of 
Addis Ababa in May 1991. In this context the importance attached to national 
sovereignty, in terms of a food crisis, is obvious. Governments are able to withhold 
from their citizens the right to assistance from the U.N and other humanitarian 
agencies, because without government consent, these agencies are technically unable 
to operate within national borders. 
From a political perspective, the second category of commission raises different, and 
perhaps more compelling, issues because unlike the category of omission, there is a 
clear demonstration of intent. Intentional acts in the creation of famine include 
‘attacks on the means of producing and procuring food, the hindrance of coping 
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strategies, including attacks on relief convoys, safe corridors and markets,’ (Macrae & 
Zwi 1994: 13-14). 
It is clear that attacks on food consumption and production are often central to the 
process of famine creation and act as an accelerant for the descent into starvation and 
hunger related deaths of civilian populations. Attacks on food produce include 
scorched earth tactics, by both ground troops and aerial bombing, and attacks on grain 
stores. Grain stores are a central feature of traditional food security structures 
particularly in a pre-structural adjustment setting; their destruction therefore has 
obvious, devastating consequences. 
During periods of production failure, communities who usually survive through 
subsistence agriculture become increasingly dependent on markets to sell their assets 
in exchange for grain. Markets also provide employment and act as centres of 
information, often vital to decision making processes that dictate survival. Because of 
the devastating social and economic consequences for rural communities, military 
forces have often directly attacked markets. ‘Operation Red Star’, conducted by the 
Ethiopian government, in 1982, to isolate Eritrea from food supplies is one well-
known example of such tactics (Hendrie 1991). 
Sieges of towns and cities represent one of the most dramatic restrictions on a 
population’s ability to produce and consume sufficient food. The siege of the Eritrean 
capital of Asmara, which lasted for almost a year, is one such infamous example 
(Africa Watch 1990b). Furthermore, food aid itself is often targeted, with both 
government and rebel forces arguing that attacks on relief convoys are justified 
because they often serve as a cover to supply weapons and other provisions to 
opposition forces. This problem becomes acute when relief, as it often does, moves as 
part of a military convoy. More disturbingly, feeding centres themselves can be 
directly targeted, as occurred during the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict and is occurring in 
Somalia in a present context.388 
Forced population movements represent one of the most severe nutritional and health 
risks to which war affected Ethiopian communities were subjected. Both government 
and rebel forces forcibly displaced large civilian populations in Ethiopia during the 
conflict (Macrae & Zwi 1994: 18-19). The reasons are often, ostensibly, for ‘a 
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community’s own protection’ but in reality they are more to do with de-populating 
areas of rebel activity, to provide slave labour and to remove potential sources of 
support from the opposition. Displaced communities are amongst the most vulnerable 
in conflict related famines and are often forced to move by both hunger and violence. 
Indeed the use of these tactics illustrates one of the key weaknesses of Sen’s analysis 
and economic famine theories in general. Sen’s analysis does not take sufficient 
account of the use of force, where politically powerful groups resort to various kinds 
of force to transfer wealth from victims to themselves, whether that is land, cattle or 
access to natural resources. From this perspective it is powerlessness, not poverty, 
which leads to famine. On the contrary, the Food Sovereignty model recognises, quite 
explicitly, the role of conflict in exacerbating food insecurity. 
The third classification in this analysis is a form of commission but relates specifically 
to the differential supply of food during conflicts. Food may be selectively supplied to 
current or potential government supporters or used to lure sections of the population 
to areas controlled by the military. The abuse of food aid, for political purposes, is not 
well documented, but there is increasing recognition that food aid may well have 
prolonged conflicts in the recent past, a point addressed in Chapter 5.389 Reports from 
refugees in Sudan claimed that the Ethiopian government used the promise of food aid 
to encourage peasants from rebel held areas to cross military lines and enter towns 
under government control (Clay and Holcombe 1985). Once inside the towns, 
however, people were rounded up for resettlement on state farms in the south of the 
country. Although the resettlement programmes were presented to the international 
community as a means of responding to the famine in the North, many Tigrayans 
viewed it as political and a military operation aimed specifically at depopulating the 
countryside in order to weaken the support for the TPLF (REST 1985). The current 
food crisis in Somalia, which is inextricably linked to internal conflict, demonstrates 
only too well the ongoing obstacles to overcoming differential food supplies.390 
It is important to note that the acts of the central Ethiopian Government were also 
influencing the strategic use of international relief. For example, it refused to 
guarantee safe passage of relief supplies to Tigray despite appeals from the UN and 
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the ICRC. Such an agreement would have allowed relief transports to travel from 
towns across military lines to the worst affected rural areas. From the Government’s 
perspective, however, this would have given de facto recognition of the TPLF’s 
control of large parts of the countryside, and also have been an admission that 
Government provisions for the starving in the north were failing (Jansson et al 1987). 
Instead, people from TPLF areas were expected to enter the government towns to 
receive dry ration distributions. As mentioned, however, fear and harassment from 
government soldiers effectively discouraged this option, allowing the government to 
deny food aid to rebel areas by restricting the geographic scope of the relief 
programme. 
The case of Tigray is a classic example of a government’s ability to control not only 
the flow of aid resources but also the flow of information, by exploiting diplomatic 
prerogatives, inherent in the concept of state sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty 
and the corollary of non-interference in a state’s internal affairs were invoked many 
times by major donors as a reason for not challenging the government more strongly 
on the relationship between food aid and warfare in the region.391 
More specifically, the government refused to acknowledge that a war was being 
waged in the north, thus donors were encouraged to view the situation as an internal 
security problem as opposed to an openly declared conflict (Kaplan 2003). Again 
parallels can be drawn here with the current famine in parts of Somalia and the 
ongoing conflict in Darfur.392 
It is well established that it is the politically powerless groups, especially during 
conflict, which are the most vulnerable to hunger but the role of conflict in modern 
famines is now understood as more complex than in the past (Keen 1994a). There are 
beneficiaries as well as victims and it has been the case that the wealthy may well be 
targeted (Duffield 2001). It is fair to say that in recent years there has been an 
increased flexibility in relief operations involved in areas of conflict, but there is a 
clear need for more emphasis on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-
conflict reconstruction. The failures in the Tigray area, during 1984/85 had much to 
                                                          
391
 Obvious parallels can be drawn with the current situation in Darfur, Sudan, though lack of 
intervention may have more to do with UK/US military overstretch in Afghanistan and Iraq than 
recognition of Sudanese sovereignty. 
392
 Jamal Osman. ‘Famine in Somalia.’ Guardian Focus podcast. guardian.co.uk, 18 August 2011 
Michelle Springfield    Chapter 6 
The Political Context of Food Insecurity 
 Page 216 
 
do with the almost total dependence on the Ethiopian government for information and 
distribution and its ability to manipulate events. In other words there was a complete 
lack of accountability nationally and internationally. The political unwillingness (or 
inability) of the UN to establish lines of communication with both sides, i.e. including 
the TPLF, created a life threatening distortion in both the perception and planning of 
relief operations. 
The principal of respect for state sovereignty was extended beyond reasonable 
boundaries by stopping information about conditions in rebel held areas as well as an 
effective ban on relief managers and political authorities from any contact in these 
zones. This resulted in the exclusion of up to 3 million people from access to the 
world’s food aid until it was too late (Hendrie 1994: 137). The Ethiopian experience 
of famine offers very clear lessons for policy makers both within and beyond the 
current Ethiopian government. For example the placing of rights at the forefront of 
defining the outer limits of a country’s sovereignty would prevent this situation 
occurring in the future (Rawls 1999). Indeed an emphasis on rights is the cornerstone 
of Food Sovereignty and as such this framework would go a long way towards 
reducing vulnerability to famine during times of conflict as well as peace.393 This is an 
extremely important point in developing and strengthening the arguments for Food 
Sovereignty as a responsive policy framework for global agricultural change. 
Concluding comments 
It is a common belief that one of the most important reasons for the continued failure 
of famine prevention and relief systems in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia is 
national government failure and abuse of power. This chapter has developed the 
argument that famines can result from the conscious exercise of power in pursuit of 
gain or advantage. Whilst this is undoubtedly part of the problem it is also the case 
that international influences have been a significant contributory factor and continue 
to be so. This position has been defended in previous chapters in terms of the negative 
impact of neo-liberal SA policy on government accountability, and how the 
internationalisation of welfare, the so-called ‘international safety-net’ has further 
reduced national governments’ responsibility and accountability to their people. This 
chapter has emphasised the important role that democratic systems and public 
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accountability can play in preventing famines, in both a national and an international 
context. A strict interpretation of the ‘democracy prevents famine thesis’ (Sen 2001) is 
that famine would never be able to occur in a democratic society with a free press. A 
weak interpretation, on the other hand, merely hypothesises that democracy and a free 
press reduce the likelihood of famine, because they increase government 
responsiveness, but it does not rule it out altogether. Thus weak or undemocratic 
African states must bear some responsibility for famine.394 
In the absence of a variety of political safeguards that are crucial to a fully functioning 
democracy, the dominant paradigm of economic development, pursued through free 
markets and adjustment programmes, will not provide lasting protection against 
famine. Political powerlessness is a critical factor in the occurrence of famine because 
it is largely a result of lack of protection and lack of political representation. 
In famine analysis there is often a weak call for ‘political will’ to bridge the gap 
between knowledge of technical measures and action to implement them’ (de Waal 
2006: 1). It is suggested here that Food Sovereignty can be thought of as a bridge 
between these two areas. Part of the essence of the Food Sovereignty framework is to 
regain policy space for national policymaking. However, it is important to understand 
that the potential for, and obstacles to, Food Sovereignty reside both in the 
relationships between the people and their governments and between national 
governments and international political and economic institutions. Thus it is highly 
relevant that Food Sovereignty does not primarily refer to nation-state sovereignty but 
rather a new and modern definition of sovereignty. In this context sovereignty is used 
to demand the right to control policies, the distribution of resources, and national and 
international decision-making for those who are directly affected by these policies. 
The term has therefore more of a connotation of local democracy, participatory 
development, and subsidiarity than of national policy formulation and government 
bureaucracies. These themes are brought together, specifically with regard to the issue 
of land, in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 – FOOD SOVEREIGNTY IN KENYA AND 
ETHIOPIA: THE ISSUE OF LAND 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together the potential of Food Sovereignty in 
Ethiopia and Kenya with some distinctive issues associated with land. This chapter is 
organised thematically around the three problematic issues of land tenure, land grabs 
and land use. These three areas constitute both possibilities and obstacles for 
achieving Principle 2 of Food Sovereignty, which demands radical agrarian reform.395 
For Food Sovereignty to become more than a normative concept, agriculture needs to 
be utilised as an instrument for strengthening food security and, it is argued, this can 
only happen through comprehensive agrarian reforms. One way of doing this is by 
increasing food production for local consumption through land distribution and 
tenure. This both challenges the global food system, as it is currently constituted, and 
makes greater demands on the involvement of national governments in their own food 
systems.396 Although Kenya and Ethiopia are facing similar challenges with regards to 
food security at present, their policies with regard to land and agricultural policy, 
particularly in the recent past, are quite different. Furthermore, their approach to land 
reform in a current context is also assuming different directions.397 This chapter seeks 
to establish whether or not these changes can be compatible with a Food Sovereignty 
framework. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. Part 1 looks at the issue of land tenure in 
Ethiopia and Kenya in a comparative context.398 The issue of land in these two 
countries is linked to their relative histories, their place in the global food system and 
their problems of internal governance. It will be shown in this section that the land 
issue can be conceived of as straddling the international-domestic divide. Part 2 
analyses the recent and growing phenomenon of so-called land grabbing in Kenya and 
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 See below. 
396
 See Chapter 6. 
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 Efforts by states to redistribute land since World War II, at least those in market economies, have 
utilised five basic models: land to the tiller reforms, ceilings reforms, restitution reforms, privatisation 
reforms, and, most recently, ‘community-based’ (or ‘market-mechanism’) reform. Each model tends to 
be linked to particular historical and regional circumstances giving rise to the perceived inequitable or 
inefficient distribution of land that the reform seeks to address. See Bruce (2008:20) for a useful 
discussion on the five basic models. 
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 Land tenure is the name given, particularly in common law systems, to the legal regime in which land 
is owned by an individual, who is said to "hold" the land, from the French ‘tenir’. 
Michelle Springfield   Chapter 7 
Food Sovereignty in Kenya and Ethiopia 
The Issue of Land 
 Page 219 
 
Ethiopia, again in a comparative context. The controversy around the phenomenon of 
land grabs is of growing importance for those concerned with land rights and these 
developments will be analysed in terms of how they equate with a Food Sovereignty 
framework. While international land deals are emerging as a global phenomenon, in 
keeping with previous chapters, the focus here is specifically on Kenya and Ethiopia. 
For the purpose of this discussion, ‘land grabbing’ is defined as taking possession of 
and/or controlling an area of land for commercial/industrial agricultural production. 
This definition does not focus on what may well be abusive practices in the process of 
acquiring the land but rather on the distributional aspects of the phenomenon and its 
impact on the political economy and the local and national populations’ right to 
resources associated with food. This definition of land grabbing includes both national 
and foreign investors. Part 3 addresses the tension between the use of productive land 
for growing biofuels or agrofuels rather than food.399 There is no doubt that the biofuel 
boom is a contributing factor to the problem of food insecurity outlined in Chapter 1. 
Although not yet a dominant causal factor akin to the liberal economic adjustment 
programmes or the dependency on food aid discussed in previous chapters, it seems 
certain that the demand for agrofuel can only exacerbate the problem of food 
insecurity.400 This chapter further advances the argument that a Food Sovereignty 
paradigm would provide a viable solution to many of issues raised in this thesis. 
1. Land tenure 
The second principle of Food Sovereignty demands agrarian reform articulated as 
follows. ‘A genuine agrarian reform is necessary which gives landless and farming 
people – especially women – ownership and control of the land they work and returns 
territories to indigenous peoples. The right to land must be free of discrimination on 
the basis of gender, religion, race, social class or ideology; the land belongs to those 
who work it.’401 As we will see in the following examples this vision does not 
represent the current position in East Africa and, furthermore, the breadth of scope 
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 These terms are used interchangeably in this discussion and are mainly derived from biomass or bio 
waste. Agricultural products that are specially grown for the production of biofuels include switchgrass, 
soybeans and corn in the United States, sugar cane in Brazil and sugar beet and wheat in Europe. China 
produces cassava and sorghum, Southeast Asia produces miscanthus and palm oil while India produces 
jatropha. In Africa, actual and potential biofuel crops include sugarcane, maize, sweet sorghum, 
cassava, palm oil and jatropha. 
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will, inevitably, raise questions concerning its feasibility. 
This level of agrarian reform, which is so central to Food Sovereignty, is dependent, 
first and foremost, on the reform of land tenure to reflect a more democratic model of 
ownership and control. These two factors have a clear impact on an individual or 
group capacity to produce food. The capacity to produce food depends on the resource 
base available to agriculture and this includes not only land, but also other aspects of 
production such as labour and machinery. In addition it includes farmers’ knowledge, 
the production potential of crop varieties, climatic factors such as water and sunlight 
and the methods used to increase yields, control weeds, insects and disease. The size 
of the resource base can obviously be increased or decreased: the former by 
investment and the latter by neglect or sale. It is a critical point and must be 
emphasised that nearly all the factors of the resource base can be altered. Just like the 
global food system, in general, land use is a human political construct and thus on the 
face of it, could be amenable to intervention and reform. It is now widely understood 
that primary sectors of national economies, such as agriculture, are essential for 
countries’ and peoples’ self-determination, food security and Food Sovereignty 
(Zeigler 2008). 
The first rather obvious precondition to growing food is access to land. Most Third 
World inhabitants live in the countryside, for example 80% in Asia and as high as 
95% in some parts of Africa (Fletcher 2006). To reiterate some of the issues discussed 
in Chapter 1, every poor country has, without exception, a greater proportion of its 
population whose only means of livelihood is agriculture rather than any other sector. 
Though all poor countries have incidences of appalling urban poverty in and around 
their large cities, and this is universally expected to rise (Davis 2006), most of what 
the World Bank calls the ‘absolute poor’, i.e. living on less than one dollar a day, still 
lives in rural areas.402 The 2008 World Development Report states that three out of four 
of the poorest people in developing countries live in rural areas (WDR 2008). 
Paradoxically, then, those who live on the land, and are technically in the position of 
feeding themselves, are the most likely to go hungry. It has been shown, empirically, 
that this paradox is, to a very large degree, a question of land ownership thus 
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highlighting the need for comprehensive land reform (Windfuhr & Jonsén 2005). In 
general terms land ownership in Africa tends to be concentrated in the hands of the 
few403 and the growing trend of large land acquisitions by both foreign and national 
investors is unlikely to change this situation.404 
The Ethiopian example 
For decades, Ethiopia has been known to the outside world as a country of famine, 
food shortages, endemic hunger, and chronic dependency on foreign aid. Despite 
receiving billions of dollars in aid, Ethiopians remain among the poorest in the 
world.405 It is important therefore to understand how this position can be linked, 
specifically, to land tenure. The contemporary land situation in Ethiopia can be traced 
to 1974 and the rise to power of the Derg. This changed the political and economic 
landscape of the country from a ‘feudal’ system towards a ‘socialist’ system. In 1975, 
major land reform took place which abolished existing systems, replacing them with 
communal (i.e. state) ownership of land. These changes were enshrined in the 1987 
Constitution. Farmers would receive free land in their place of residence with specific 
use requirements.406 From 1976-78, there were efforts to confiscate land from those 
families with more than 10 hectares (ha) to redistribute equally to other farmers 
through peasant associations. Throughout the 1980s, there was a continued 
collectivisation of land and agriculture, and one could argue that the situation was not 
altogether incompatible with a Food Sovereignty model. It may not have been 
democratic but it prioritised small rural farmers and localised control of food 
production through peasant organisations. However in 1989, the Derg announced its 
intent to move towards more market-based approaches to land tenure more in keeping 
with a neo-liberal economic model. 
In 1991, Meles Zenawi’s TPLF came to power forming a ruling political coalition 
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 John Bruce co-coordinated an in-depth profile of land tenure in Africa country by country that 
supports this assertion. See LTC Research Paper 130 available from Land Tenure Center, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison December 1998. 
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 See section 2 on land grabs. 
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 It would be misleading, however, to portray Ethiopians as an homogenous group in terms of poverty 
rates. There are in fact significant differences between and within the country’s regions and 
communities. See, for example, Devereux (2007). 
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(2008:20). 
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called the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)407 and 
continued the system of ‘universal access’ and state ownership of land. The political 
(socialist) rationale for this policy was that opening land markets would provide 
inroads for dispossession of land from poor and vulnerable peasants. The 1995 re-
enactment of the Constitution thus reaffirmed state ownership of land. According to 
the Constitution, landholders have the right to transfer land and assets (under specific 
conditions) and the right to compensation in case of expropriation. Furthermore, under 
the Constitution there was an increased recognition of pastoralist rights, a fact that has 
great relevance in a contemporary context and again, lends itself to Principle 2 of the 
Food Sovereignty model. 
The 1996 Constitutional land reforms in Ethiopia contained several important 
changes, including legalising land leases and rentals. The Federal Rural Land 
Administration and Use Proclamation (Proclamation 89/1997) heralded a move 
towards decentralisation, enabling regional governments to make laws to administer 
their lands. On the face of it, this could be construed as a positive step towards the 
democratisation of localised food systems (Principle 7). For example at the federal 
level, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) has the mandate 
for land issues. At the regional levels, responsibility for land administration varies 
between regions and, in practice, rural land administration and use is carried out at the 
woreda (district) and kebele (village) levels. 
However, since early 2008, the Ethiopian federal government has embarked on a 
process to award millions of hectares of land to foreign and national agricultural 
investors. Recent research shows that at least 3,619,509 ha of land have been 
transferred to investors, although the author of the report for the Oakland Institute 
acknowledges the actual number may be higher (Horne 2011). As stated, regional 
governments now determine land tenure and certification specifics in Ethiopia, which 
may be beneficial to rural populations but these vary from region to region so 
potential benefits are not consistent. There are three main types of systems of arable 
land rights in practice in Ethiopia today: administrative based, market-based, and 
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customary-based non-market arrangements, however these ‘rights’ need to be 
understood in terms of continued state-ownership of all land. 
1. Administrative-based. Under this system, eligible families have the right to land, 
subject to a size limit. These rights are usually unrestricted except for 
conservation and/or improvement requirements. There are increasing rental rights 
associated with this system and it has become the most common system in use. 
2. Market-based. This has largely occurred because the demand for land is 
outstripping the supply in many areas of the country. Farm sizes are dropping, 
whereas local populations are growing. Rent markets are based on supply/demand 
factors. The usual form is shared tenancy, short-term contracts and very limited 
and specific uses. These rights are not usually transferable, and lands are rarely 
left fallow (arguably resulting in further land degradation). 
3. Customary-based non-market arrangements. This is the dominant system in the 
lowland areas where much of the current foreign direct investment in land is 
focused. It is also where the most marginalised group of Somali pastoralists are 
located. It usually involves some claim to ancestral lands and hereditary rights are 
still dominant in this type of tenure. There are many variations of this system 
depending on the ethnicity of the people and the location, which can make it more 
sensitive to local needs. In addition to arable land rights, there are rights to pooled 
resources, or ‘commons’, which are used for grazing, hunting, fishing, spiritual 
purposes, or other resource uses. Typically these are managed through customary 
arrangements and this aspect of Ethiopian land tenure could lend itself more easily 
to a Food Sovereignty framework than the administrative or market based 
arrangements. Access to these areas is managed through groups with customary 
claim to the area. The mode of access and sharing of use, as well as the use of 
these areas by other groups, are often governed by informal, but well understood, 
rules. In a current context state involvement in these processes is minimal and this 
fact is absolutely crucial but in contrasting ways. 
Despite the strong constitutional basis for pastoralists’ rights in Ethiopia, it has been 
noted that government policies have historically disregarded the communal land 
tenure traditions that characterise pastoral production (Hagmann 2005a). Numerous 
reports of pastoralists loss of lands and lack of secure tenure would appear to support 
this assertion. Examples include the current controversial issues with the dam 
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construction in the Omo valley, land issues with Afar pastoralists in the Awash valley, 
and the issue of the Karruyu Oromo pastoralists (See Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008) 
Thus Principle 2 of Food Sovereignty which would give landless and farming people 
– especially women – ownership and control of the land they work and return 
territories to indigenous peoples requires a different, more proactive type of state 
involvement. By institutionalising the right to land and ensuring that its allocation is 
free of discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, race, social class or ideology, 
the state would take on a more positive and constitutionally ordained role. Customary 
non-market based arrangements are, therefore, a useful and appropriate model for 
Food Sovereignty but they must be protected. A second requirement for state 
intervention in land matters in Ethiopia concerns the need for state protection of 
vulnerable groups from external forces. The potential for exploitation of certain 
groups involved in the land acquisition process and the positive role that the state 
could play are discussed in part 2 of this chapter. Despite these very real issues, it can 
be said that the ‘communal logic’ of Ethiopian politics is a feature that lends itself to a 
Food Sovereignty model and we will now see how this compares with the Kenyan 
example. 
The Kenyan example 
Land tenure 
As one would expect Kenya’s different experience, historically and politically has also 
left its imprint on its land tenure system. Kenya’s arable land constitutes 9.2% of the 
country’s territory, of which 1.8% is irrigated.408 Smallholdings have an important role 
in Kenyan agricultural production, as they are responsible for about 70% of the 
general crop production.409 Despite this key function in food production smallholdings 
are generally in an unstable position as only 6% of the land in the country is registered 
under individual titles. Smallholders have both customary and statutory rights in 
Kenya, but the large number of different legislations and policies issued by the 
government has restricted further registration, mainly due to a large number of land 
adjudications, and the fear by smallholders of having their customary rights 
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 Rural Poverty Portal, Kenya Statistics, available at: 
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/guest/country/statistics/tags/kenya. Accessed 20/01/2010. 
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 FAO, Land Reform: Land Settlement and Cooperatives, 2001/2002, p. 50. Available at: 
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disregarded. Land has always played an essential role in Kenya, both politically and 
socio-economically. During British rule,410 many of the uplands of Kenya, the so-
called ‘While Highlands’ and adjacent rangelands, were dispossessed and given to 
European settlers. It is estimated that 20% of Kenya’s land, most of which were prime 
agriculture lands, was seized in this process (FIAN 2010). This colonial land policy 
was legalised by colonial legislation, replacing the customary land tenure systems with 
the implementation of an individual freehold title registration system, and thereby 
taking away the local inhabitants’ guaranteed claims over their land.411 Furthermore, 
colonial laws did not consider the indigenous groups to be ‘capable’ of holding direct 
land titles, and therefore held land ‘on trust’ for them by governmental authorities.412 
Kenya’s first president after its independence, Jomo Kenyatta, gave major political 
posts as well as much of the fertile central highlands to a small group of Kikuyu (the 
ethnic group to which the President belonged) at the expense of other ethnic groups 
(Wrong 2009). These land inequalities were further aggravated by Kenyatta’s 
successor, Danial arap Moi. Like his predecessor, it is generally understood that Moi 
used public lands as patronage resources and means to maintain control during the 
1990s, at the advent of multiparty politics in Kenya.413 Land was traded for political 
support and allocated to influential individuals and to groups on whose support the 
government depended (Chua 2003). This is both a predictable and a rational response 
in a political system characterised by neo-patrimonialism.414 The Ndungu Report, a 
report by the Ndungu Commission to investigate patterns of illegal and irregular 
allocation of public land, revealed that ‘most illegal allocations of public land took 
place before or soon after the multiparty general elections of 1992, 1997 and 2002’.415 
Kenya has not yet recovered from civil strife after the disputed presidential elections 
in January 2007. What is commonly referred to as post-election violence cost the lives 
of around 1,200 Kenyans and displaced around 400,000 (FIAN 2010) and this 
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making of Land-Grabbing Millionaires, Living Large Series, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2006, p. 1. 
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continues to impact on the people and their relationship with the land. 
Issues over land in Kenya have been on the political agenda for some time but the 
New Land Policy (NLP), whilst still in its development stage, was delayed due to the 
2007 post-election violence. It was finally adopted by Parliament in December 2009. 
Up until that point land policy in Kenya was not explicitly articulated in any policy 
document, nonetheless, the legal framework for land had been clear and consistent for 
decades. In keeping with a neo-liberal political economy it was accepted, 
unquestionably, that only private ownership of land could ensure economic growth. 
Consequently, as a result of the dominant neo-liberal paradigm, customary tenure in 
Kenya has been neglected and treated as an inferior tenure system. Accordingly, the 
thrust of laws previous to the NLP had been to individualise all modes of tenure, 
especially customary tenure. It is clear, however, that serious injustices in terms of 
land use and distribution occurred (Chua 2003). Some involve illegal and irregular 
allocations of public and reserve lands depriving local populations of their food and 
economic resources. It is understood that these resentments lie behind the ongoing 
ethnic conflict in the Rift Valley.416 
It is noteworthy that the NLP tends to use the term ‘illegitimate’, rather than ‘illegal’ 
in dealing with historical injustices. This would indicate that the new land programme 
seeks to redress shifts of land ownership viewed as unfair or unjust, even though they 
may be legal (Bruce 2008) In this respect it can be said that Kenya land policy is 
moving closer towards a system that can, at least in part, be compatible with a Food 
Sovereignty model. The direction of the NLP also indicates that there are grounds for 
thinking that present circumstances favour the legal bureaucratisation of the political 
order in Kenya in a way that the theory of neo-patrimonial precludes.417 
For example, the current Constitution in Kenya establishes three types of land: 
government land, private land, and trust land while the NLP distinguishes between 
public land, community land and private land. The category of government land that 
was previously ‘owned’ by the State, and for which the President was legally 
empowered to allocate, will be replaced by public land, and will come under the 
National Land Commission, which is to be accountable to Parliament. As such, the 
                                                          
416
 See ‘Ethnic Violence in Rift Valley Is Tearing Kenya Apart’ at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/ 
Accessed 15/11/11. 
417
 See Chapter 6. 
Michelle Springfield   Chapter 7 
Food Sovereignty in Kenya and Ethiopia 
The Issue of Land 
 Page 227 
 
President will no longer have a privilege of giving away land freely. This certainly 
weakens the theory that political elites in African countries such as Kenya will always 
exploit government resources, such as land, for patrimonial purposes. They may, in 
other words, give way to ‘institutionalised legitimacy’, which shifts the supremacy of 
the individual to the supremacy of institutions, that is, parliament (Chabal & Daloz, 
1999). This is a positive step towards principle 7 of Food Sovereignty which demands 
that ‘everyone has the right to honest, accurate information and open and democratic 
decision-making. These rights form the basis of good governance, accountability and 
equal participation in economic, political and social life, free from all forms of 
discrimination’.418 
The former trust land will become community land, and will not be ‘held in trust’ by 
local county councils but instead administered by the local communities. This 
increases democratic control over issues of land. In the past, the county councils 
which consisted of a number of elected and appointed councillors needed to seek the 
consent of the communities whenever they wanted to dispose of portions of the trust 
land. Legally, the local councils cannot sell it but they may lease it for up to 99 years. 
In practice, however, communities were rarely consulted (Bruce 2008). Both the 
county councils and central government treated trust land as if it were government 
land and the communities were simply informed when trust land was leased or even 
sold. This is why land administration has become the centre of controversy; the former 
allocation process lacked transparency because it was almost exclusively in the hands 
of the President. No regard was taken of the interests of the residents, tenants or 
squatters in the area. Under the NLP, all land allocations must be made public to the 
people so objections can be raised. The NLP also ensures that land use by foreign 
investors complies with environmental standards and that land use benefits first and 
foremost local citizens, and colonial land leases allowed for up to 999 years would be 
limited to 99 years (FIAN 2010). In view of the rising foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in Africa, this is a timely and important development. Before moving on to discuss the 
growing phenomenon of FDI and land-grabs it would be useful to consider the 
Malawi model of land reform. There are good reasons to argue that these reforms are 
compatible with a Food Sovereignty framework and could be adopted in a Kenyan and 
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Ethiopian context. 
The Malawi model. 
It is clear that the present distribution of land in Kenya is inequitable and it has been 
argued that if the land reforms proposed by the NLP were fulfilled they would go 
some way towards achieving agrarian reform as advocated by a Food Sovereignty 
model. This is especially true of the proposed return to customary rights rather than 
private ownership of land. The question is whether programs of the nature put forward 
by the NLP can be implemented in an equitable fashion and in a manner that avoids 
major negative impacts on food production. In an atmosphere of deep ethnic 
resentment over land issues, many of the NPL solutions are framed in terms of 
historical injustices that have cut along lines of race and ethnicity. In this way the 
reforms resemble a ‘restitution’ model’ of reform. This can be troublesome in many 
ways. The process of their implementation, though aimed to redress those ethnically 
charged injustices, may in the short run acerbate the tensions those injustices have 
caused. As the example of Zimbabwe shows only too well, badly implemented land 
reforms based on a ‘restitution model’ can have devastating consequences across the 
whole society. 
Thus it has been suggested that the Kenyan Government might consider a different 
land reform agenda, one that is framed in ethnically neutral terms, such as classic 
‘ceilings’ (Bruce 2008:20). ‘Ceilings reforms’ is the model most associated with Latin 
American reforms in the 1960s. In the Latin American case, the large estates were 
often worked as at least partly integrated operations, by a paid labour force (who 
usually had their small food plots), rather than tenants. A legal maximum size of 
holding was legislated, and all or a part of each holding that exceeds that maximum 
(the ‘ceiling’) was taken by the state for redistribution. Compensation may or may not 
have been paid, or have been adequate, depending on the case. Beneficiaries included 
the farm’s labour force but also other poor. The land was sometimes given to 
individual households to farm, but was also sometimes given to collectives, in an 
attempt to preserve the integrated large farm operation. Brazil provides an example of 
an effective ongoing reform on these lines and one can clearly see how this model of 
reform has been incorporated into the Food Sovereignty framework. 
Whilst it is accepted that ‘ceilings’ lack the moral justification of injustices redressed, 
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as they often are through ‘restitution reforms’, they may be less socially risky and this 
is of vital importance if land reforms are to be implemented peacefully. Ceilings also 
have another important advantage: they reassure a very large portion of landholders 
(those with holdings below the ceilings) that they will not be affected directly by the 
reforms and so can continue to invest time and money in their enterprises. 
This community-based land reform is also being implemented in southern Malawi. 
Freehold tea and other estates around the old capital of Blantyre have extensive 
uncultivated lands and, on many estates, the cultivated area is shrinking. At the same 
time, the population of the local communities surrounding the estates, to whom the 
land once belonged, has grown and land has become scarce. The Government of 
Malawi, using funds from the World Bank, is extending credit to groups of local 
families to purchase land from the estates, often adjacent to their communities. A 
critical factor is that various controls have been put in place to ensure that the buyers 
are not cheated and the government registers the new holdings. The beneficiaries can 
receive a freehold title, or can, at their option, have the land reintegrated into the 
customary land tenure system of their community and the government is also 
registering the new titles. Thus protective guarantees of different land rights are being 
institutionalised. 
Although this process is said to be slow, it has been shown to be faster than most 
compulsory acquisition processes, at least those that are done in accordance with law 
and subject to reasonable compensation requirements (Bruce 2008). The process in 
Malawi appears to have gone smoothly, in part, because this is a regional, not a 
national, political issue, but one that the national government was keen to see 
addressed before it became more problematic. This regional approach to land reforms 
lends itself to Ethiopia and Kenya both geographically and politically. As stated, the 
Ethiopian land reform of the 1970s resembled the ‘land to the tiller’ model in its early 
stages,419 at least de facto, but crucially beneficiaries did not receive ownership rights 
and damaging periodic distributions of land were introduced. The ‘ceiling reforms’ 
model has the advantage of formalising the reforms through registration and titling. 
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Thus land reforms sensitive to local political, social and historical contexts would 
undoubtedly prove more successful than adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach. 
The community-based land reform process in Malawi is essentially a state-assisted 
and state-subsidised market mechanism solution. It involves recognition by the 
government and the World Bank that land markets, without help, will not move land 
to these smaller and potentially much more efficient land users. The approach has the 
advantage of not being compulsory, and so the owners do not contest the acquisitions 
in court. Kenya and Ethiopia can thus look to Malawi as a possible model for land 
reforms that would be consistent with the agrarian reforms essential to a Food 
Sovereignty framework The Malawi model, also referred to as ‘community-based 
reform’, achieved recognition in the 1990s with the support of the World Bank. 
Instead of the state taking land, sometimes by force, to redistribute to the poor and 
landless, the state loans funds to groups of the poor who then purchase large farms on 
the market and subdivide them among themselves. Besides learning from its adoption 
in Malawi, Kenya and Ethiopia can also learn from an adaptation of the model utilised 
by South Africa in its ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ reforms (Bruce 2008).420 
In a contemporary context it is fair to say that almost all societies have a need for 
state-held and public land, but there is equally room for private rights, whether 
individual or community. This position is compatible with a Food Sovereignty 
framework at every level since all seven principles, in some way, seek protection of 
both. It is vital, however, that these private rights are administered and secured 
through formalised systems, including land registration and titling as is happening in 
Malawi, or through less formal systems, such as customary, ‘traditional’, or other non-
statutory systems as seen in many parts of Africa. The degree of formalisation needed 
depends on the development of national markets; the needs of the country; its 
administrative capacity; and other social, political, economic, and cultural challenges 
and opportunities. It is not uncommon therefore, or necessarily problematic, to have 
both formal and informal or less formal systems operating in one country at the same 
time. Indeed this is already very much the position in Kenya and is increasingly 
becoming the case in Ethiopia. 
When dual systems of land tenure do exist, the challenge for a Food Sovereignty 
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framework is not to eradicate one in favour of the other—the informal in favour of the 
formal—but to create linkages between these systems that will provide security of 
property rights and allow individuals, communities, and corporate structures 
opportunities to make transactions between these systems. The opportunity to upgrade 
or transform property rights (from less formal to more formal) could be provided 
when economic conditions are right, and institutions exist to administer, record, and 
adjudicate more formalised rights. This clearly demands an institutionalised state 
apparatus, but one that functions as a custodian of public goods. 
Despite the alleged agrarian bias of the NLP (Bruce 2008), the Kenyan national 
economic development ‘Vision 2030’,421 considers foreign investment to be key to 
agricultural development. The Kenyan government has thus sought to attract investors 
with the particular intent to grow cash crops both for export and for domestic 
consumption. The official Ethiopian government position also reflects the idealistic 
point of view that foreign investors will bring technology, jobs, infrastructure and tax 
revenues, facilitating the country’s transition to modern farming. It is within this, 
sometimes contradictory, context of government policy and land reforms that large-
scale land acquisition is taking place in both Kenya and Ethiopia and is discussed in 
the next section. 
2. Land grabs 
This section examines some potential obstacles to the development of a Food 
Sovereignty model, which arise from the growing phenomenon of large-scale 
acquisition of farmland in foreign countries referred to as ‘land grabs’. For the 
purpose of this discussion large-scale land acquisitions is broadly defined as 
acquisitions (whether purchases, leases or other) of land areas over 1,000 ha (Cotula et 
al 2009). In this context land grabs can be viewed as a potential obstacle to Food 
Sovereignty, but more powerfully, Food Sovereignty can be viewed as an appropriate 
framework to mitigate some of the detrimental affects of large-scale land acquisitions. 
Specifically, Principle 7 of Food Sovereignty which calls for increased democratic 
control, demands that ‘Smallholder farmers must have direct input into formulating 
agricultural policies at all levels’ and, ‘everyone has the right to honest, accurate 
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information and open and democratic decision-making’.422 
The issue of food security is by no means confined to the poorest countries of the 
world indeed very rich governments concerned about the stability of their own food 
supplies are pursuing large-scale acquisition of farmland in foreign countries as an 
alternative to purchasing food from international markets. Recipient countries, such as 
Kenya and Ethiopia, are welcoming the new wave of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and as we will see, have been proactive in implementing policy and legislative 
reforms to attract investors.  This newly evolving context of land use and tenure 
creates both opportunities and challenges but above all it creates risk for food insecure 
populations. Generally speaking, the current literature on land grabs offers two 
conflicting views, which we will refer to as the ‘idealistic’ and the ‘realistic’ position. 
The idealistic position reflects a neo-liberal political economy approach discussed in 
previous chapters, and advocates that increased FDI will bring macro-level benefits 
(GDP growth and government revenues), and create opportunities for raising local 
living standards. For poorer countries with relatively abundant land, incoming 
investors can bring capital, technology, know-how and market access, playing an 
important role in kick-starting rural economic development. 
Conversely, what we will call the ‘realistic position’ reflects the more radical stance of 
Food Sovereignty advocates and argues that large-scale land acquisitions can result in 
local people losing access to the resources on which they depend for their food 
security and livelihoods. Local people may be directly dispossessed of the land they 
live on, often land they have farmed for generations. Indirect impacts may also be of 
major significance, although these impacts are often more difficult to measure (Cotula 
et al 2009). They can include, for example, loss of seasonal resource access for non-
resident groups such as pastoralists, or shifts of power from women to men as land 
gains in commercial value. Traditionally, land rights in both Kenya and Ethiopia are 
conceived of in patriarchal terms and the need to address gendered inequality is 
explicit in the Food Sovereignty framework.423 In addition it is not only the land 
acquired that can be affected. Knock-on effects are possible in the same region, or in 
other parts of the country as local users can be pushed from higher-value lands to 
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more marginal lands and as poorer people are priced out of the land market altogether. 
There is no doubt that, in recent years, vast tracks of agricultural lands in Africa have 
been taken over by foreign companies or governments and this phenomenon is of 
growing concern not just to NGOs and civil society but to UN agencies such as the 
FAO as well (Cotula et al 2009). One of the most controversial aspects, in as much as 
it is not even related to meeting food needs, is recent research revealing the 
relationship between land grabs and private hedge and equity funds.424 The growth in 
land acquisitions in African countries for short term, high returns on private 
investment funds, which do not pay taxes and have exit strategies of 5-6 years is 
potentially damaging on many levels.425 In terms of democratic criteria such as 
consultation, transparency and accountability there are very real concerns that much of 
this land acquisition has been happening outside public scrutiny and many details 
remain hidden (FIAN 2010). This is in essence the position adopted by the Food 
Sovereignty movement, and specifically addressed in Principle 7. It is fair to say that 
in the Food Sovereignty literature land grabs are increasingly cited as the greatest 
obstacle to land reform in Africa. However until now, few evidence-based studies 
have been undertaken to analyse the full extent and nature of the land deals in 
individual countries. Recent studies in selected African countries by the Oakland 
Institute (OI) and FIAN international have gone some way towards filling that 
information and knowledge gap. Because of the lack of detailed studies on land grabs 
in Ethiopia, this discussion draws fairly heavily on the 2011 OI Ethiopian country 
report.426 In the case of Kenya, a 2009 joint research project by FAO/IFAD/IIED has 
been particularly instructive.427 In addition between May and August/September 2009 
FIAN international investigated four cases of land grabbing in Kenya and 
Mozambique, of which findings from the three Kenyan examples will be included in 
this discussion. 
In Africa in general, land leases, rather than purchases, predominate with durations 
ranging from short term to 99 years. As stated, in Ethiopia the Government owns all 
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the land, which is usually leased for periods from 20 to 45 years.428 Much of the newly 
leased Ethiopian land is in the state of Gambella and other western lowland regions 
and represents more than 20% of the area currently farmed by its own people 
countrywide (Cotula et al 2009). Amongst hundreds of relatively minor private 
investors, the current government programme has already secured individual contracts 
covering 100,000 hectares or more from corporations acting on behalf of foreign 
governments scouring the world for sources of food.429 The official Ethiopian 
government position reflects the idealistic point of view that foreign investors will 
bring technology, jobs, infrastructure and tax revenues, facilitating the country’s 
transition to modern farming. The neo-liberal economic position, which this reflects, 
has been explored at length in other chapters of this thesis so will not be considered in 
any more detail here. Rather attention will be focused on the realistic position on land-
grabs and the ways in which a Food Sovereignty model could prevent the negative and 
undemocratic impact of land grabs. Those adopting the realistic position seriously 
challenge the notion that a food deficit country such as Ethiopia, with more than 10 
million people dependent on assistance, can address its problems by relieving the food 
insecurity of countries such as Saudi Arabia and India (Mittal 2011). 
In December 2008, it was made known that Kenya would receive a US$2.5 billion 
loan to build a second deepwater port, and provide in exchange 40,000 hectares of 
land to the government of Qatar to grow food for Qatar (FIAN 2010). Since this deal 
was reported in the Kenyan press in early December of 2008, no further details have 
been made known. An FAO/IFAD/IIED sponsored report reads in this regard: “The 
Qatar-Kenya deal has drawn particular media attention as the project, implying the 
alienation of land and export of food crops was revealed just as Kenya had 
experienced severe droughts and failed harvests, forcing the government to admit it 
would have to declare a national food shortage emergency.”430 More critically, the 
Kenyan government has been accused of intentionally leasing land, in drought-ridden 
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areas, to agribusiness. This allows the government to simultaneously manipulate food 
aid whilst destroying the pastoralists’ way of life (Yego 2011).431 Thus land grabbing 
represents a newly evolving political paradox: certain governments (in this case the 
Qatari government) maybe fulfilling their obligations to their own people, by ensuring 
the right to food for example, but in so doing they may well be acting against the 
interests of other nations (in this case the Kenyans). In this respect, a strong argument 
can be made for the development of Food Sovereignty, as an alternative analytical 
framework. Food Sovereignty is more democratic and comprehensive than the ‘right 
to food’ because as the issue of land grabbing demonstrates, in certain situations, the 
right to food can be fulfilled without changing any aspect of the global food system. 
However, fulfilling the rights contained within a Food Sovereignty model would not 
be possible in the GFS, certainly as it is currently constituted.432 A Food Sovereignty 
model, for example, would put in place structures and guarantees to ensure that the 
right to food was not being met by a total dependence on food aid whilst locally 
produced food is exported elsewhere. 
The Oakland Institute, FIAN international and FAO/IFAD/IIED reports have all 
attempted to move beyond the rhetoric and hype and provide a meaningful 
understanding of the actual impacts of land investments on the land and its people. 
Interviews with impacted communities, government officials, investors, civil society 
and others, have produced an abundance of data, from which six key areas of concern, 
relating to land grabs, can be identified. The ways in which these six areas of concern 
can be addressed specifically by a Food Sovereignty model are discussed below. 
1. Commercial investment will increase rates of food insecurity in the vicinity of 
land investments. Despite Ethiopia’s endemic poverty and food insecurity, it has 
been found that there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that these investments 
contribute to improved food security. In addition, there are numerous incentives 
to ensure that food production is exported out of the country, providing foreign 
exchange for the country at the expense of local food supplies. Furthermore, 
while the Ethiopian government lists transfer of technology as a major outcome 
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of land investment, it has established no mechanism for such transfers to take 
place. In the case of Kenya, the FAO/IFAD/IIED report concluded that, despite 
its positive intentions, the government’s ‘Vision 2030’ strategy has not 
undergone any human rights impact assessment, nor does it even signal 
awareness of economic, social and cultural rights. It is based on an unshakeable 
belief that incoming investors can bring capital, technology, know-how and 
market access, playing an important role in kick-starting rural economic 
development, referred to in this chapter as the idealistic position. It has been 
observed that the international financial institutions, which have largely ignored 
the development of peasant farming, have promoted the ideology reflected in 
‘Vision 2030’. As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 this has included instigating 
governments to dismantle the existing elements of pro-peasant policies and 
institutions. This situation is clearly at odds with the agrarian reforms advocated 
by the Food Sovereignty movement. However, policy–making at both a national 
and an international level could be refocused to ensure that FDI benefits the 
majority of the rural poor who are currently the most food insecure. This would 
be achieved, for example, by adopting Principle 4 of Food Sovereignty.433 
Reorganising food trade to ensure that food is first and foremost a source of 
nutrition and only secondarily an item of trade would be a practical and positive 
first step. If national agricultural policies were to prioritise production for 
domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency then food insecurity could be 
addressed in the long-term. 
2. There are large discrepancies between publicly stated positions, laws, policies 
and procedures and what is actually happening on the ground in Kenya and 
Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government, for example, insists that for all land deals, 
consultation is being carried out, no farmers are being displaced, and the land 
being granted is ‘unused’. However, the OI team did not find a single incidence 
of community consultation. Furthermore, virtually every investment site they 
visited involved the loss of some local farmland, and every investment area 
exhibited a variety of land uses and socio-cultural/ecological values associated 
with it prior to land investment. In other words the land was clearly not ‘unused’. 
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Principle 7 of Food Sovereignty, which demands democratic control, specifically 
addresses this issue. It states ‘Smallholder farmers must have direct input into 
formulating agricultural policies at all levels’. Furthermore principle 7 states 
‘Everyone has the right to honest, accurate information, and open and democratic 
decision-making.’434 The adoption of principle 7 would thus go a long way 
towards minimising the displacement and loss of land of vulnerable communities, 
particularly pastoralists. 
3. Evidence gathered on land grabs highlights that, at present, there are no limits on 
water use, no Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA), and no environmental 
controls. With water being of critical importance in Ethiopia and considering its 
critical location at the headwaters of the Nile, it is of great concern that investors 
are free to use water in Ethiopia with no restrictions. Despite assurances from the 
Ethiopian government that EIAs are performed, no government official could 
produce a completed EIA, no investor had evidence of a completed one, and no 
community had ever seen one (Horne 2011:1). The priority of Principle 3 of Food 
Sovereignty is protecting natural resources – ‘Food Sovereignty entails the 
sustainable care and use of natural resources, especially land, water, and seeds 
and livestock breeds. The people who work the land must have the right to 
practice sustainable management of natural resources and to conserve 
biodiversity free of restrictive intellectual property rights. This can only be done 
from a sound economic basis with security of tenure, healthy soils and reduced 
use of agro-chemicals’. Thus environmental controls are an essential feature of 
the Food Sovereignty framework and would limit this type of unsustainable 
development, whether nationally or internationally generated. 
4. Evidence of land grabbing in both Kenya and Ethiopia shows that displacement 
from farmland is widespread, and the vast majority of locals receive no 
compensation. The majority of these investments in Ethiopia are in the lowland 
areas where, with the exception of one region, there are no land certification 
processes under way (Horne 2011). Furthermore, it seems that the Ethiopian 
government pays little attention to patterns of shifting cultivation,435 pastoralism, 
                                                          
434
 See Appendix 3. 
435
 Shifting cultivation is practiced in the southern and western part of the country. Fields are usually left 
fallow after short periods of cultivation to revegetate (usually 1-2 years). Clearing of the vegetation 
Footnote continued on the next page 
Michelle Springfield   Chapter 7 
Food Sovereignty in Kenya and Ethiopia 
The Issue of Land 
 Page 238 
 
or communally used areas, and therefore claims all these lands to be ‘unused’ 
when they are clearly not. Displaced farmers are forced to find farmland 
elsewhere, increasing competition and tension with other farmers over access to 
land and resources (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). Again the principles of Food 
Sovereignty that are focused on agrarian reform, democratic control of food 
systems and protecting natural resources would address these major concerns. 
Food Sovereignty entails the sustainable care and use of natural resources, 
especially land, water, and seeds and livestock breeds. It demands that people 
who work the land must have the right to practice sustainable management of 
natural resources and to conserve biodiversity free of restrictive intellectual 
property rights. 
5. The country reports used in this discussion have demonstrated that there is no 
meaningful pre-project assessment, and little in the way of local benefits 
associated with land investments (OI 2011; FIAN 2010; FAO/IFAD/IIED 2009). 
Forests are cleared, critical wildlife habitat lost, and livelihoods destroyed. There 
is no process to ensure that land investment is happening in appropriate areas to 
find a balance of land uses across the landscape. Instead, it is largely at the 
investor’s discretion to determine if agriculture is the best use of the land. 
Crucially, there is nothing in place to ensure that local people benefit from the 
business opportunities that these investments could present. In many cases, local 
indigenous people already live on the margins and face chronic food insecurity.436 
The Yala swamp project in Kenya is a case in point. The Yala Swamp wetlands 
are located on the north-eastern shoreline of Lake Victoria covering 
approximately 17,500 ha (175 Km2). It provides major ecological and 
hydrological functions and is a key source of livelihoods for the neighbouring 
communities. The Yala swampland is trust land (designated as community land 
under NLP) under the custody of the Siaya and Bondo County councils. It is a 
densely populated area with a population of about half a million; for a very long 
time, the local people accessed this land and used it in their various daily 
activities on a free access basis. In 2003, Dominion arms Ltd, a subsidiary of 
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Dominion Group of Companies based in the USA, arrived in Yala swamp. 
Dominion entered into an agreement with both the Siaya and Bondo County 
Councils covering 6,900 ha of the 17,500 ha wetlands under the Yala Swamp 
Integrated Development Project, for a period of 25 years, with a possibility of 
extension. Eventually, Dominion proposed to cover the entire swamp region of 
17,500 hectares.437 Principle 6 of Food Sovereignty, which demands social peace, 
addresses this kind of marginalisation that stems from land grabbing. It states 
‘Increasing levels of poverty and marginalisation in the countryside, along with 
the growing oppression of ethnic minorities and indigenous populations, 
aggravate situations of injustice and hopelessness. The ongoing displacement, 
forced urbanisation, repression and increasing incidence of racism of smallholder 
farmers cannot be tolerated’. 
6. It is also clear from recent research that while large foreign investments are 
highly controversial and ‘headline-grabbing’, many East African land deals 
involve small-scale investors (local and diaspora), many of whom have limited 
agricultural experience (Horne 2011). While potential investors must provide 
some evidence that they have the financial ability to carry out the operation, no 
such evidence is required of an investor’s technical ability and knowledge. It was 
evident from the OI fieldwork (2011) that many investors lack the knowledge to 
be farming at this scale. The need to recognise the value of farmer’s knowledge, 
especially poor rural farmers, is embedded in the Food Sovereignty framework. 
Ethiopia, for example, has numerous other incentives in place to encourage large-
scale investment. Listed incentives focus on encouraging export, tax/duty/land-
rent holidays, improved access to financing, and streamlined processes. Crucially 
from a Food Sovereignty perspective, there are no incentives to ensure that food 
production is available to meet local needs. This is a critical point and one that 
would become a central feature of agricultural policy-making in a Food 
Sovereignty model. 
Because of the shift in government policy on FDI, for Ethiopia, this is very likely to be 
just the beginning. However, the lack of local knowledge about these land 
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investments, with local communities often only becoming aware once bulldozers 
arrive to clear the land, is deeply troubling. This highlights the need for transparency 
and accountability, which is the basis of the demand for democratic control. As 
articulated in principle 7, Food Sovereignty demands that ‘Everyone has the right to 
honest, accurate information and open and democratic decision-making. These rights 
form the basis of good governance, accountability and equal participation in 
economic, political and social life, free from all forms of discrimination’. It is 
arguable that Ethiopian government’s desire for land investment is associated with the 
likely further marginalisation/disempowerment of the indigenous people, increased 
dependence on government for food security, and increased difficulty for rebel groups 
to operate in the lowland areas. The granting of land-based assets to the Tigray and 
other urban elites who offer support for the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRD) emphasises the message that support of the government 
will result in preferential treatment (Horne 2011).438 
In the absence of enhanced democratic controls, it seems likely that as investors 
increasingly clear Ethiopian land, levels of frustration will grow, and environmental 
and food security concerns will steadily worsen. The negative impacts of land grabs 
will likely be magnified many times over into the future unless the Ethiopian 
government takes steps to address them. The most obvious policy reform is for the 
government to ensure that any land investments that are granted are for the benefit of 
local communities and for the country as a whole. It is accepted that this proposal and 
all others associated with a Food Sovereignty paradigm, require far-reaching changes 
in the current regulation of international agricultural and trade policies. Indeed, in 
terms of trade, the entire scope of major international institutions and treaties would 
have to be changed. However, Food Sovereignty is less a proposal for a single policy 
change in one of the international regimes, but more a framework to change the broad 
range of agricultural policies. Under the umbrella of Food Sovereignty, several new 
institutional frameworks are required but they are possible. The current controversy 
surrounding land grabbing in both Kenya and Ethiopia is inseparable from the model 
of agricultural production, which such deals imply.439 An increasingly controversial 
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aspect of this current model, the move towards biofuel production, is discussed in the 
next section. 
3. Land use: The food versus fuel debate 
In addition to the potential loss of control of national food production through large-
scale land acquisition, there is growing concern surrounding the support for a 
transition from fossil fuels to agrofuels. The two categories of agrofuels are ethanol 
crops or bio-diesel crops. Research on the negative effect of biofuel or agrofuel on 
food-poor countries (Pretty et al 2004) strengthens the position on biofuels adopted by 
the Food Sovereignty movement. This section begins by considering the evidence of 
these negative impacts and then looks at how the adoption of a Food Sovereignty 
model would overcome most of these problems. 
There seems little doubt that the agrofuel boom is a contributing factor in the current 
food price crisis and its continued growth is most likely to exacerbate this situation 
(Eide 2007; Rosset 2009). Although environmentalists promoted biofuel in the 1990s 
as a ‘green energy’ alternative to oil, it is now recognised that biofuels are 
contributing to soil erosion and serious depletion of water resources, removing crops 
from the food system and driving up food prices (Paul & Wahlberg 2008). A World 
Bank assessment in 2008 concluded that biofuels were responsible for more than 50% 
of the overall price increases in food (World bank 2008). In addition, new quotas for 
the use of agrofuels in the European Union and the United States have contributed to 
large land acquisitions as corporations have begun searching for the vast land (and 
water) resources needed to produce crops that can be converted to fuels.440 Within the 
context of a pro-biofuel policy arena, the right to food, which is the first principle of 
Food Sovereignty, is challenged in two specific areas. If one’s right to life includes the 
right to food, which it clearly does within a Food Sovereignty framework, then it must 
also include the freedom to exercise a livelihood so that one’s entitlement to food is 
ensured.441 This is particularly relevant to the rural poor who rely on the land for their 
livelihoods. The most severe critics of the global food system, however, have argued 
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that the process of globalisation442 is rewriting the human rights agenda. Shiva, for 
example, argues that ‘the most basic of human rights is today under threat as the right 
to food is sacrificed to the right to trade’ (Shiva 2003: 87). The competition for land 
for biofuel rather than food production is very often portrayed within this context 
especially land that is acquired by foreign governments. For many of the world’s 
poorest, this ‘clash of rights’ of private property ownership, over the right to food, is 
increasing vulnerability and food insecurity. As already discussed, it demonstrates that 
relying on rights, as a basis for reducing vulnerability to famine, can be problematic. 
That is not to say that we shouldn’t rely on rights in overcoming food insecurity but it 
is more a question of which rights are most important. In this discussion the right to 
food, without which we can’t live, assumes a greater importance than the right to 
trade. Within a Food Sovereignty framework, subsistence rights, therefore, need not 
be regarded as only possible in some utopian future; on the contrary it is a case of 
restoring ‘something of value that has for some time been lost in our theory and our 
practice’ (Shue 1996: 29). Within this framework the interconnectedness of all rights 
are recognised and institutionally protected. Thus supporting the broader set of rights 
and democratic controls that a Food Sovereignty framework would guarantee seems 
eminently more desirable and robust as a long-term solution.443 
The tension between the uses of land for fuel verses food can be demonstrated by 
research on a project in the Tana delta in Kenya, which concerns sugarcane 
monoculture (FIAN 2010). The Tana River Delta is a lifeline to some 30,000 farmers, 
pastoralists and fishermen as well as minority hunter and gatherer communities 
collectively called the Wasanya. In a planned-public private joint venture, Mumias 
Sugar Company Ltd, the largest sugar company in Kenya, and the state-run Tana Athi 
River Development Authority (TARDA), are proposing to turn 16,000 hectares (160 
Km2) into a sugar cane plantation for agrofuels. On 11th June 2008 Kenya’s National 
Environment Management Authority (NEMA) approved the project. Although the 
Tana River Delta conservation lobby took the issue to the High Court to try to halt the 
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decision, in June 2009, Kenya’s High Court ruled in favour of the developers.444 If 
realised, this will lead to the displacement of tens of thousands of peasant farmers, 
who currently use this land for food crops for their consumption such as maize, 
cassava, beans, vegetables and mango. Pastoralist tribes such as Orma and Wardei 
will also suffer severely as the delta has been used as grazing land for their cattle for 
generations (FIAN 2010). 
As another example of the tension between food and fuel production, Bedford 
Biofuels Inc, a multinational company based in Canada, is seeking a 45 year lease 
agreement on 65,000 ha of land in Tana River District in Kenya to transform it into 
biofuel farms, mainly growing jatropha (Jatropha curcas). All of this land is either in 
or adjacent to the delta. A significant percentage of the local community members are 
not in support of this project and during 2011 there have been ongoing disputes to try 
and prevent the project from going ahead. One of the key arguments against this 
project is that jatropha has been shown to fail as an economically viable crop in East 
Africa.445 Furthermore it is argued that as a biofuel, the aim of which is to reduce 
carbon emissions, the process of producing it actually releases more carbon than 
would be reduced in burning it instead of fossil fuels.446 Indeed it has been argued that 
the industrial agricultural system, as a whole, produces 50% of the green house gasses 
but this could be reversed in fifty years if all arable land was returned to agricultural 
and traditional methods (Yego 2011). Although this seems unlikely in the present 
context, it is indicative of the growing awareness of the unsustainable nature of the 
current agricultural model, particularly in those countries most adversely affected by 
it, and the need to reverse the huge incentives currently available to the biofuel 
industry.447 
Within this context the Ethiopian Government has also encouraged biofuel projects as 
a means of reducing the drain on the economy of importing increasingly expensive 
crude oil. In view of Ethiopia’s current economic position, this seems to be a justified 
and rational response. As a result several Jatropha and Castor Oil projects have been 
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established. The government’s official line is that there is no shortage of agricultural 
land in Ethiopia for food production. In fact, they have suggested that they have up to 
23 million hectares, which could be developed both for crops and biofuel.448 
Importantly, the government argue that biofuel plants are being developed on arid and 
barren land not suitable for food production. However this is not supported by the 
most recent research (Horne 2011). 
It must be said that the agrofuel transition is not inevitable, especially in Africa as a 
whole, as most countries are still only studying the possibilities of biofuels. There is 
no rational reason to sacrifice the possibility of sustainable, equitable food and fuel 
systems to an industrial strategy that compromises both (Sielhorst et al 2008). Many 
successful, locally focused, energy-efficient and people-centred alternatives are 
presently producing food and fuel in ways that do not threaten food systems, the 
environment, or livelihoods. By way of example PELUM-Kenya has been actively 
participating in raising community awareness on issues of agrofuels.449 A study on the 
Kenyan situation was carried out by PELUM-Kenya as a way to establish the extent of 
agrofuels adoption, promoters and the existing effects on the small-scale farmers. This 
research should enable communities within Kenya to make informed choices on 
whether or not to adopt the agrofuels and to what scale. They will also be in a position 
to influence agrofuels policy drafting ensuring they make known their concerns to the 
policy makers. This provides a good example of the possibilities of incorporating 
democratic principles into agricultural decision-making along the lines of a Food 
Sovereignty model. 
Indeed, research has shown that biofuel production can have positive socio-economic 
effects on the population of African wetlands, provided that production is carefully 
managed by governments and companies, and monitored by certification schemes and 
non-governmental organisations.450 Several general conditions have been identified 
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which help to mitigate risks from biofuel production and promote the potential 
benefits (Sielhorst et al 2008:50). It would make sense, therefore, that these become 
embedded in the design and maintenance of any future agrofuel production projects. 
• Effective land use planning by governments 
• Effective biofuels policies by governments 
• Effective accountability mechanisms, i.e. sustainability criteria for biofuels 
• Adjust biofuel crop to natural conditions present at production location 
(instead of the other way around) 
• Apply good agricultural management practices 
• Stimulate awareness of impacts of biofuel production on African wetland areas 
The question, therefore, is not whether ethanol and bio-diesel, per-se, have a place in 
our future, but whether or not a handful of global corporations are to determine the 
future by advancing the agrofuels transition despite the detrimental impacts. In view 
of what we understand as the negative impacts, discussed earlier in this section, any 
effective mechanisms put in place to enhance the benefits and minimise their costs to 
local rural populations can only be encouraged. 
So how could a Food Sovereignty framework ensure a more positive future outcome? 
Within this model policy makers would pursue a different, steady-state agrarian 
transition built on re-distributive land reform that re-populates and stabilises the 
world’s struggling rural communities. Food would, first and foremost, be recognised 
and protected as a necessity of life and therefore would only be considered an item of 
trade once this need has been fulfilled. The development of biofuels has undoubtedly 
added a new dimension, and a new obstacle, to achieving this balance, but that does 
not negate the potential of institutionalising the right to food over and above any other 
rights. In concrete terms this means that national agricultural policies must be allowed 
to prioritise production for domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency over and 
above any other trade consideration. With land grabbing specifically for the 
production of biofuels, the globalisation paradigm is reaching further into the primary 
sector of national economies and if this is not controlled it does not bode well for 
countries’ and peoples’ self-determination and Food Sovereignty. Thus from a 
realistic position, land grabbing fits well within a strategy towards deepening the 
commodification of agriculture and the domination of a small group of ‘investors’ and 
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their TNCs.451 But that is assuming it continues to evolve in the absence of 
institutionalised protections, and, of course, this is not set in stone. As PELUM Kenya 
demonstrates, increasing democracy at all levels of the decision-making process can 
mitigate many of the negative outcomes. Therefore defending equitable access to land 
and resources as a precondition for decentralised, sustainable and autonomous peasant 
agriculture is a crucial component of the right to adequate food. This position is 
supported by the authoritative international recommendations such as those of the 
Hunger Task Force of the UN Millennium Project and the more recent International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development 
(IAASTD) (2009), which view the support of peasant agriculture as a fundamental 
effort in the struggle against food insecurity.452 There is a growing evidence-based 
movement that continues to campaign for this increased support. 
Concluding comments 
The Food Sovereignty approach is to replace the existing agricultural model with a 
new model through agrarian reform (Principle 2) and a renewed emphasis on the 
importance and value of peasant culture. In this way it is truly radical but the 
important question is whether or not it is feasible, especially within the context of 
globalisation. On a structural level Food Sovereignty necessitates a move towards 
increased democratic processes and decision making at all levels of society and this is 
neither controversial nor very far removed from what we already understand as 
‘deliberative democracy’.453 However the demands for an alternative agricultural 
model are more challenging. Research reveals that most contemporary land-grabbing 
processes do not promote peasant and sustainable agriculture as advocated by a Food 
Sovereignty framework because of the industrial high-tech agriculture that they 
favour. Furthermore it appears that land grabbing is set to be an increasing activity, 
which if uncontrolled, may potentially destroy ecosystems and pastoral communities 
and foreclose rights based rural policy options such as agrarian reform. 
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Elements of Food Sovereignty has only been made possible for those in the developed 
world because the correlative duties, which safeguard the right to food, have been 
institutionalised. A Food Sovereignty framework, therefore, advocates that this can 
and should be extended, on a global scale, through increased democratic control. The 
concept of Food Sovereignty, necessarily, means a return to protecting the national 
food production of vulnerable nations, especially against the dumping of artificially 
cheap food from developed nations and limiting the amount of land given over for 
purely commercial purposes. It also means rebuilding national grain reserves and 
prioritising farmers’ organisations as the guardians of food production. In real terms 
this means regaining local control of food supplies and reducing the power of TNCs 
and International Financial Institutions. Most importantly, national governments need 
the ability to implement export controls, to prevent the forced exportation of food that 
their own populations may desperately need. This can only be realistically achieved by 
a development orientated trade agenda, which embraces the concept of Food 
Sovereignty. This is not the situation at present but the salient point is that it could be. 
With regard to the biofuel transition, the increasing pressure to produce agrofuels as 
an alternative to fossil fuel is reported as creating an artificial demand (for agrofuels) 
that is unprecedented among cash crops, and which is likely to persist beyond the 
usual length of a ‘commodity boom’ cycle.454 Curbing or reversing this lucrative trend 
is obviously a huge challenge particularly during the current period of economic and 
social instability. This reversal is explicit in the Food Sovereignty framework and is 
clearly an ambitious and far-reaching project. However, a reasonable next step would 
be for the Food Sovereignty movement to launch a pro-active, global moratorium on 
the expansion of agrofuels. Time and public debate based on a model of deliberative 
democracy is needed to assess the potential impacts of agrofuels in East Africa, and to 
develop the regulatory structures, programmes, and incentives for conservation and 
food and fuel development alternatives. 
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CONCLUSION OF THESIS 
This thesis has sought to address two key questions: first, in what ways does the 
global food system, as it is currently constituted, increase food insecurity in East 
Africa; second, in what ways might reorganising aspects of the global food system 
reduce food insecurity in Kenya and Ethiopia, with Food Sovereignty as a guiding 
principle? In addressing these questions, this thesis has approached food insecurity in 
terms of identifying the problem and the key causal factors, assessing interventions 
and responses, and making recommendations for permanent solutions. In addressing 
these questions this analysis has taken account of both internal and external political 
and economic pressures. 
The original contribution of this thesis has been to propose and test three distinct 
arguments in respect of food insecurity in East Africa. The first argument (A1) is that 
a failure to think about food insecurity in Africa as a consequence of the global food 
system (GFS) handicaps attempts to reduce that insecurity. The second argument (A2) 
is that Food Sovereignty is an appropriate solution to famine, and vulnerability to 
famine, where famine is caused by systemic features of the global food system. The 
third argument (A3) is that there are clear obstacles to the adaptation and development 
of Food Sovereignty in an East African context taking account of differences in 
economic structure, political culture, land tenure and institutions of government. 
Summary of the thesis 
A1 was addressed primarily in the first two chapters. Chapter 1 discussed the problem 
of food insecurity, in general, and in East Africa in particular. It outlined some of  the 
methodological issues that arose in this study of food insecurity and emphasised the 
importance of definition and measures when analysing the phenomenon. It also 
highlighted the relationship between famine and famine vulnerability and 
demonstrated how this reflects on efforts both to understand and to overcome them. It 
concluded that famines continue to be viewed mainly as food crises, with 
demographic or environmental causal factors with international food aid as the main 
response. However, it was made clear that food production or the vagaries of the 
weather are not essentially the issue; political marginalisation at a regional, national or 
international level is the critical reality of contemporary famines. The political basis of 
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food insecurity is located in the  relationships of power between people and groups 
(both nationally and internationally), and not just between people and commodities. 
These power relationships and their causal role were conceptualised within the global 
food system, which was introduced in the next chapter. 
Chapter 2 gave a substantive and analytical account of the GFS and laid the 
foundations for the subsequent analysis of structural adjustment policies, transnational 
corporations, international institutions and the state, and the notion of Food 
Sovereignty. This account of the GFS presented a complex web involving interactions 
of natural, social, economic and political factors. Factors, it is argued, that have 
hitherto been underplayed. It is clear that farmers, producers, consumers, politicians 
and aid agencies are all integral to the GFS and have their part to play if the situation 
for the most food insecure is to improve. However, this analysis of the GFS suggests 
that as long as food insecurity co-exists with over-production and over-consumption, 
only structural international change, combined with domestic measures, can provide 
everyone with enough of the kinds of food they need for healthy development.455 This 
acknowledgement and understanding that reducing food insecurity requires building 
democracy from the bottom up links to the second thesis question and the exploration 
of Food Sovereignty as an alternative paradigm. 
Chapter 3 set out the framework of Food Sovereignty and showed how it evolved in a 
Latin American context as a response to the failure to think about food insecurity as a 
consequence of the global food system. This chapter laid the foundations on which to 
build the argument to support A2, that a new paradigm based on Food Sovereignty 
would be the most effective way of reversing the corporate monopolisation of the 
global food system and would protect people’s political and economic right to 
determine the course of their own food system. What becomes clear from this 
exploration of Food Sovereignty is that one cannot yet talk of a fully-fledged Food 
Sovereignty model. By this I mean that there is no ready-made set of policies available 
for national and global governance of rural and agricultural policies. Although many 
key elements of a new policy proposal have been identified and formulated, the 
overall concept and strategy needs further improvement and clarification. The pressing 
need for this process of democratisation in agriculture was emphasised by the  
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consideration of the failure of responses to food insecurity. The conceptual framework 
of this thesis, based on a rejection of the neo-liberal view that the market is the most 
appropriate system by which basic needs can be met, was strengthened in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 4 carried forward the argument, central to this thesis (and the Food 
Sovereignty framework), that food has a unique social function and it should not be 
subordinated to market dictates. It made an explicit link between liberal economic 
policies such as structural adjustment and increased food insecurity. Understanding 
this relationship sheds light on the necessary role for the state, at the national and 
international level, in the provision of food. Policies that have looked to open markets 
and greater economic integration have not been successful in improving food 
insecurity in East Africa. However, concentrating on the failures of big ‘top-down’ 
agendas may be overly pessimistic. If the focus shifts to more local and specific 
agendas, advocated by a Food Sovereignty model, then there is greater reason for 
optimism. Developing and sustaining democratic control of food requires bringing the 
state back in, not only to regulate the market, but also to provide social welfare and 
protect the most weak and vulnerable in society. This requires a constructive 
reappraisal of the role and function of food aid in a current context. 
Chapter 5 considered the role and function of food aid and revealed that it remains 
deeply politicised and embedded in the current global food system. It would seem that 
for those on the political left food aid is still, in many ways, about making reparations 
for colonialism and the injustices of the past. For those on the right of the political 
spectrum it is about the undesirable creation of welfare dependency and filling the 
coffers of corrupt African rulers. There are well-documented cases to support both 
points of view but this thesis has argued for more a positive position that is situated 
somewhere in the middle. From a humanitarian perspective, international aid is 
undoubtedly an appropriate response to cases of extreme hunger, caused by sudden 
emergencies. The challenge, however, is to incorporate this response within a 
combined course of complementary action as suggested by A2. An overemphasis on 
food aid in the past may be partly due to the fact that it is the easiest thing for the 
developed world to do (rather than address structural inequalities, or secure the right 
to food, for example) and partly because aid slots into the moral universe that 
demands reparation to be made for past wrongs. However, Chapter 5 advanced the 
argument that donor countries have a responsibility to ensure that food aid works to 
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the benefit of the most needy and this can only be achieved by reforming the major 
international actors who govern global food aid.456 The positive changes, such as the 
reduction in tied aid and the increase in aid procured in developing countries, are 
acknowledged but the critical point is that these changes should be expanded. The 
long-term aim of food aid should be about developing local productive capacity and 
removing restrictive practices so that developing countries have their own immunity 
to adverse conditions.457 This is a central feature of Food Sovereignty but a 
paradigmatic shift towards Food Sovereignty can only be developed if the current food 
aid regime is seriously and constructively reformed as understood in A3. This 
necessitates a move away from food aid to one of social protection, a move that would 
be facilitated by the adoption of a comprehensive framework of Food Sovereignty. 
This examination of the role and function of food aid leads to the utilitarian 
conclusion that the system would be relatively easy to reform, without incurring huge 
costs to anyone, resulting in far greater benefits to those most in need. 
Chapters 2 to 5 advanced the argument that greater control, and hence accountability, 
of food systems should be relocated within a national or regional context. Support for 
this position can be found in the current East African food crises (2011/12) affecting 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia. The food crises in these countries  demonstrate how 
national government response to a deteriorating food situation is absolutely crucial. 
With regard to Somalia, the lack of governance and political instability is proving to 
be catastrophic whereas the Ethiopian government, at least at present, is managing to 
avert the same level of disaster.458 
The last two substantive chapters of this thesis addressed A3 and focused on the 
potential and obstacles to Food Sovereignty, as an alternative framework for 
agriculture, in Kenya and Ethiopia. The conclusion reached in Chapter 5 that the 
internationalisation of welfare, particularly in terms of food provision, has further 
reduced national governments’ responsibility and accountability to their people is 
taken forward in Chapter 6. The continuing focus on aid and/or technological 
solutions avoids the uncomfortable fact that it is the relationship between politics and 
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food insecurity that must come to the forefront of policy making. The Food 
Sovereignty model recognises, and aims to institutionalise, the need for states to 
regain the necessary policy space to conduct their fight against food insecurity. Most 
importantly states must be able to implement their obligations to their citizens to 
ensure both their right to adequate food as well as their other human rights. There is 
no doubt that this poses political challenges. As Chapter 4 made clear, in terms of 
food insecurity it seems that the role of the state has been largely denigrated just at the 
moment it may be most needed. 
However, the availability of the necessary policy space does not automatically lead to 
national policies that promote or even consider the interests of smallholder farmers, 
pastoralists and fisherfolk or remote rural areas. Chapter 6 demonstrated that national 
governments are often not respectful of the needs of the most food insecure segments 
of their society. More critically, this chapter showed that governments have been 
responsible for causing, or at least not preventing, certain incidences of famine thus 
showing that food insecurity is not always a result of the systemic features of the 
GFS.459 This understanding of causal factors not directly related to the GFS reinforces 
the need to place rights at the forefront of food issues. The right to food is an 
extremely important element of Food Sovereignty since it is already a legal instrument 
with which to make national governments accountable to people facing hunger and 
food insecurity. By its very nature, accountability operates at its best when it is 
responding to local and specific pressure. A2 is therefore defended in this thesis by the 
assertion that the localised and bottom-up approach of Food Sovereignty, strengthened 
through international support, is the key to eradicating famine and famine 
vulnerability in the twenty first century. This necessity of internal and external 
components is of paramount importance. 
Nonetheless, this study has shown that one cannot promote Food Sovereignty as an 
alternative model in East Africa without taking seriously the issues of political 
cultures and structures, which may be problematic. Principles 6 and 7 of Food 
Sovereignty, which incorporate demands for social peace and democratic control,460 
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are clear signposts to these potential obstacles. However, whilst democracy is 
accepted as a good in itself, and may augment good governance especially with 
respect to the civil and political liberties it guarantees, it does not add up to, nor does 
it guarantee, good governance. Thus there are very good reasons for supporting the 
notion implicit in the Food Sovereignty model that constructing good governance in 
Africa is likely to be more realisable within a more developed social democracy than 
in the context of liberal democracy. Chapter 7 provided an opportunity to tentatively 
explore this idea specifically in relation to the issue of land in Kenya and Ethiopia. 
An abundance of research shows that land conflicts and the struggles to gain access to, 
and control over, land is nothing new in Africa. Historically, women, peasants, small 
producers, pastoralists and indigenous people have seen their traditional lands taken 
away by powerful actors, including colonial powers, their own government, national 
elites or large investors. However, as Chapter 7 demonstrated, the pressure on the land 
of peasants has undoubtedly increased with the multiplication of deals by which 
foreign investors (governments or TNCs) can now acquire and control vast tracks of 
land. Furthermore, in cases, where land is taken without respecting basic international 
standards such as a prior comprehensive impact assessment, consultation, 
compensation and rehabilitation, human rights are very likely to be violated (FIAN 
2010). This poses many questions in relation to A3. Not only are there the immediate 
problems of violating human rights to adequate food and housing, water and personal 
security linked to land conflicts and evictions, but also the issue of reduced land 
availability in the long term.  
References to research in Kenya and Ethiopia showed that land grabbing, even where 
there are no related forced evictions, drastically reduces land availability for land 
scarce groups. This reduces the political space for peasant oriented agricultural 
policies and gears national markets towards agribusiness interests and global markets, 
rather than sustainable peasant agriculture for local and national markets. That said, 
recognition of the need for more comprehensive land reform is gaining ground and the 
Kenya NLP offers a contemporary example, which, if fully adopted, will go some way 
towards improving the prospects for a Food Sovereignty model to be developed in 
East Africa.461 
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The key findings 
In view of the fact that for the next four decades or so, the majority of the world’s 
poor population will continue to live in rural areas, it makes sense that strategies to 
reduce the worst incidences of food insecurity will require a new focus on rural 
development and rural areas. Food Sovereignty policies offer a necessary and 
important contribution to the current debate by concentrating attention on the 
perspectives of those who suffer most from food insecurity. This principle is common 
to all the different interpretations of Food Sovereignty: that is, they start their analyses 
from the perspective of those facing hunger and rural poverty. It is a dynamic debate 
that requires further support and enrichment from civil and political society and this 
includes scientific contributions. It is clear that the negative aspects of the past and 
present economic models need to be reversed, and now may be an opportune time for 
transformative change. It seems reasonable to suggest that the further development of 
the Food Sovereignty framework would probably be best served by implementing 
several of the ideas in parallel. Some initiatives have already started, for example 
some co-ordination of views is being achieved through the IPC for Food Sovereignty 
in Rome.462 For the time being though, the most important outcome could be to enrich 
the debate and discuss the relevance of different potential policy changes associated 
with the seven principles. Each government, NGO, CSO or social movement could 
then decide which strategic element it can support. 
It has been made clear that overcoming food insecurity depends, to a great extent, on 
the way in which it is defined. It also depends on whether food insecurity is 
understood and addressed as an issue of political containment or political 
empowerment. The first approach, particularly in a national context, is a successful 
strategy for meeting needs at times of acute crises, as is occurring in a current context 
in both Kenya and Ethiopia. This thesis, however, has advanced the argument that the 
second approach is the only way to transform the vulnerabilities of these famine prone 
communities in the long-term. At present famine-vulnerable communities in East 
Africa tend to lack sufficient leadership, cohesion and political power to mobilise 
against famine effectively but the point is that they could. Alliances, therefore, will be 
necessary and this in turn requires food insecurity to become a political issue for those 
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not directly affected. Thus, the argument made in this thesis for a greater 
understanding of famine in an international context. The suggestion that famine 
prevention should become a ‘barometer of political legitimacy’ (de Waal 2006: 215) is 
a helpful one and would fit very well within a Food Sovereignty paradigm. This 
requires more public engagement in the processes that can prevent and relieve famine 
but it also requires public bodies able to investigate political responsibility when 
famines do occur. 
The level of interactions in the GFS demonstrates that the scientific and technical 
expertise of participating nations could be pooled in the search for best practices and 
production methods. For example it is not unreasonable to suggest that a global 
authority could be formed, within a strengthened UN, to coordinate and protect the 
world’s food and water resources. Such an institution could provide an accurate 
inventory of global food supplies and develop mechanisms for the global allocation of 
these vital resources in times of extreme scarcity or emergency. Shared research 
efforts could lead to more economical methods of converting salt water into fresh 
water or for more efficient and widespread irrigation. The UNDP and the WHO have 
demonstrated, over a considerable period of time, the capacity to address complex 
international problems in an efficient manner. But this optimistic vision demands the 
re-building of local food systems architecture to ensure that most of the wealth and 
benefits of food systems accrue locally, not in the company accounts of agri-foods 
giants. This thesis, therefore, has argued for a much greater role for the state in food 
provision in what is essentially in Africa a market economy. The recommendation is 
for a more balanced and mixed economy as opposed to the extreme liberalism of 
classical liberal economics and structural adjustment. 
It is evident that a genuine transformation of the current food system will require 
tremendous political will and a powerful coalition for change. It is also the case, 
however, that the developed world has a strong collective interest in addressing the 
problems of the world’s most food insecure. The rapid growth of the Food 
Sovereignty movement over a relatively short space of time allows for some 
optimism. The greatest potential of the Food Sovereignty paradigm is in the 
recognition that the key to establishing a more positive strategy lies in both the 
national and the international sphere. Nationally, by increasing democratic credentials 
and control over the supply of food to all members of society and internationally, by 
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establishing more robust international institutions that could address major food 
problems whilst retaining the confidence of global leaders and the public. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the current global financial crisis and economic recession 
could create opportunities to challenge flawed existing models and assert new 
strategies for Africa’s economic progress. 
It is clear that collective responses to food insecurity need to occupy the political and 
economic realms as well as a humanitarian one and non-food aid responses need to be 
given greater emphasis.463 In countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, the focus on 
meeting short-term consumption through food aid has added to the conceptualisation 
of the acute stage of famine as a discrete event, rather than how it is conceptualised in 
this thesis, as the logical, but preventable, outcome of underlying powerlessness and 
livelihood crises embedded in the global food system.464 Without effectively addressing 
the underlying processes creating food insecurity, that is the local and international 
power structures that shape famine and famine relief, then interventions, particularly 
food aid, can merely reinforce existing power structures and may even exacerbate 
famine vulnerability. Thus the deep-seated nature of the problem has resulted in a 
growing tendency amongst international agencies to develop indefinite food aid 
programmes. Indeed the changing role of food aid as part of the international ‘safety 
net,’ provided by international humanitarianism, has led to a ‘black hole of 
accountability’ (Devereux 2007: 8). In other words the donor is primarily accountable 
to communities and powers outside the area of the food crises; it is rarely, if ever, 
accountable to those insiders receiving the aid. This permanent ‘safety net’ can act as 
an obstacle to the development of local and national food secure systems that are 
implicit to a Food Sovereignty model (Yego 2011). As a result, the politicisation of 
food aid has contributed to the failure to prevent famine vulnerability in a current 
context. 
There is no doubt, however, that positive action can bring about change. Food 
Sovereignty could be pursued like the anti-apartheid movement on the basis that it 
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 The provision of water and health supplies, for example, and long-term support given to the most 
vulnerable livelihood systems such as pastoralism. 
464
 Ethiopia is a pressing example of how emergency responses have so far been inadequate in 
addressing long-term poverty reduction and the underlying processes that lead to famine. Arguably, 
Ethiopia is more vulnerable now than it was a decade ago because of lack of long-term development 
strategies. See Lautze & Maxwell (2007). 
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must be a bottom up approach but one that operates at a global level. In essence, this 
thesis argues that the concept of Food Sovereignty should be taken more seriously, 
given international protection and treated as something separate from general 
development programmes. This thesis reveals that the Food Sovereignty framework 
addresses both external and internal factors in overcoming food insecurity. It paves the 
way for special attention to be given to the international governance of food and 
agriculture and to the international causes of hunger and malnutrition. Thus the Food 
Sovereignty movement has a clear international focus and devotes much of its 
campaigning activities towards the international institutions and organisations, which 
influence food security. But it also encourages a discussion about the policy space that 
needs to exist to facilitate the creation of national policies, which aim to reduce rural 
poverty and eliminate food insecurity. The reality of food insecurity is not simply a 
struggle between the evil rich world and a noble poor one. Nor is it just about corrupt 
African rulers oppressing brave people within a national context. The struggle to 
eradicate famine and famine vulnerability is both within and beyond the most 
vulnerable countries. It follows that so too are the solutions. 
Areas for further research 
The political context. 
It is easy to foresee problems in achieving more political support for Food Sovereignty 
particularly since the framework is so broad and covers a variety of issues and 
proposals. Clearly new thinking on agricultural and rural development policies is 
required, but paradigm shifts need time. Many people might agree with the principles 
of Food Sovereignty, but disagree with some of the analyses or policy proposals. The 
scope remains extremely broad and the use of terminology and definitions, particularly 
the rights-based language, will need to become more precise. Several issues have yet 
to be properly addressed, such as the situation of the urban poor and their access to 
food.465 These are areas in which further debate is needed. Thus it is fair to say that the 
Food Sovereignty framework has not yet been finalised but it is still being formed. 
Although we can see a convergence in the analyses of important problems, concrete 
policy proposals still have to be developed and defined further. While few will 
disagree with Food Sovereignty’s principle of the human right to food, some countries 
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will remain opposed to the overall framework and this requires greater understanding. 
Kenya and Ethiopia, for example, are both committed to pursuing FDI in agriculture 
but how this can be reconciled with the agrarian reforms so central to a Food 
Sovereignty framework is not known. 
When it comes to reducing resistance to Food Sovereignty, however, its 
comprehensive nature could be an advantage. The policy changes needed to seriously 
reduce, and ultimately eradicate, the number of food insecure people, as well as to 
tackle rural poverty, are enormous. Therefore a broad-based discussion based on the 
principles of Food Sovereignty is more likely to initiate far-reaching changes than a 
discussion about making small changes to existing instruments. At present the main 
focus is to widen policy spaces for the nation state within international regimes such 
as the trade regime. National responsibilities are not yet addressed in as detailed a way 
as international trade policy changes. The Food Sovereignty framework aims to create 
policy space for the nation state in international forums, thereby assuming that they 
would be adopted by national governments. Whether, and under what conditions, 
national governments would make use of these policy spaces for the benefit of hungry 
and food insecure peoples has not yet been thoroughly understood. As has been 
demonstrated by the examples of Kenya and Ethiopia, national polices still play a 
crucial role and should therefore not be downplayed. 
The inclusion of Food Sovereignty in the mainstream conversations that at present 
dominate the political and social dilemmas about food insecurity is offered in my view 
as a political challenge but one that has huge consequences for a viable response to 
famine. In the light of what we have seen in this thesis to be consistent failure in the 
conventional approaches to food insecurity, the introduction of Food Sovereignty as a 
more viable alternative would inevitably bring the search for solutions to another level 
of challenge. In advocating Food Sovereignty, this thesis does not try to provide a 
policy blueprint for eradicating global food insecurity. What I have sought to 
emphasise is the need to make food policy design sensitive to each country’s historical 
and initial conditions. 
Agro-ecological production methods 
Critical challenges to Food Sovereignty are most likely to include many questions 
concerning food production. Will smallholder farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk be 
able to increase global production enough, particularly if support for marginal farmers 
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is combined with agroecology? Will a new policy based on the interests of 
smallholder farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk adequately take into account the future 
need to increase the production of food for the growing world population? Is there a 
risk that Food Sovereignty policies will favour producers who are less ‘efficient’ in 
conventional economic terms? From the perspective of a Food Sovereignty framework 
seeking to guarantee the right to food, protect natural resources, maintain social peace 
and achieve democratic control of food and rural issues through agro-ecological 
methods is a huge task, and whether it can successfully replace the food security 
model remains to be seen. 
Thus the question remains as to whether the more radical dimensions of Food 
Sovereignty can be integrated into the mainstream framework of food policies. This 
thesis does not seek to answer this question but to open up a context for what could be 
an evolving dialogue. It has been the underlying hermeneutic of this study that the 
emergence of Food Sovereignty into the landscape of food issues would not be one of 
dominance but as another perspective would bring a more creative and fresh approach. 
I would want to affirm that the diversity of approaches that we have looked at, have 
been prone to failure, not so much because of the intention and context of their goals 
per se, but rather in terms of a dimension that was missing. It has been argued here 
that that dimension is the alternative framework of Food Sovereignty. 
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Summary of Via Campesina’s ‘Seven Principles to Achieve Food Sovereignty’ 
 
1. Food: A Basic Human Right – Everyone must have access to safe, nutritious 
and culturally appropriate food in sufficient quantity and quality to sustain a 
healthy life with full human dignity. Each nation should declare that access to 
food is a constitutional right and guarantee the development of the primary 
sector to ensure the concrete realization of this fundamental right. 
2. Agrarian Reform – A genuine agrarian reform is necessary which gives 
landless and farming people – especially women – ownership and control of 
the land they work and returns territories to indigenous peoples. The right to 
land must be free of discrimination on the basis of gender, religion, race, social 
class or ideology; the land belongs to those who work it. 
3. Protecting Natural Resources – Food Sovereignty entails the sustainable care 
and use of natural resources, especially land, water, and seeds and livestock 
breeds. The people who work the land must have the right to practice 
sustainable management of natural resources and to conserve biodiversity free 
of restrictive intellectual property rights. This can only be done from a sound 
economic basis with security of tenure, healthy soils and reduced use of agro-
chemicals. 
4. Reorganizing Food Trade – Food is first and foremost a source of nutrition and 
only secondarily an item of trade. National agricultural policies must prioritize 
production for domestic consumption and food self-sufficiency. Food imports 
must not displace local production nor depress prices. 
5. Ending the Globalization of Hunger – Food Sovereignty is undermined by 
multilateral institutions and by speculative capital. The growing control of 
multinational corporations over agricultural policies has been facilitated by the 
economic policies of multilateral organizations such as the WTO, World Bank 
and the IMF. Regulation and taxation of speculative capital and a strictly 
enforced Code of Conduct for TNCs is therefore needed. 
6. Social Peace – Everyone has the right to be free from violence. Food must not 
be used as a weapon. Increasing levels of poverty and marginalization in the 
countryside, along with the growing oppression of ethnic minorities and 
indigenous populations, aggravate situations of injustice and hopelessness. The 
ongoing displacement, forced urbanization, repression and increasing 
incidence of racism of smallholder farmers cannot be tolerated. 
7. Democratic control – Smallholder farmers must have direct input into 
formulating agricultural policies at all levels. The United Nations and related 
organizations will have to undergo a process of democratization to enable this 
to become a reality. Everyone has the right to honest, accurate information and 
open and democratic decision-making. These rights form the basis of good 
governance, accountability and equal participation in economic, political and 
social life, free from all forms of discrimination. Rural women, in particular, 
must be granted direct and active decision-making on food and rural issues. 
 
Michelle Springfield   Appendices 
 Page 263 
 
Appendix 4 
Chronology of the Emergence of the Food Sovereignty Framework 
Date  Publication/Statement/Declaration  Authors/Location  
199
6  
'Food Sovereignty: A Future Without Hunger' Via Campesina  
199
6  








'Final Declaration of the World Forum on Food Sovereignty'  Havana, Cuba  
200
1  
'Priority to Peoples' Food Sovereignty'  Via Campesina  
200
1  
'Sale of the Century? Peoples Food Sovereignty. Part 1 – the 
Implications of Trade Negotiations'  
Friends of the Earth International  
200
1  
'Sale of the Century? Peoples Food Sovereignty. Part 2 – a 
New Multilateral Framework for Food and Agriculture'  
Friends of the Earth International  
200
1  
'Food Sovereignty in the Era of Trade Liberalisation: Are 
Multilateral Means Feasible?'  
Steve Suppan, Institute for 
Agriculture and Trade Policy  
200
2  
'Food Sovereignty: A Right for All. Political Statement of the 
NGO/CSO Forum for Food Sovereignty'  
Rome, Italy  
200
2  
'Statement on People's Food Sovereignty: Our World is Not 
for Sale.'  
Cancun, Mexico  
200
2  
'Sustaining Agricultual Biodiversity and the Integrity and Free 
Flow of Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture'  
ITDG/GRAIN/ETC Group  
200
3  
'What is Food Sovereignty?'  Via Campesina  
200
3  
'Towards Food Sovereignty: Constructing and Alternative to 
the WTO's AoA'  
Geneva, Switzerland  
200
3  
'Trade and People's Food Sovereignty'  Friends of the Earth  
200
3  
'How TRIPS Threatens Biodiversity and Food Sovereignty'  Hyderabad, India  
200
3  
'Statement on People's Food Sovereignty: Our World is Not 
for Sale.'  
Cancun, Mexico  
200
5  
'Food Sovereignty: Towards Democracy in Localised Food 
Systems  
Michael Windfuhr and Jennie 
Jonsén, FIAN International  
200
6  
'Agrarian Reform and Food Sovereignty: Alternative Model 
for the Rural World'  
Peter Rosset, 
Univ California at Berkeley / 
Globalalternatives  
(adapted from Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005: 47-48) 
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Appendix 5 
The millennium development goals (MDGs) are eight goals to be achieved by the year 
2015 aimed at addressing what are considered to be the world’s main development 
challenges. These goals are a result of the plans and targets identified in the 
Millennium Declaration that was adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of 
state and governments during the UN Millennium summit in September 2000. The 
eight goals break down in to eighteen quantifiable targets that are measured by forty-
eight indicators.466 The eight goals are as follows. 
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. (Halve by 2015 the proportion of 
people whose income is less than $1 a day. Halve the proportion of people 
who suffer from hunger.) 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women. 
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development. 
The overriding aim of the MDGs is to reconcile and synthesise many of the most 
important commitments that were made at separate international conferences and 
summits during the 1990s. Its authors explicitly recognise the interdependence 
between poverty reduction, growth and long term sustainable development. 
Furthermore, emphasis is now also on the concept that development (in a Western 
liberal context) is dependent on democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and security. In order to achieve the eight goals, the framers aim to bring 
together the responsibilities of developing countries with those of the developed 
countries, and utilise the wealth, new technologies and the global awareness with 
which we entered the twenty-first century. 
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